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ABSTRACT 
This thesis makes an historical and contemporaneous analysis of patenting of 
methods of medical treatment of human beings in Australia and other 
common law jurisdictions that derived their origin from the UK law. The issue 
of patenting of methods of medical treatment has never been an easy 
question to discuss for it raises public policy considerations surrounding this 
area. The main difficulty derives from the conflict between the intellectual 
property and practice of medicine. There is a public policy concern that in 
order to ensure the best possible health treatment, physicians must always be 
free in their choice of treatment. Since a patent may restrict this freedom, 
many countries around the globe prohibit methods of medical treatment from 
being granted patent protection. Yet, Australian courts decided to depart from 
those exclusions. 
This thesis examines how courts deal with express exclusions of patents for 
method of medical treatment and how such exclusions can be avoided by 
creative drafting of patent specifications. It will also examine the approach 
taken in Australia where there are no express exclusions. It first provides the 
descriptive background of the case law in UK, Member States of the 
European Patent Convention, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, US and Australia 
in order to make a comparative analysis of the approaches adopted in these 
countries in dealing with the issue, and in order to establish the framework 
around which the doctrinal issues can be analysed. 
Against this background an examination of the origins of the patent law is 
necessary in order to fully assess the interpretation of patent legislation by 
courts and consequences of such interpretation for medical profession. The 
thesis investigates the pre-enacting history of the 1624 Statute of Monopolies 
in order to analyse whether patenting of methods of medical treatment of 
human beings is 'generally inconvenient' within the meaning of the proviso to 
s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, which in turn, form a part of s 18 (1) of the 
Patents Act 1990 (Cth). 
The analysis of early patent law cases at the time they were argued and 
decided will lead to the conclusion that the actual original meaning of the term 
'generally inconvenient' has been wrongly interpreted and applied by modern 
courts. The thesis considers the role of the courts in deciding whether 
methods of medical treatment should be granted patent protection and 
whether judges should and/or have ability to make moral or public policy 
judgments in interpreting statutes. 
The thesis explore the consequences of interpretation of 'generally 
inconvenient' as a main public policy objection to granting patents for methods 
of medical treatment. It concludes that it is questionable whether the term 
'generally inconvenient' includes public policy considerations in its scope, and 
though there may be some circumstances where a patent to method of 
medical treatment should be rejected on public policy grounds, 'generally 
inconvenient' does not provide a basis upon which patents to methods of 
medical treatment can be denied. 
The thesis is that such methods should not be expressly excluded from 
patenting. Each method must be treated equally with other inventions and 
examined on its merits, on case by case basis. The tensions associated with 
patents for methods of medical treatment can be resolved within patent 
legislation by making the public policy ground for objection a separate criterion 
for patentability, equally relevant for any invention. Accordingly, the author 
argues that legislative amendments are necessary to rectify the existing 
problem and makes a number of proposals to this effect. The author also 
suggests the involvement of an independent body to make public policy 
decisions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. 	The Problem with Patents for Methods of Medical Treatment 
There has been ongoing and longstanding debate about whether methods of 
medical treatment of the human body should be patentable for almost a century. 
The issue is complicated as it involves two conflicting concepts - intellectual 
property and practice of medicine. Creations of the intellect may be given 
recognition by means of intellectual property rights, including patents. A patent is 
a temporary monopoly granted to the creator in return for disclosure of the 
invention to the public. Patents for industrial and consumer innovation are 
common and generally welcomed in our society.' The patent system is justified 
on the basis that it provides benefit to the inventor and to society as a whole. The 
inventor of a patentable invention benefits by being able to exclude others from 
exploiting the invention for 20 years, 2 and the public benefits because when the 
patent expires, the invention is freely available for others to use. The practice of 
medicine, which is based on the Hippocratic Oath, however, aims to preserve 
human life, disseminate medical knowledge, and deny exploitation of this 
knowledge for the sole benefit of a medical practitioner. 
If a medical practitioner is the creator of the intellectual property that relates to 
medical treatment, can he/she seek a monopoly over the creation of his intellect? 
Will the legal rights associated with the monopoly interfere with the practictioner's 
moral, ethical and professional obligations of proving the best possible health 
treatment and dissemination of medical knowledge and information? These and 
many other ethical and public policy arguments have been raised against 
patenting of methods of medical treatment. The main argument is clear: there is 
a public policy concern that in order to ensure the best possible health treatment, 
doctors must always be free in their choice of treatment. Since patents may 
restrict this freedom, it has been argued that methods of medical treatment 
should be excluded from patent protection. 
The Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1995 3 
mandates the minimum standards of intellectual property protection for all 
I However, it is recognised that patenting of some subject matters is highly controversial in contemporary 
society, particularly genes, higher organisms, software and business methods. 
2 See Art 27 and 33 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Including Trade in 
Counterfeit Goods (1994) 25 IIC 209 (TRIPS); Patents Act 1977 (UK), s25; Patents Act 1990 (Cth), Ss 65 
and 67. 
3 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Including Trade in Counterfeit 
Goods (1994) 25 IIC 209 (TRIPS). 
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countries that are members of the World Trade Organisation. However, by virtue 
of Article 27.2 of this Agreement, member countries are allowed decide for 
themselves whether or not to exclude methods of medical treatment from 
patenting. By the year 2007, approximately 80 countries around the globe had 
made the decision to prohibit methods of medical treatment from being granted 
patent protection. 4 Different countries have taken different approaches in the way 
that they deal with this issue. In the UK, other European countries, for example, 
methods of medical treatment are expressly excluded from patenting. 5 In Canada 
and New Zealand, on the other hand, such methods are prohibited by common 
law.8 In marked contrast with these approaches, in the US methods of medical 
treatment have been considered patentable since 1954. 7 However, by virtue of 
Public Law 104-2088 patents on medical and surgical procedures are 
unenforceable against medical practitioners and related health care entities, 
unless they fall under one of three exceptions provided by the new law. 9 
• Notwithstanding the prohibition of methods of medical treatment in many 
countries, such prohibition can be worked around by skilled patent attorneys in 
drafting a patent application in the form of the Swiss type claims. .o  Since Swiss 
type claims are directed to treatment of a particular disease, the claims provide 
indirect protection of therapeutic methods of medical treatment. Thus, despite 
the express prohibition in European patent law, only methods of treating human 
illness by surgery and/or diagnostic methods are excluded. This practice 
therefore narrows the scope of prohibition to a minimum, and in cases where 
therapeutic methods are involved, makes it meaningless. 
The US approach under the Public Law 104-208 is also problematic. While it 
allows patents to methods of medical treatment, at the same time, it takes away 
their value by making them unenforceable against medical practitioners and 
related health care entities. 
4 The list includes all European countries and countries in Asia, Africa, North America, South America, 
Central America. 
5 Section 4(2) of the Patents Act 1977 (UK) and Art 52(4) of the EPC. 
6 See, eg, Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1999] NZCA 332; Pfizer 
Inc v Commissioner of Patents [2004] NZCA 104; Tennessee Eastman Co v The Commissioner(1972) 33 
DLR (3d) 459; ICI v The Commissioner(1986) 9 CPR (3d) 289; Visx v Nidek (1996) 66 CPR (3d) 178 
(FCTD). 
7 In 1954 the Case Ex parte Scerer 103 USPQ (BNA) 107, overruled Ex parte Brinkerhoff 24 Off.Gaz.Pat 
349 (Comm'r Pat. Off.1883). 
8 Amendment to 35 US Code § 287(c), known as Pubic Law 104-208. 
9 These exceptions are listed by § 616(c)(2)(A)(i-iii) of the 35 US Code. 
10 Swiss—type claims are named after the practice adopted by the Swiss Office of Intellectual Property, 
which allows patents for the use of compounds for therapeutic treatment when worded as follows: 'Use of 
compound X in the manufacture of a medicament for a new therapeutic use' 
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In Australia, methods of medical treatment are not expressly excluded from 
patenting by the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (the 1990 Act). However, it has been 
argued that if such an exclusion were to be accepted by the Australian courts, it 
would be based upon the public policy justification that manufactures should not 
be 'generally inconvenient', located in the proviso to s 6 of the 1624 Statute of 
Monopolies (the Statute of Monopolies), which in turn, forms a part of s 18 (1) 
of the 1990 Act. 11 However, the definition of 'patentable invention' in s 18 (1) 
provides no guidance on the meaning of the term 'generally inconvenient'. 
Accordingly, the issue of interpretation of the term and the question as to whether 
patenting of methods of medical treatment is 'generally inconvenient' has been 
left to the courts to determine. 
Following on from the judicial interpretation of the meaning 'manner of 
manufacture' by the High Court of Australia in the foundational case of National 
Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents, 12 methods of 
medical treatment are now considered to be a 'manner of manufacture' within s 6 
of the Statute of Monopolies. 13 Yet, it is still arguable that such methods could be 
excluded, in reliance on the 'generally inconvenient' exclusion in the proviso to s 
6 of the Statute of Monopolies or by other means. Following Anaesthetic 
Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd" (Rescare) and Bristol—Myers Squibb Co v F H 
Faulding & Co Ltd15 (BMS) methods of medical treatment have been granted 
patent protection in Australia. However, the courts in both cases accepted that 
the general inconvenience proviso could be used to introduce public policy 
considerations in patent examinations in Australia. As a result, the true ambit of 
general inconvenience remains uncertain16 and it is likely that attempts will be 
made to use general inconvenience as the vehicle for introduction of public policy 
considerations in the future, either in respect of methods of medical treatment or 
in relation to other controversial subject matter. 
11 See, eg, Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 41 (Sheppard J); Bristol—Myers 
Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd [2000] FCA 316 (Heerey J); W. Yang 'Patent Policy and Medical 
Procedure Patents: The Case for Statutory Exclusion From Patentability' (1995) 1 Boston University 
Journal of Science and Technology Law 5; P Loughlan 'Of Patents and Patients: New Monopolies in 
Medical Methods' (1995) 5 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 13. 
12 [1959] 102 CLR 252, 271. 
13 Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 611. 
14 (1994) 50 FCR 1. 
15 [2000] FCA 316. 
16 This is because there is no clear High Court authority on the question of whether methods of medical 
treatment patenting is 'generally inconvenient'. 
3 
This brief overview illustrates that the issue of patenting of methods of medical 
treatment of human beings is complicated and depends very much on the 
country, its legislation, the case law and numerous public policy considerations 
surrounding the patentability of such methods. It is also complicated by the way 
the courts deal with this matter. In deciding whether methods of medical 
treatment of human beings should be granted patent protection, the courts seek 
guidance from other jurisdictions worldwide. 
2. 	The Scope of this Thesis 
This thesis aims to explore more broadly the appropriateness of the current law 
relating to patenting of methods of medical treatment in Australia. To make sense 
of the current Australian position, this analysis cannot be undertaken in isolation: 
the historical context of the Australian legislation and case law must be examined 
and a comparative analysis of countries with historical origins in common with 
Australia must also be undertaken. 
The thesis will analyse the legislation and case law in various jurisdictions, and 
the law in Australia regarding patenting of methods of treating human illness by 
surgery, therapy and/or diagnostic methods, drug treatments, as well as 
processes for improving strength and elasticity of human nails and hair. 
Patenting of pharmaceutical substances or surgical equipment that may be used 
in a method of treatment is beyond the scope of this thesis. Neither it is intended 
to provide a full account of specific public policy arguments for and against the 
patenting of methods of medical treatment. 17 Rather, the aim of this thesis is to 
achieve two things. First, this thesis will examine the approaches adopted by the 
various jurisdictions, deficiencies (if any) with their approaches, and, where 
applicable, their mechanisms for exclusion of methods of medical treatment 
inventions from patenting. This examination will demonstrate that notwithstanding 
the express exclusion of therapeutic, surgical and diagnostic methods of medical 
treatment from patenting in many countries, the exclusion, in practice, is 
narrowed down to surgical and some diagnostic methods 18 because courts and 
17 For a general account of the arguments see, eg, Justine Pila, 'Methods of Medical Treatment Within 
Australian and United Kingdom Patents Law' (2001) University of New South Wales Law Journal 30; Joel 
J Garris, 'The Case for Patenting Medical Procedures' (1996) American Journal of Law and Medicine 85, 
90-100; Beata Gocyk-Farber, 'Patenting Medical Procedures: A Search for a Compromise Between Ethics 
and Economics' (1997 Cardozo Law Review 1527. 
18 It could be argued that in relation to therapeutic medical treatments the exclusion is meaningless in the 
same way as the exclusion of computer programmes. See, eg Rolls-Royce Ltd's Application [1963] RPC 
251; British Petroleum Co Ltd ',s Application (1968) 38 AOJP 1020; but since that time attitudes towards 
patenting of computer programs have changed: see, eg IBM Corporation v Smith, Commissioner of Patents 
(1991) 22 IPR 417 and CCOM Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1994) 28 IPR 481. 
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legal practitioners have created an indirect way to obtain patent protection for 
methods of therapeutic and drug treatments. Hence, even though such methods 
are explicitly excluded, the exclusion is very easy to avoid through the wording of 
the patent claims and/or patent specifications. 
Secondly, this thesis will analyse the fundamental historical principles of the 
patent law, and the origin of modem patent to assist in understanding the 
purpose of the Statute of Monopolies itself and its proviso, and actual original 
meaning of the term 'generally inconvenient'. The aim is to reconstruct the legal 
questions raised by early patent law cases at the time they were argued and 
decided and demonstrate that the original meaning of the term 'generally 
inconvenient' has been wrongly interpreted and applied by modern courts. This 
thesis does not question the correctness of the decisions in Rescare or BMS, but 
questions the reasoning behind the application of general inconvenience. This, in 
turn will assist in answering the question of whether or not patenting of methods 
of medical treatment of the human body should be denied patent protection 
based on interpretation of the term 'generally inconvenient' that forms part of s 
18(1) of the 1990 Act. 
The thesis will argue that the term 'generally inconvenient' does not permit 
introduction of public policy considerations in Australian patent law, thus the 
interpretation of the term adopted by the courts does not have a sound historical 
basis. This, however, does not mean that public policy should never be 
considered in deciding patentability. The thesis will argue that public policy 
considerations should only be made where the legislature specifically directs 
them to be made and that should be done by bodies other than judiciary. The 
thesis will end with proposals, the aim of which is to provide practical tools to 
assist the courts, Australian Patent Office or other relevant body in assessing 
inventions relating to methods of medical treatment of human beings. 
The thesis will explore these issues in six chapters by making comparative 
analysis of the common and statutory law of the reviewed countries; inquiring into 
the history and concept of patent law and the rules of statutory interpretation in 
order to construct the framework upon which a comprehensive conclusion is 
made. The thesis can be divided into four main themes: 
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1. Analysis of the key aspects of patent law in respect of patenting of 
methods of medical treatment in UK, Member States of the European 
Patent Convention, Canada, Israel, New Zealand and US (Chapters 1-3). 
2. Analysis of Australian approach to such patenting (Chapter 4); 
3. Enquiry into the meaning of the term 'generally inconvenient' in s 6 of the 
Statute of Monopolies by making a historical review and analysis of the 
origin, purpose and scope of the term, and analysis of the modem 
interpretation of the proviso to s 6 using the general principles of statutory 
interpretation (Chapter 5); and 
4. Proposals (Chapter 6). 
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CHAPTER 1: PATENTABILITY OF METHODS OF MEDICAL TREATMENT IN 
THE UNITED KINGDOM PRIOR TO 1977 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Any discussion of patent law in common law countries must invariably start with 
analysis of UK law, since this is its origin, particularly the Statute of Monopolies 
1624' (the Statute of Monopolies). 
Following federation in 1900, Australia adopted the Patents and Designs Act 1907 
(UK) as its own Patents Act 1907 (Cth). Although there have been two new Acts in 
Australia since that time, the basic principles remain unchanged. For example, the 
Statute of Monopolies continues to be referred to in the current Australia 
legislation, the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). In addition, until the mid 1980s in Australia, 
the English Privy Council was the highest Court of Appeal. For both of these 
reasons, the UK has been highly influential in the development of Australian patent 
law. However, the influence of UK law has been steadily diminishing since the late 
twentieth century. There are two main reasons for this. First, by virtue of the 
Australia Act 1986 (Cth) the avenue of appeal to the Privy Council was removed. 
As a consequence, the Australian High Court has been developing its own distinct 
jurisprudence and the use of English precedents in Australia has become less 
persuasive. Moreover, patent law in the UK was significantly reformed in 1977 to 
align it more closely with the European Patent Convention and the patent 
legislation of other member states. 
The task in this Chapter is to analyse the development in UK law up to the 
enactment of the Patents Act 1977 (UK) (the 1977 Act), to set the scene for 
consideration of the law in other jurisdictions in Chapters 2-3 and Australian law in 
Chapter 4. 
Prior to the 1977 Act there was no statutory prohibition on patenting of methods of 
medical treatment in the UK. The prohibition arose from the cases considered 
either under the Patents Act 1949 (the 1949 Act) or earlier legislation. 
An examination of the case law regarding patenting of medical treatment in the UK 
indicates that such methods were excluded from patentability by the courts since 
1914. The exclusion was based solely on the Patent Office practice that existed 
prior to the well-known decision by the Solicitor-General In the Matter of C & W's 
I 21 Jac. I, c.3, § 6. 
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Application for a Patent2 (C & W's Application). In that case the practice was 
reaffirmed and the basis for the practice clearly set out. 3 
Before considering this and other cases in detail, it is necessary to be familiar with 
the wording of the legislation relating to the patent law. 
1.2 THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS PRIOR TO 1977 
The relevant provisions in relation to patentable subject-matter derive from the 
Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act 1883, s 46; Patents Act 1907, s 93; and the 
1949 Act, s 101. These Acts defined the word 'invention', not by direct explication 
and in the language of its own day, but by reference to the established ambit of s 6 
of the Statute of Monopolies. 4 None of these Acts included a specific exclusion for 
methods of human treatment. It is noteworthy that many countries, including 
Australia, New Zealand and Israel, have patent law provisions that are similarly 
derived from, or incorporate by reference s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. 
Section 101 (1) of the 1949 Act defined Invention' and 'the Statute of Monopolies', 
thus: 
'Invention' means any manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent and 
grant of privilege with section six of the Statute of Monopolies and any new method 
or process of testing applicable to the improvement or control of manufacture; and 
includes and alleged invention. 
'The Statute of Monopolies' means the Act of the twenty-first year of the reign of 
King James the First, chapter three, entitled 'An Act concerning monopolies and 
dispensations with penal laws and the forfeiture thereof'. 
1.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH COMMON LAW PRIOR TO 1977 
This Part discusses the English common law with main aim to show the history and 
development of the view of the UK courts that no patents should be granted to 
methods of medical treatment. It will be evident at the end of this discussion that 
most of decisions regarding such patents in the UK were made in 1970s, the time, 
when a large group of European countries started negotiation of creation the 
2 (1914) 31 RPC 235. 
3 The Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Plantex Ltd [1979] 2 NZLR 591, 619 ( Davison CJ). 
4 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252, 269. 
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European uniform law that aimed to deal with the issue of patenting of medical 
inventions by express prohibition. 
1.3.1 Methods of medical treatment and manner of manufacture in C & W's 
Application5 
The first time a medical procedure patent was considered in the UK was in C & Ws 
Application. The relevant statute in this case was the Patents and Designs Act 
1907 (UK). The definition of invention in s 93 of that Act was essentially in the 
same terms as s 101 of the 1949 Act, extracted above. To be patentable, the 
alleged invention had to constitute a manner of manufacture within the meaning of 
s 93 of the Act, which in its turn referred to the requirement of 'new manufacture' in 
s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. 
C & W applied for a grant of patent in respect of a process for extracting metals 
from living bodies, and particularly for extracting lead from persons suffering from 
lead poisoning. Based on established practice, 6 the Patent Office refused a patent 
on the ground that the alleged invention related simply to medical treatment, and 
therefore was not a manner of manufacture. 
The appeal was heard by the Solicitor-General, Sir Stanley Buckmaster, He first 
examined the meaning of the phrase 'new manufacture' and concluded that it was 
something associated with the manufacture or sale of commercial products. This 
led to the conclusion that an 'invention' within the meaning of the 1907 Act was an 
invention for a manner of new manufacture that was in some way associated with 
commerce and trade. In applying this interpretation to the alleged medical 
treatment invention, the Solicitor-General concluded that the extraction of lead from 
the body of human beings was not 'a process employed in any form of 
manufacture or of trade'. 7 
The Solicitor-General also made a point that an invention 'does not merely mean 
that it must be a product', but 'it may be a ... process that can be used in making 
something that is, or may be, of commercial value'. 8 He concluded that a medical 
treatment process could not fit this description. This was the second ground for the 
decision. 
5 In the Matter of C & W's Application for a Patent (1914) 31 RPC 235. 
6 The Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Plantex Ltd [1979] 2 NZLR 591, 619 (Davison CJ). 
7 In the Matter of C & W's Application for a Patent (1914) 31 RPC 235, 236. 
8 Ibid. 
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The Solicitor-General cited no authorities in support of his exclusion of methods of 
medical treatment from patentability. Rather, the Solicitor General relied on 
established practice of the Patent Office - to refuse applications merely upon the 
ground that the alleged invention related simply to medical treatment, which he 
concluded was sound. Thus, it appears that the only authority of the exclusion of 
patenting of medical inventions was the practice established by the Patent Office. 
However, at no point did Lord Buckmaster attempt to ascertain the purpose of s 6 
or the meaning of the proviso to s 6, particularly the meaning of 'generally 
inconvenient'. Instead, the Solicitor-General did no more than endorse what 
appears to have been represented to him as the Patent Office view (which could 
be erroneous). Nevertheless, since C & W's Application it seems to have been 
accepted as axiomatic in the UK that there can be no patents for medical 
treatment.9 
1.3.2 The 'vendible product' rule and its application in Matter of an 
Application for a Patent by GEC 1° (GEC's Application) and beyond 
1.3.2.1 GEC's Application 
The next significant step in the development of UK patent law leading up to the 
crucial 1970s cases on methods of medical treatment was GEC's Application. In 
this case, decided in 1942, Morton J provided guidance in distinguishing between a 
method or process that is a manner of manufacture from a method or process that 
is not. As the consequence, the word 'manufacture' came to be restricted to a 
vendible products and processes for their production. 
The applicant in GEC's Application claimed patent protection for the 'improvements 
in and connected with fire extinguishing'. 11 Five out of ten claims were allowed by 
the Patent Office. The remaining claims were subsequently amended, but were 
refused by the Patent Office. On appeal, Morton J, as he then was, expressed 
certain principles as to the interpretation of the phrase 'manner of new 
manufacture'. His Honour said: 
In my view a method or process is a manner of manufacture if it (a) results in the 
production of some vendible product or (b) improves or restores to its former 
9 The same manner of new manufacture test has been applied in a number of English cases that followed after 
C & W's Application, including Re BA's Application (1915) 32 RPC 348 and Sharp and Dohme Inc v Boots 
Pure Drug Company Ltd (1928) 45 RPC 153. 
I° (1942) 60 RPC 1. 
II Ibid. 
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condition a vendible product or (c) has the effect of preserving from deterioration 
some vendible product to which it is applied. 12 
In this statement the interpretation of the word 'manufacture' is restricted to a 
'vendible product' resulting from the three kinds of activity: a production, an 
improvement or restoration and preservation from deterioration. 
1.3.2.2 Henry Bamato Rantzen's Application (Rantzen's Application) 13 
The test laid down by Morton J was given an expansive interpretation in the case 
of Rantzen's Application illustrates how the scope of the vendible product test 
could be given an expansive application. In this case an application for a patent 
was made for a method of transmitting electrical energy in a particular form either 
by wireless or over wires. The Patent Office refused to grant a patent on the basis 
that since the alleged invention was not within the rule which was stated by Morton 
J in GEC's Application, it was not a 'manner of new manufacture'. 14 
On appeal, Evershed J decided the matter in a manner favourable to the inventor. 
It appears that his Honour had some initial difficulty in applying the vendible 
product test to the alleged method of transmitting electrical energy. His Honour 
said: 
I find it, therefore, difficult to apply to electricity the characteristics of 'vendible 
product', if by that phrase is meant something which can be passed from one man 
to another upon a transaction of purchase or sale. 15 
Evershed J went on to refer to the definition in the Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary of the word 'product', which included 'that which is produced by any 
action, operation or work'. His Honour stated that it would not be right to give to the 
term 'vendible product' a narrow construction by placing undue emphasis on the 
material requirements, 16 and concluded: 
in the light of present knowledge that electricity or electric oscillation is an entity 
which, however lacking in material content, can without any violence of language 
be said to be generated and its characteristics controller... and further to be 
12 Ibid, 4. 
13 (1947) 64 RPC 63. 
14 Barnato Rantzen's Application (1947) 64 RPC 63. 
15 Ibid, 66 (Emphasis added). 
16 Ibid. 
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transmitted and received. Nor,... can it be said that the notion of electricity as a 
product which is paid for, is... wholly inappropriate and insensible. 
I have therefore come to the conclusion that the appeal should be allowed; that is 
to say, I do not think that the right of the Applicant to proceed to a grant ought to be 
altogether barred on the ground that the electric oscillations.., are not 'vendible 
products', and, on that account, not the subject of any manner of manufacture. 
Rantzen's Application is a valuable example of how the courts were prepared, in 
some cases, to apply an expansive interpretation of the vendible product test. It 
shows the necessity of looking at manufacture as a general concept found in the 
Statute of Monopolies. On the facts, the method was held to be a manufacture by 
interpreting the vendible product requirement in a sense wide enough to include 
electrical energy, despite its non-material character. 17 
It could be argued that the English tribunals could have taken this expansive 
approach to the interpretation of the vendible product requirement for all types of 
patent applications. However, it seems that there was a marked reluctance to do 
so in some areas. The tribunals remained particularly reluctant to extend patent 
protection to cover methods of treatment of plants, animals and humans, as can be 
seen in the following example. 
1.3.2.3 Canterbury Agricultural College's Application 18 
In this case, the applicant's specification was concerned with mixtures to be 
administered to sheep to improve the wool yield. The Superintending Examiner, Mr 
Taylor, refused the application, based upon the long established Patent Office 
practice relating to the treatment of human beings and animals and the decision in 
the C & W's Application. Though the interpretation of manufacture was not 
expressly considered in this case, clearly, the Superintending Examiner had the 
vendible product test in mind when he said: 
If a claim covers the treatment of an animal in association with a process of 
working up the immediate product of the treatment, which working-up process is 
novel and leads unquestionably to a vendible product, the claim is properly 
allowable. 19 
" National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patent (1959) 102 CLR 252, 272. 
18 (1958) 75 RPC 85. 
19 Ibid, 87. 
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However, he did not see the proposed process as a 'vendible product' and refused 
the application. 
It must be noted that the Patent Office attitude towards patenting of methods of 
animal treatment was only a practice, not a rule of law, and that Mr Taylor was not 
bound by it. Although the Solicitor-General in C & W's Application had denied a 
patent for process for the purposes of removing lead from humans, it appears that 
the situation would have been different if the application had involved the removal 
of lead from animals, in order to make them more marketable products. His 
Lordship emphasized that: 
I repeat, if the applicant desires to apply for something applicable to merchantable 
articles like sheep and cows, that may be the subject of different considerations. 2° 
Based on Lord Buckmaster's dictum, it was open to Mr Taylor in Canterbuty 
Agricultural College's Application to find that the alleged inventive process was not 
outside the meaning of vendible product. The improvements to the wool yield 
would clearly make the sheep a more marketable product. 
1.3.3 First doubts regarding the correctness of the vendible product rule in 
Swift& Co's Application21 
Following the decision in the GEC's Application, the vendible product test 
continued to be applied on multiple occasions, for more than 20 years. Justice 
Morton's stated intention was to restrict the application of this test to the particular 
case, not to make an exhaustive rule. But effectively this is what it became. 
Rantzen's Application illustrates that the vendible product requirement could be 
interpreted expansively, where necessary. However, more generally it was given a 
literal interpretation. In particular, methods of medical treatment were considered 
by the Patent Office as unpatentable, for they did not lead to the manufacture of a 
'vendible product' of commercial value. However, with the passage of time, doubt 
was expressed as to the soundness of this rigid construction. The vendible product 
test became the subject of extensive criticism. 22 
In 1959, the Australian High Court in National Research Development Corporation 
v Commissioner of Patents (NRDC) took the opportunity to move beyond the 
restrictions of the vendible product test. The High Court redefined the question 
more widely as '[i]s this a proper subject of letters patent according to the principles 
20 Ibid. 
21 Swift & Co's Application [1961] RPC 129. 
22 Samuel Reitzman v Grahame-Chapman and Derustit Ltd (1950) 68 RPC 25, 32; National Research 
Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patent (1959) 102 CLR 252. 
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which have developed for the application of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies?' 23 In 
the following year, the Supreme Court of New Zealand adopted the NRDC test in 
Swift & Co v Commissioner of Patents. 24 
The first decision where doubt was expressed about the vendible product test in 
the UK was Swift's & Co's Application25 (Swift). The alleged invention in this case 
related to a new method of tenderizing meat products through enzymatic action. 
The tenderizing effect of certain enzymes on meat was well known, as was the 
injection of such enzymes into animal carcasses to make the meat more tender. In 
the known method, a pump was used to inject the enzyme into vascular system of 
the dead animal. However, this resulted in non-uniform distribution of the enzyme 
and non-uniform tenderization. 
The applicant invented a new method of distributing the enzyme, utilizing the 
pumping action of the animal's heart while the animal was alive. This new method 
overcame existing difficulties associated with the known method. The issue was 
whether the new process was a manner of manufacture within the statutory 
meaning of that expression. 26 
When the application came before the Patent Appeal Tribunal in England, Lloyd-
Jacob J declined to follow the decision of Barrowclough CJ in the Supreme Court 
of New Zealand Swift & Co v Commissioner of Patents relating to the same 
invention.27 In that case, Barrowclough CJ held that the fact that an alleged 
process is a biological or physiological invention is no bar to the grant of a patent, 
and if the process results in an improved vendible product it is a manner of 
manufacture and available for patenting. In delivering his judgment Barrowclough 
CJ followed the High Court of Australia in NRDC. In the English decision. Lloyd-
Jacob J concluded that: 
...the decision under appeal that this application does not qualify for patent 
protection as a manner of manufacture was, in my opinion, justified, and must be 
endorsed 28 
23 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252, 269. 
24 [1960] NZLR 775. 
25 Swift & Co's Application [1961] RPC 129. 
26 SW ifi & Co v Commissioner of Patents [1960] NZLR 775. This decision will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3. 
27 [1960] NZLR 775. 
28 Swift & Co's Application [1961] RPC 129, 134. 
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On an application to the Divisional Court of Queen's Bench for a writ of certiorari to 
quash the decision of the Patents Appeal Tribuna1, 29the Divisional Court did not 
directly address the question of whether a method of tenderizing meat was a 
method of new manufacture. It decided the application on a preliminary basis, and 
held that a patent application should not be refused in the first instance unless 
there existed no reasonable view that the application was within the ambit of the 
1949 Act. 
After considering the Australian and New Zealand decisions, the court concluded 
that on the facts, the application before the court was not within the ambit of the 
1949 Act, and therefore, the decision on the Appeal Tribunal was wrong in law. 3° 
Furthermore, the court discussed the desirability of having a homogeneous 
development of the law in all countries that had adopted the UK system of patent 
regulation. Parker CJ, in delivering the leading judgment, said: 
That desirability must result in a tendency of our Court to follow those decisions if it 
possible to do so. Accordingly, I have come to the conclusion that approached in 
that way there is an error of law on the face of the record. 31 
Thus, without explicitly overruling the vendible product requirement and the narrow 
approach to the manner of new manufacture introduced by Morton J, the decision 
in Swift expressed doubt as to the correctness of this rigid construction, though 
NRDC was not followed directly. The case clearly paved the way for future change. 
As the years passed, pressure came to be exerted on the Patent Office to grant 
patents for methods concerned with medical treatment of humans. 
1.3.4 One stage further in the frontier of patentability: United States Rubber 
Company's Application32 
The patent application at issue in United States Rubber Company's Application 
concerned a process of treating malignant tumour cells by maleuric acid together 
with a pharmaceutical carrier. The application covered treatment of both animals 
and human beings. The Superintending Examiner, Mr Taylor, rejected the 
application but agreed to the filing of an amended specification in which the 
treatment was to be confined to animals. 33 
29 [1962] RPC 37. 
30 Ibid, 47. 
31 Ibid, 47. 
32 [1964] RPC 104. 
33 United States Rubber Company's Application [1964] RPC 104, 107. 
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During the course of his decision, Mr Taylor considered the applicability of the 
Australian NRDC34 and the New Zealand Swift cases, 35 and said: 
Neither the Australian NRDC application nor the New Zealand Swift application 
was concerned with medical treatment, and the references to such in the two 
judgments are few. However, in the former there is a reference to the need for the 
qualification of a remark made in a very old judgment 'even if only to put aside a 
process for treating diseases of the human body: [1961] RPC 142; and at page 
145 there is an aside The exclusion of methods of surge!), and other processes of 
treating the human body may well lie outside the concept of invention because the 
whole subject is conceived essentially as non-economic: see Maeder v Busch 
(1938) 59 CLR 684 at page 706.' I consider, having regard to these remarks, that it 
would unreasonable to think of a method of medical treatment of human body as 
an invention within the meaning of s 101 of the Act. 36 
From the above statement, one can easily see that, while quoting from the 
Australian judgment the words 'even if only to put aside a process for treating 
diseases of the human body', Mr Taylor omitted from the quotation the words 'as 
they apparently must be put aside'. It could be argued that he did not fully 
appreciate the doubt inherent in these words. 37 
Further, in considering the New Zealand Swift case, 35 Mr Taylor went on to say: 
...I would not now be prepared to say, having regard to the facts of the New 
Zealand Court judgment, that there could be no reasonable doubt that the 
treatment of an animal for stimulating or altering a product of its metabolism such 
as milk or wool was not a manufacture. 39 
From this statement, it appears that Mr Taylor, after considering the New Zealand 
case, changed his attitude towards patentability of treatments of animals, recalling 
that in the Canterbury Agricultural College) case he decided that the process for 
administration of mixtures to sheep to improve wool yield was not a manner of 
manufacture. 
34 National Research Development Corporation 
35 Swift & Co v Commissioner of Patents [1961] 
36 United States Rubber Company's Application 
37 The Wellcome Foundation Ltd. v Plantex Ltd. 
38 Swift & Co v Commissioner of Patents [1961] 
39 United States Rubber Company's Application 
40 (1958) 75 RPC 85. 
v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252. 
RPC 147. 
[1964] RPC 104, 105 (Emphasis added). 
and other [1974] RPC 514, 529 (Witkon J). 
RPC 147. 
[1964] RPC 104, 106. 
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Mr Taylor admitted that the earlier decision was based solely on the practice of the 
Patent Office, but in view of the Australian and New Zealand decisions he gave 
new significance to the remark of the Solicitor-General in C & Ws Application, 
where he said that a process which makes animals a better marketable product is 
subject to different considerations. Thus, he clearly distinguished the above 
process from the process concerned with medical treatment of humans.'" 
Mr Taylor also distinguished between the tenderized meat product of the New 
Zealand Swift process and medical treatment of a living animal. However, he 
concluded, after reference to Swift, that he was unable to say of the medical 
treatment of animals that on no reasonable view could it be said to be an invention 
within the meaning of s 101 of the 1949 Act. 42 Consequently, he agreed to the filing 
of an amended specification in which the treatment was to be confined to animals. 
It is interesting to note that, although Mr Taylor made reference to C & W's 
Application and to NRDC, he did not consider the effect of the NRDC decision 
upon the grounds for refusal given in the C & W's Application. Moreover, the 
development in the law was not into account in evaluating C & W's Application. 43 
Thus, it can be suggested that United States Rubber did not establish any clear 
ground for refusing a patent for medical treatment. The decision, rather, advanced 
the frontier of patentability one stage further. This is because the Examiner allowed 
an application for an invention providing for medical treatment to proceed to a grant 
if the complete specification deleted reference to treatment of humans, and was 
therefore applicable solely to animals. 
1.3.5 Release from the restrictions of the vendible product test by English 
courts: Schering AG's Application" (Schering). 
Another seven years passed before the easing of the restrictions of the vendible 
product test was accepted in England, in Schering. 45 As Witkin J stated in 
Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Plantex Ltd,'" the importance of the judgment in this 
case lies more in the reasons rather than in the final result. The result in Schering 
was that the Patents Appeals Tribunal allowed a patent application for a method of 
contraception to proceed upon the grounds that, although patents for medical 
41 (1914) 31 RPC 235, 236. 
42 United States Rubber Company's Application [1964] RPC 104, 106. 
43 Wellcome Foundation's (Hitchings's) Application (New Zealand) [1979] 2 NZLR 591, 618. 
44 [1971] 3 All ER 177. 
45 Ibid. 
46 [1974] RPC 514, 531. 
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treatment in the strict sense of curing or preventing disease had to be excluded 
under the 1949 Act, the claimed method of contraception did not appear to fall 
within that prohibition. The reasons of the Patents Appeal Tribunal are important 
because in stating them the court considered the main question of whether the 
exclusion of methods of medical treatment from patentability had a firm basis. 
At the first instance, the Superintending Examiner rejected the application as he 
considered it to be a method of treatment of the human body. On appeal, Whitford 
J of the Patents Appeal Tribunal stated that neither the 1949 Act nor the preceding 
legislation provided that a process for the treatment of human beings was regarded 
as incapable of patent protection. Whitford J confirmed that the refusal had been 
based solely on the Patent Office practice that such process has never qualified as 
a manner of new manufacture within s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. Based on 
that practice, for more than 50 years, inventions in the field of contraception had 
been denied the royal prerogative of granting monopoly. 
The court made it clear that it was no longer bound by the restrictive concept of 
invention adopted by earlier case law and said: 
It may be thought surprising that the definition of 'invention' in 1971 should be 
based on words in a statute in 1623, but the policy of the courts has always been to 
avoid putting too precise an interpretation of the word 'manufacture' and some 
observations in the judgment of the High Court of Australia in National Research 
Development Corporation's Application (1961) RPC 134 at 142 are as apposite to 
the development of the law in this country as they are to the development of the 
law in Australia. 47 
Whitford J then went on to state: 
Thought the test of 'vendible product' may often be a useful test, it has long been 
accepted that it is not a conclusive test which must be passed if a patent is to 
result. 48 
Further, Whitford J repeated that today it is recognized that the vendible product 
test, though sometimes useful, is not conclusive. ° Notwithstanding that the alleged 
invention did not satisfy the vendible product test, the court acknowledged that a 
47 Schering AG's Application [1971] RPC 337, 340. 
48 Ibid, 341. 
49 Ibid, 344. 
18 
process involving a chemical treatment was an invention. 50 The court also 
recognised the role of the patent system in encouraging the development of new 
pharmaceutical inventions, stating that: 
It is plainly arguable on ethical grounds that there should be no patent protection 
on the medical field at all. In this country, however, it has long been recognized that 
persons producing new pharmaceutical substances or curative devices can secure 
patent protection for them. Any unwarrantable exploitation in the medical field is 
supposed to be guarded against by the compulsory licence provisions of s 41 of 
the Patents Act 1949... 51 
Clearly then, the court recognized that costly research on an ever-increasing scale 
might be necessary in the field of medical treatment. However, the court expressed 
the opinion that it was for legislature to review the question whether the methods of 
medical treatment should be patentable, remarking that: 
it may well be desirable that the legislature should review the question whether 
applications for patents for medical treatments generally or to some less, and, if so, 
to what, extent should be permitted. An opportunity to do this will arise in the near 
future if and when the Banks Committee report is implemented. 52 
In considering the terms of the 1949 Act, the court felt compelled to accept the 
practice of the Patent Office as good law, stating that claims to methods of medical 
treatment must be considered as being excluded from the scope of the Act. 
However, the court was not persuaded that it necessarily followed that claims to a 
method of contraception should be rejected. As the emphasis had been upon the 
element of 'treatment of a disease', the court took the view that treatment for the 
prevention of pregnancy was outside the area of therapeutic treatment of the 
human body, since it could not be regarded as a 'medical' treatment or a treatment 
to cure or prevent disease. Thus, Whitford J in Schering accepted a narrow 
interpretation of the meaning of 'medical treatment', and allowed a patent 
application for a method of contraception. 
The decision in Schering has significance. Firstly, the court distinguished in kind a 
non-patentable process for treating the diseases of the human body from a 
patentable contraceptive process. In rejecting any general exclusion for processes 
5° Ibid. 
51 Ibid, 340. 
52 Ibid, 344. 
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of medical treatment, the court applied the principle enunciated by the High Court 
of Australia in NRDC. 53 The process was in the field of the 'useful arts' (as opposed 
to the 'fine arts'), it was of commercial value because it would produce a result that 
people would be prepared to pay for, and in the present state of public opinion, the 
result was considered desirable. As a consequence, therefore, the court 
considered the method of contraception as a patentable invention. 
Secondly, in interpreting the word 'manufacture', Whitford J did not apply a rigid 
statutory formula, but followed NRDC in making an inquiry into the scope of the 
subject matter of letters patent protected by the s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. 
Thus, Schering was the first judgment in the UK where the court accepted the 
broad construction of manner of manufacture first formulated by the High Court of 
Australia in NRDC. However, this change in approach did not release methods of 
medical treatment from the restriction against their patentability. 
1.3.6 Applications of the Schering case 
1.3.6.1 Calmic Engineering Co Ltd's Application 54(Calmic Engineering) 
In 1972 another unsuccessful attempt was made to patent a method of treatment 
for the human body. In Calmic Engineering55 the patent application in issue 
concerned a new method of purifying blood using an apparatus for removing toxic 
substances from the blood. The Superintending Examiner, Mr Mirams, refused to 
allow the claim as it did not relate to an invention as defined in s 101 of the 1949 
Act. Although the claim was concerned simply with purification of the blood and did 
not mention the treatment of a patient, the interpretation of patent specification led 
to the conclusion that it was indeed a method of treatment claim. 
In his reasons for the decision, Mr Mirams admitted that it appeared 'somewhat 
illogical' to allow claims to an apparatus and at the same time disallow claims to 
the normal use of that apparatus. 56 However, he did not give any logical 
explanation for such an approach. 
On appeal to the Patent Appeals Tribunal, Graham J, in a very short judgment, 
held that the claim was broad enough to cover the process when 'it is being carried 
out by a doctor or hospital as applied to a patient suffering from a kidney 
53 See National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252, 269, 
which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, Parts 4.4.2 and 4.5.1.2. 
54 [1973] RPC 684. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid, 685. 
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disease'.57 Therefore it was clearly a method of medical treatment, and thus 
unpatentable. Graham J said: 
[It] was quite clear to the hearing officer also as it seems to me from his decision. 
He came to his conclusions on the basis that the claim was for a method of medical 
treatment as patents have not been allowed to cover up to the present date. 
Whitford J and I in the Schering case made it clear that in our view patents as the 
present time should not be granted for such a medical treatment. 58 
1.3.6.2 Dow Corning Corporation (Bennett's) Applications 59 
In this case the applicant discovered that certain fluoroalkylsilicon compounds were 
capable of effecting an alteration in the androgenic capacity of male mammals 
when administered in any pharmacologically acceptable manner. The claimed 
invention related to a package containing a well-known substance (which therefore 
was not a manner of new manufacture), together with the instructions of such 
administration. 
The appeal case was heard by Whitford J again, who held that the only basis upon 
which it could be suggested that there was some disclosure of a manner of 
manufacture, was the instructions of administration of the compound. However, the 
instructions were viewed as a claim to a process, which covered the treatment of 
humans, and so was not patentable. Whitford J noted that in the case of Schering 
he had made certain observations as to the illogical position that exists under 
which it is possible to secure patent protection for new drugs which are going to be 
used in treatment but not possible to secure patent protection for methods of 
treatment as such. 6° However, his Honour was unprepared to discuss this any 
further, concluding that: 
In truth, what the applicants would like to do is to secure protection which is 
effectively going to give them a monopoly which must, as I see it, have this affect, 
that it will give them a monopoly in relation to medical treatment of human beings. 
For the application it was said, quite frankly, that the importance if this in the field of 
treatment of human beings is that the substances can be used to treat certain 
diseases. 61 
57 Ibid, 687. 
58 Ibid, 687. 
59 [1974] RPC 235. 
60 Ibid, 238. 
61 Ibid, 238. 
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Thus the instructions for administering the compound were viewed as a claim to a 
process of medical treatment, therefore, not the proper subject matter of patent. 
This view is somewhat incongruous. The instruction itself cannot be a treatment. 
The drugs, on the other .hand, are more likely to be a treatment than instructions. 
Indeed, in most cases, drugs are exclusively used for and will result in a treatment 
of disease, and yet they are considered a patentable subject mater. If the final 
result of the administration of the substance determines its patentability, then the 
instructions to the treatment, the drugs and treatment must equally enjoy a patent 
protection as they produce the same result: a changed condition in the human 
body. 
1.3.7 The first applications of the proviso to s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 
by the English courts: Eli Lilly & Company's Application 62(Eli Lilly) 
In 1974 yet another unsuccessful application was made to patent a method of 
medical treatment of humans in Eli Lilly. In this case, the court, for the first time, 
based the exclusion on the basis of the public policy proviso to s6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies. 
The applicant discovered that certain chemical compounds, which were known per 
se, had unsuspected anti-inflammatory properties that could be used with 
beneficial effect in the symptomatic treatment of various inflammatory conditions in 
humans and animals. 
The Patents Appeal Tribunal, constituted by Graham and Whitford JJ, held that 
since the chemical compounds were not new, the only possible claim was to a 
novel manner of use. However, since the novel manner of use was treating 
disease in humans, it was therefore not patentable. The court stated that 
regardless of other changes in the law, 63 the restrictions on medical treatment 
patents still applied. Thus, the refusal by the court to allow patent protection 
appears to have been based not upon the argument that the application did not 
involve a method of manufacture, but on the basis that such a method of 
manufacture was not patentable in respect of medical treatment of humans. 
The court confirmed that the law at the present time stood, so that no patent could 
be granted for a new use that sought to be claimed as a cure or disease prevention 
in human beings. Schering was cited as authority on this point. Although the court 
62 [1975] RPC 438. 
63 For example, a change in the concept of 'manner of manufacture' to meet the needs of the modem age, 
formulated by the Australian High Court in NRDC. 
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regarded the prohibition as 'technically anomalous and therefore illogical , 64 it went 
on to explain the legal justification for such illogical refusals of medical treatment 
patents, stating that 'the reasons for such an exclusion appear to us to be based in 
ethics rather than logic...'. 65 
The court reached this conclusion after a discussion of the proviso to s 6 of the 
Statute of Monopolies, which declared the invention void if it was 'contrary to the 
law or mischievous to the State by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of 
trade, or generally inconvenient.' Graham and Whitford JJ admitted that the 
'generally inconvenient' exception had never previously been used as the basis for 
refusing medical treatment applications. But they concluded that the proviso at the 
end of s 6 '[could] no more be ignored', and in every case where the issue of 
patentability arises, it has to refer to s 6 to answer the question, formulated by the 
High Court of Australia in NRDC as to whether 'this then a proper subject of letters 
patent according to the principles which have been developed for the application of 
s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies?' 
Therefore, for the first time the court justified the soundness of its refusal to allow • 
patenting of medical treatment by reference to public policy66 . Though Graham and 
Whitford JJ adhered to public policy, the court made clear that it did so with respect 
for the legislative process: if there is to be a change of policy, which would 
appear to us to be sensible, this ought in our view to be effected by legislation 
rather than by interpretation'. 67 
64 [1975] RPC 438, 444. 
65 Ibid, 445. 
66 The question about the relation between ethics and public policy has a long tradition in Western 
philosophy. It dates back to classic Aristotlean philosophy and continues to be debated in modem traditions 
such as Hobbes and Kant. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to deal with the difference between ethics and 
public policy. Nor it is the purpose to analyse the relation between these two concepts. Rather, it is sufficient 
to say that ethics has become an integral part of the political, legal, and the social life. Compared to the 
limited Aristotelian conception of ethics and public policy, in modem democracies ethics extends into such 
contexts as the parliament, law, academia and media. Indeed, when considering patenting of methods of 
medical treatment courts often use terms 'ethics', 'morality', and/ or 'public policy' without any apparent 
intention to make any clear distinction in their meanings (see, eg Eli Lilly &Company's Application [1975] 
RPC 438; Anaesthetic Supplies Ply Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 1; Joos v Commissioner of Patents 
(1972) 126 CLR 611). The most recent decisions suggest that the courts tent to refer to 'public policy' as a 
concept that embraces both ethics and/or morality (see, eg Bristol — Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co 
Ltd [2000] FCA 316). For the above reasons this thesis deals with ethics, morality, and/ or public policy by 




This Chapter has revealed a consistent pattern of exclusion of methods of medical 
treatment in the UK case law, from C & Ws Application in 1914 onwards. However, 
the rationale for the exclusion has changed over time in parallel with the changes 
to the interpretation of the manner of manufacture requirement. The position of the 
UK case law immediately prior to the 1977 Act on the issue of patentability of 
medical treatment could be summarised as follows: 
1. Methods of medical treatment did not come within the definition of 'invention' as 
meaning 'any manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent and 
grant of privilege within s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies.' 
2. There was no actual judicial authority in the UK, which had stated that such 
methods were patentable. 
3. A non-patentable process for treating the diseases of the human body was 
distinguishable in kind from a patentable contraceptive process. The latter 
process was considered to be in the field of the 'useful arts' and former of the 
fine arts'.68 
4. Since the foundation in the C & W's Application has been removed by 
subsequent decisions in NRDC, Swift and Schering, English courts started 
searching for alternative basis for refusal of granting patents for methods of 
medical treatment. The basis was found in the proviso to s 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies which provides that the monopolies shall not be 'generally 
inconvenient'. Eli Lilly is the first decision whether the proviso to s 6 of the 
Statute of Monopolies was ever considered by the courts. The public policy 
argument from the proviso to s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies was found to be a 
new basis for the refusal of the invention in question and paved the way for 
future refusals. 
It is interesting to note that most of the decisions heard in 1970s were decided by 
the same judge of the Patents Appeal Tribunal, Whitford J. 69 From this fact, one 
could suggest that the exclusion of such methods was substantially influenced by a 
subjective view of one judge. 
68 Schering AG 's Application [1971] 3 All ER 177. 
Ibid• Dow Corning Corporation (Bennett 's) Applications [1974] RPC 235; Eli Lilly & Company's 
Application [1975] RPC 438; Upjohn Company (Robert's) Application [1977] RPC 94. 
24 
However, it is conceded that such methods have long been excluded from 
patentability by an established practice of the Patent Office and the case law that 
followed the decision in C & Ws Application. 70 The fact that methods of medical 
treatment had been considered to be unpatentable for so long meant that it would 
have been a bold step for Whifford J to pass over the barrier of non-patentability 
and change this situation. Although his Honour expressed doubt regarding the 
legal and political legitimacy of this exclusion from patentability, he was of the 
opinion that elimination of this exclusion exceeded the competencies of the courts 
and was regarded as being a task for the legislature. 7' 
The legislature was given the opportunity of addressing this issue in the new 1977 
Patents Act (UK). However, it was not entirely free to decide this issue in isolation, 
because the main driver for new legislation was harmonisation of UK law with 
European law. The European position with regards to patenting of methods of 
medical treatment forms the basis of the next Chapter. 
7(1 (1914) 31 RPC 235. 
71 [1971] RPC 337, 344. 
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CHAPTER 2: 	THE EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION AND 
THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
2.1 	INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter provides an analysis of the key aspects of patent law in Member 
States of the European Patent Convention, 1 as it relates to patenting of methods of 
medical treatment. The discussion in this Chapter is important because it marks a 
shift away from reliance on s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 1624 (the Statute of 
Monopolies) in UK law. It illustrates how courts deal with express exclusions from 
patenting for method of medical treatment and how such exclusions can be 
avoided by creative drafting of patent applications. This also provides an 
interesting contrast to the approach taken in Australia where there are no express 
exclusions.2 
This Chapter starts with a discussion of the outcomes of an inquiry into patent law 
reform in the UK in 1970, followed by an analysis of the development and 
operation of the European Patent Convention and its influence on the laws of 
member states. Chapter 1 showed that until 1974 there had been no court decision 
in the UK that had upheld a claim related to a method of medical treatment of a 
human body to cure or prevent disease. Indeed, there had been no court decision 
to this effect in any of the other prospective member states 3 of the European 
Patent Convention either. 4 
Though the patent courts of other European countries did not deal so intensively 
with the issue of patentability of methods of medical treatment as English courts, 
the general practice was similar. 5 For example, a grant for patent protection in 
France and Italy would be denied if the alleged invention lacked industrial 
character. 6 In Austria 7 and SwitzerIan& one of the ground for refusal of medical 
inventions was public policy considerations. 
Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) 5 October 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 
199, E.T.S. No 16, Cmnd, Munich. The Convention entered into force on 7 October 1977 for the following 
first countries: Belgium, Germany, (then West Germany), France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Swetzerland 
and UK, and on 1 May 1978 for Sweden. 
2 See Chapter 4. 
3 A small exception to that is a fact that, during the early years of the German Patent Office (until 1904), a 
few patents were granted for medical methods. See further discussion. 
" White, 'Patentability of Medical Treatment — Wellcome Foundation's (Hitching's) Application' (1980) 2 
European Intellectual Property Review 364. 
5 Rainer Moufang, 'Methods of Medical Treatment Under Patent Law' (1993) 24 International Review of 
Industrial Property & Copyright Law 18, 26. 
6 Moufang, above n 3, 27. 
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One country where there were some notable decisions on patenting of methods of 
medical treatment prior to the European Patent Convention was Germany. During 
the early years of the German Patent Office, in 1890-1904, a few patents had been 
granted for medical methods. These included patents for a method of removing 
deeper stitches from wounds; 9 a method for treating curvature of the human 
spine; 10 a method of removing magnetized objects from the eye or another part of 
the body; 11 and a method of transilluminating parts of the body using X-rays. 12 
However, following the decision of the Board of the Imperial Patent Office in 
1904, 13 Germany changed its attitude towards patentability of medical inventions. 
The Patent Office stated that the treatment of humans was an area for which 
patent protection had not been created by the legislature. This case established 
the precedent that an industrially applicable invention could only be assumed to 
exist were raw material was mechanically or chemically treated or processed. 
In 1967 the German Federal Supreme Court delivered a judgment that had a 
lasting influence on future European patent law. In the Glatzenoperation case, 14 
the court emphasized that public health was a key element of public welfare, which 
must be safeguarded by the State. The court concluded that the duties placed 
upon medical doctors in order to maintain human health constitute a social-ethical 
reason why the medical profession is not a trade and why a doctor must be free in 
the use of methods of medical treatment. 15 It was held in this case that the criterion 
of industrial applicability 'could serve as the dogmatic anchor for the exclusion of 
medical methods'. 16 It will be seen later in this Chapter that this criterion was to 
become the basis for the exclusion of medical methods in the European Patent 
Convention. 
Although the patentability of medical treatments was blocked following the 
Glatzenoperation case, case law in Germany in the field of pharmaceutical product 
7 Decision of the Appeal Board of the Austrian Patent Office of May 29, 1973, 1974 GRUR Intl 80. 
8 Decisions of the Swiss Federal Court, September 24, 1946, 72 BGE I, 368, 1951 GRUR 283; February 4, 
1975, 101 BGE lb 18, 1975 SchwPMMBI. I 33, 1975 GRUR Int 314. 
9 German patent No. 150666. 
I° German patent No. 150699. 
II German patent No. 155294. 
12 German patent No. 156389. 
13 Badewasser (1904) BlfPNZ 4. 
14 Decision of the Federal Supreme Court of September 26, 1967,48 BGHZ 313, 1968 GRUR 142. 
15 Glatzenoperation Federal Supreme Court, 1968 GRUR 142, 146. 
16 See critical point of view expressed by Friedrich-Karl Beier, 'Future Problems of Patent Law' (1972) 3 
International Review of Industrial Property & Copyright Law 423, 431. 
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patents proved to be much more generous. 17 At the same time, however, all 
pharmaceutical inventions in Italy were deemed to be unpatentable. Also, 
pharmaceutical products in France could only be patented by way of a special 
medicament patent, for which there were strict provisions for sufficiency of 
disclosure. 18 
2.2 	THE UNITED KINGDOM: BANKS COMMITTEE REPORT 
In the UK, in parallel with developments in the case law, the political debate about 
the appropriate scope of patenting was intensifying. In 1970 the Banks Committee 
in its Report on the British Patent System (the Banks Report) considered the 
patentability of a process consisting of using a known compound for treating 
human beings medically. 19 
Notwithstanding arguments presented by unsuccessful patent applicants on many 
occasions, inter alia, that lack of patent protection in the field of medical treatment 
of humans had resulted in insufficient research and development effort being put 
into discovering of new chemical compounds and new uses for treatment of 
disease, the Committee decided that an extension of patent protection would not 
be desirable. Instead, the Committee recommended that patents should not be 
granted for processes for treating human beings with known substances. The 
ground for this recommendation was simply the fact that the majority of countries 
did not permit patents for a new medical use of a known substance, and that the 
UK should follow suit. 29 According to the Committee, since new chemical 
compounds and processes for making such compounds were already patentable, 
the only additional type of invention that could be patentable would be a method 
using a known compound in a known form against a disease for which it was not 
previously thought to be effective. In the view of the Committee, a claim for such an 
invention would have to specify the conditions against which the compound was 
effective and include instructions for its use. 21 As a consequence, it would allow 
patents for the treatment of human beings, and this, according to the Committee, 
was undesirable. 
17 Decision of the German Federal Supreme Court of January 20, 1977, 68 BGHZ 156, 9 International Review 
of Industrial Property & Copyright Law 42 (1978)-Benzene sulfonyl urea; also decision on the Federal 
Supreme Court of June 3, 1982, 14 International Review of Industrial Property & Copyright Law 283 
(1983)- Sitosterylglycosides. 
18 Alan W White, 'Patentability of Medical Treatment Claims — The Nimodipin Cases' (1984) European 
Intellectual Property Review 38. 
19The British Patent System (1970) Cmnd. 4407, (the Report) para 237-40. 
2° Report, Cmnd 4407, para 237-240. 
21 Ibid. 
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No explanations were given as to why it would be undesirable to extend a patent 
protection to processes of medical treatment. The Committee was aware of the 
decisions that had concluded that a process of medical treatment is not the proper 
subject matter for a patent monopoly. However, it is noteworthy that at the time of 
the Banks Report, the question of what was 'a proper subject for a patent 
monopoly' was 'whether the invention was a manner of new manufacture within s 6 
of the Statute of Monopolies'. 22 At that time, there had been no judgment of an 
English court that decided whether process for medical treatment fell outside the 
ambit of s 6. 23 In particular, no judgment had addressed the question of whether or 
not methods of medical treatment were 'mischievous to the State' or 'generally 
inconvenient'. As such, the statements made in the Banks Report appear to be 
over simplification. As Chapter 1 revealed, the long established Patent Office 
practice that methods of medical treatment were not associated with commerce 
and trade, had been removed by subsequent decisions. Therefore, at the time of 
the Report, there was no legal ground on which to base a refusal for patenting of 
such methods, although it is conceded that subsequently Whitford J found such a 
ground in the general inconvenience provision in s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 
in Schering and subsequent cases. 24 
It is submitted that the Banks Report included various errors of law and fact25 , one 
of which was the omission of details of the true position in the United States, which 
had been clear since 1954. In that year the Patent Office Board delivered the 
decision of Ex parte Scherer,26 which is discussed in Chapter 3. In that case, the 
United States Board of Patent Appeals held that medical processes were 
patentable subject matter. 27 Since then, patents with claims to human medical 
treatment have been frequently issued in the United States. In addition, the Report 
did not mention that in one European country, namely Belgium, a patent had been 
granted to medical processes for the treatment of humans.28 
The main mandate of Banks Committee was to investigate the UK patent system 
and to deliver its opinion on that system. In reality, the Committee simply made an 
22 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patent (1959) 102 CLR 252. 
23 White, above n 2. 
24 See Schering AG 's Application, Eli Lilly & Company's Application [1975] RPC 438; Upjohn Company 
(Robert's) Application [1977] RPC 94. 
25 See critical point of view expressed by White, above n 2. 
26 Ex parte Scherer (1954) 103 USPQ 107. 
27 Ibid, 110. 
28 JW Baxter, World Patent Law and Practice (1968), 232. Baxter clearly said: "The following countries are 
the only important ones in which one can obtain claims to medical processes for the treatment of man: 
Belgium, South Africa and USA". 
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observation of the situation with regards to this matter in other European countries 
without fully investigating the legal principles that form the backdrop to patentability 
of inventions in the UK. Since the majority of other European countries did not 
permit patents for new medical uses of known substances, 29 the Committee took 
the view that the UK should remain in line with this majority. Moreover, after an 
observation of English case law, the Committee simply followed the decisions of 
the courts and did not form its own opinion based on relevant legal principles, as it 
was mandated to do. It appears therefore, that the Committee did not fulfill its initial 
requirement. 
The decision of the Banks Committee not to recommend patenting of methods of 
medical treatment had significant consequences for UK patent law. As a 
consequence of the Committee's recommendation to the UK Parliament, it was 
decided to expressly exclude methods of medical treatment from patentability by 
the provisions of s 4(2) of the Patents Act 1977 (UK) (the 1977 Act). It is submitted 
that but for the Banks Report, the UK Parliament might well have changed its 
attitude towards patentability of medical treatment, following the suggestion of 
Whitford J to reconsider the appropriateness of such an exclusion. It is submitted 
that this was the right time for the UK legislature to ask two fundamental questions. 
First, what is the true aim and object of the patent system? Secondly, is it fair that a 
reward for service to the public is denied to those who spent their lives, passion 
and expertise in looking for and finding a cure for a disease? At that time the UK 
Parliament had an opportunity to change its attitude towards patentability of 
medical treatment, but lost that opportunity. 
It is acknowledged that the UK Parliament was somewhat constrained in its 
capacity to reform patent law because of the UK's obligations under the European 
Patent Convention, of which it was a Member State. However, it is submitted that 
had the Banks Committee supported patenting of methods of medical treatment, 
the UK could have played a more influential role in drafting of the European Patent 
Convention. For instance, a case could have been made for providing Member 
States with the liberty to decide for themselves whether or not to exclude certain 
subject matter, including methods of medical treatment. 39 
29 Report, Cmnd 4407, para 237-40. 
3° This is the case in the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Articles 27.2 and 27.3 
[1995] ATS 12 (entered into force 15 April 1994) 
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2.3 	DEVELOPMENT OF EXCLUSIONARY PROVISIONS IN THE 
EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION 
The European Patent Convention (EPC) was signed in Munich in 1973, and came 
into effect in 1978. Shortly after signing the EPC, Member States commenced 
adjusting their legal systems in accordance with European uniform law, and Art 
52(4) was largely adopted. For example, the UK, Germany and France included 
mirror provisions of Art 52(4) and declared excluded methods as not industrially 
applicable. 31 Denmark, Italy and Sweden treated them as non-inventions. 32 
Switzerland declared excluded methods as legal exceptions to patenting. 33 
Art 52(4) of the EPC reads as follows: 
(1) European patents shall be granted for any inventions which are susceptible of 
industrial application, which are new and which involve an inventive step. 
(4) Methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and 
diagnostic methods practiced on the human or animal body shall not be regarded 
as inventions which are susceptible of industrial application within the meaning of 
para 1. This provision shall not apply to products, in particular substances or 
compositions, for use in any of these methods. 
(Emphasis added) 
Before considering the exclusionary scope of Art 52(4), it is necessary to be 
familiar with the historic roots of the exclusion of medical treatment, in order to 
understand how this specific exclusionary provision was developed. 
There can be little doubt that drafting of Art 52(4) of the EPC was strongly 
influenced by the Strasbourg Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of 
Substantive Law on Patents for Invention (Strasbourg Convention) of November 
1963. 34 The contents of Art 52(4) were not formulated until after the Strasbourg 
Convention. The first documents that expressed the possibility of an exception for 
31 Section 4(2) Patents Act (UK); Section 5(2) Patents Act (Germany); Article 6(4) Patents Act (France). 
32 Section 1(3) Danish Patents Act; Section 12(4) Italian Patents Act; Section 1 Swedish Patents Act. 
33 Section 2(b) Swiss Patents Act. 
34 Moufang, above n 3, 27. The Strasbourg Convention is a treaty signed by Member States of the Council of 
Europe on November 27, 1963 in Strasbourg, France. It entered into force on August 1, 1980 and led to a 
significant harmonization of patent laws across European countries. The Strasbourg Convention established 
patentability criteria by specifying on which grounds inventions can be rejected from patentability. The main 
intention of Convention was to harmonize European patent law. Yet this Convention is quite different from 
the EPC which establishes an independent system for granting European patents. 
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methods of medical treatment first appeared in the EC Committee documents in 
1964. 35 
Another international document, the 1970 Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), in 
particular r 39.1, is also likely to have been highly influential in the exclusion of 
medical methods. 36 R 39.1 included a list of objects of applications for which the 
International Searching Authority was not obliged to conduct a search on the basis 
of unpatentability of those objects. The list in r 39.1(iv) contained 'methods for 
treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy, as well as diagnostic 
methods.' As a consequence, the first draft of the EPC in 197037 contained Art 
9(2)(e), which declared methods for the treatment of the human or animal body by 
surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods as non-patentable inventions. 
In 1972 the French delegation suggested that the term 'diagnostic methods' be 
clarified by the precise phrase 'applied to the human or animal body', since 
technological development had resulted in diagnostic methods that lacked a 
specific medical character. 35 Following that suggestion, the term was clarified. 
Later, during the Munich Diplomatic Conference, the German delegation made a 
successful proposal to clarify that medical methods did in fact constitute actual 
inventions, but lacked industrial applicability. 39 It is clear that this proposal was 
made so that the EPC would be compatible with the Glatzenoperation decision,40 
which had determined national German patent law since 1968. Subsequently, 
methods for the treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and 
diagnostic methods were deleted from the list of non-inventions and placed in the 
newly created para 4 of Art 52. 
Moreover, upon the instigation of the Dutch delegation, which was concerned that 
there might be future arguments over the disadvantage of the patentability of 
medical appliances or instruments, 41 the second sentence of para 4 of Art 52 was 
amended. It clarified that it was not limited to substances and compounds only, but 
included products in general. 
35 Document (EEC) 11821/IV/64 of December 7, 1964, published in Historical Documentation Relating to 
the EPC, (Munich, 1985) Vol.10E. 
36 Moufang, above n 3. 
37 Published in Historical Documentation Relating to the EPC (Munich, 1985) Vol 15 D+E+F. 
38 Document BR1135/72 of March 15, 1972, Published in Historical Documentation Relating to the EPC 
(1985, Munich) Vol 12 E. 
9 Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, Minutes of the Munich Diplomatic Conference for the 
Setting up of a European System for the Grant of Patents (1977) 28, No.23, 28 (the Minutes); Moufang, 
above n 3. 
4° Glatzenoperation Federal Supreme Court, 1968 GRUR 142. 
41 See the Minutes, above n 37; Moufang, above n 3. 
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The final draft included almost all proposals of the negotiating States. As is the 
case with practically all international instruments, the EPC was formulated as a 
compromise among the existing laws of the States, which arguably, harmonized 
patent laws across European countries. Regarding the exclusion from patentability 
of methods for treatment of the human or animal body, for example, Alan White 
remarks that the exclusion was a product of political pressure to curb patent 
protection in the field of medicine, and the absence of clear law permitting patents 
to human medical treatment in any of negotiating States. 42 
Art 52(4) has been criticized for perpetuating the 'legal fiction' that methods of 
treatment of a human body are not susceptible of industrial application. 43 Its first 
sentence excludes from patentability such methods even if they satisfy the 
requirements of novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability. Consequently, 
notwithstanding that the wording of Art 52(4) implicitly recognises that such 
methods are in fact susceptible of industrial application, they will not be regarded 
as inventions anyway. It could be argued therefore that the exclusion from 
patentability of methods for treatment is artificial. 
2.4 	THE EXCLUSIONARY SCOPE OF ART 52(4) EPC 
Medical inventions cases heard by the European Patent Office (EPO) Boards of 
Appeal (the Boards of Appeal) and by the UK Patent Office necessarily involve 
reference to Art 52(4) of the EPC and its equivalent in the 1977 Act and in the 
patent legislation of other Member States. This part of the thesis will present a 
discussion of the scope of excluded subject matter for the purposes of these 
provisions. The discussion will provide a summary of the UK view, adopted by the 
UK Patent Office and the English courts under the 1977 Act, and also a review of 
the case law of the Boards of Appeal. 
The provisions covering patentability in the field of medical inventions are found in 
Ss 1(1), 2(6) and 4 of the 1977 Act and Art s 52(1), 52(4), 54(5) and 57 of the EPC. 
The 1977 Act brought about substantial changes to UK patent law, its stated 
purpose being to 'to establish a new law of patents' and `to give effect to certain 
international conventions on patents'. 44 The Conventions mentioned are the EPC 
and the Community Patent Convention (CPC). The latter never came into force. 
Section 1 of the 1977 Act states: 
42 White, above n 2. 
43  Moufang, above n 3, 32-34. 
" Patents Act 1977 (UK), Recitals. 
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(1) 'A patent may be granted for an invention in respect of which the following 
conditions are satisfied, that is to say- 
(a) the invention is new; 
(b) it involves an inventive step; 
(c) it is capable of industrial application; 
(d) the grant of a patent for it is not excluded by subss (2) and (3) below; 
and references in this Act to a patentable invention shall be construed 
accordingly.' 
S 4(1) and (2) then provides: 
(1)Subject to subs (2) below, an invention shall be taken to be capable of industrial 
application if it can be made or used in any kind of industry, including agriculture. 
(2)An invention of a method of treatment of the human or animal body by surgery 
or therapy or of diagnosis practiced on the human or animal body shall not be 
taken to be capable of industrial application. 
(Emphasis added) 
Although the 1977 Act uses different numbering from that of the corresponding 
provision of EPC and CPC, 45 it implemented those Conventions by using, in some 
parts, the same wording as their English language versions. In other places, 
however, the Act uses different language. For example the EPC refers to 
inventions that are 'susceptible of industrial application', whereas the 1977 Act 
refers to inventions that are 'capable of industrial application'. Nevertheless, it 
seems that the EPO and English courts adopted the same meaning to those 
phrases. 
Section 4 of the 1977 Act clearly follows the terms of Art 52 of the EPC, excluding 
medical treatments from the definition of a patentable subject matter. In addition, 
as with the second sentence of Art 52(4), s 4(3) of the 1977 Act makes it clear that 
the prohibition in s 4(2) does not prevent a product consisting of a substance or 
composition being treated as capable of industrial application merely because it 
was invented for use in any such matter. Thus, s 4, as well as Art 52, second 
sentence, carefully distinguishes unpatentable methods of treatment from 
patentable medical products. 
45 EPC Article 177(1); CPC Article102. 
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Since the criteria of patentability under the 1977 Act and the EPC do not differ, a 
high degree of consistency between decisions issued by the UK Patent Office, the 
English courts, and judgments delivered by the Boards of Appeal would be 
expected to be seen. For this reason, judgments from all of these jurisdictions are 
considered together below. 
2.4.1 Art 52(4), firsts sentence: surgery, therapy and diagnosis 
The legislatures have defined the contours of the field of medicine within the three 
separate categories of: 'surgery', 'therapy' and 'diagnosis'. It is important to 
emphasise that, for each category, the exclusion only applies to methods 
performed on a living animal or human body. 46 In principle, the three categories 
are independent. However, the categories share the same general requirement of 
having a medical character. 47 At the same time, the medical character of a method 
does not depend solely on the person who executes it. Hence, a method does not 
have a medical character simply because it is performed by a medical doctor rather 
than a non-medical practitioner or a nurse. 
Before considering the case law on the exclusionary scope of these three 
categories in Art 52(4), it is useful to look at the Guidelines for Examination in the 
EPO (Guidelines). Although not binding upon the Boards of Appeal, the 
Guidelines provide useful parameters for defining the content and scope of 
excluded subject matter for the purposes of Art 52(4). 
According to Guidelines C-IV, 4.3, first para, neither a treatment of body tissues or 
fluids after they have been removed from the human or animal body, nor a 
diagnostic method applied thereon are excluded from patentability. Similarly, 
storage in a blood bank or diagnostic testing of blood samples are not excluded. 
However, in cases involving treatment of blood by dialysis with the blood being 
returned to the same body, the treatment would be denied patentability. The UK 
Patent Office has adopted this approach following the decision of Calmic 
Engineering° of the UK Patents Court. 
In the next paragraph, the Guidelines state that, regarding methods carried out on, 
or in relation to, the living human or animal body, it should be borne in mind that 
the intention of Art 52(4) is only to free from restraint non-commercial and non-
industrial medical and veterinary activities. Interpretation of the provision should 
46 See, eg, Case t 182/90; Guidelines for Examination, C-IV, 4.3. 
47 Moufang , above n 3, 36. 
48 (1973) RPC 684. Note that this case was decided under the Patents Act 1949 (UK). 
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avoid the exclusions going beyond their proper limits.49 The Guidelines go on to 
give examples of surgery, therapy and diagnostic methods, referring to decisions of 
the Boards of Appeal, where appropriate. 
2.4.1.1 The field of surgery 
Compared to extensive case law on the exclusion of therapeutic methods, 
discussed below, the exclusion of methods for treatment of the human or animal 
body by surgery have not yet been addressed extensively by the Boards of Appeal. 
However, some points have been clarified in the case law. 5° For example, methods 
performed on corpses or actual extraction of organs from corpses do not fall under 
the exclusion clause of Art 52(4), 51 nor does the extraction of organs in transplants, 
which requires the use of an organ bank. This is because, from the meaning of the 
word `surgery', 52 such operations would not be performed on a live body. However, 
were the extracted organ immediately implanted into a live body, it would fall within 
the scope of Art 52(4). 53 
According to Guidelines, surgery within the meaning of Art 52(4) defines the nature 
of the treatment rather than its purpose. 54 From the case law, the term surgery 
means the field of medicine involving the healing of diseases or accidental injuries, 
or remedies against physical defects by means of surgical operation or 
manipulation performed on a live body. 55 
Decision T 35/9956 of the Board of Appeal states that the words 'methods for 
treatment of the human or animal body by surgery' mean: any (by its nature) 
surgical method, that can be carried out as such on the human or animal body. 
Consequently, a claim is not allowable under Art 52(4), first sentence, if it includes 
at least one feature defining a physical activity or action that constitutes a 'method 
for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery': it is irrelevant whether the 
49 See decision G 5/83, OJ 3/1985, 64. 
5° See, eg, decisions in T 182/90 1994 OJ EPO, 641; T 35/99 2000 OJ EPO, Decisions of Technical Board of 
Appeal 3.2.2. dated 29 September 1999; T 820/92 1995 OJ EPO, 113; T 83/93 1996 OJ EPO, 274; Unilever 
Ltd (Davis's) Application 1983 RPC 219. 
51 See Seymour v Osborn (1870) 78 US 516, 533-34; Kewanee Oil Co v Bicron (1974) 416 US 470, 480-81; 
Moufang , above n 3, 36. 
52 See the definition of 'surgery' in the next paragraph. 
53 See Moufang, above n 3, 38. 
54 See C-IV, 4.3. 
55 See Cartegena Accord, Decision 344, Common Regimen Patent to Industrial Property, Patents of 
Invention, Article 6(f); Implantieren von Haarbundeln Decision of Federal Patent Court of December 12, 
1988,30 Bpat GE 134. 
56 T 35/99 2000 OJ EPO, Decisions of Technical Board of Appeal 3.2.2. 
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method in question is susceptible of being carried out in isolation, or in combination 
with other methods that together achieve the intended medical effect. 57 
From a UK perspective, surgery includes such operations as cutting the body, 
setting broken bones, and dental surgery. 58 Also, following a decision by the 
Patents Appeal Tribunal under the Patents Act 1949 (UK) in the case of Oral 
Health Products (Ha/stead's) Application, 59 methods of removing dental plaque, 
methods of cleaning teeth in which dental plaque is removed, and methods of 
treating human teeth with a fluorine-containing compound to prevent dental 
cavities, are to be refused as unpatentable by the UK Patent Office. On the other 
hand, procedures such as giving an injection, taking a blood sample, piercing ears, 
or tattooing are not regarded as 'surgery', the test applied being whether or not the 
skill or knowledge of a surgeon is required.66 
Obiter remarks made by the Patents Court judge in Unilever Ltd (Davis's) 
Application 61 suggest that surgery can be curative of the disease or condition 
thereof, or prophylactic, that is, preventative of diseased conditions. For instance, 
the removal of an appendix or tonsils is a surgery even though a diseased 
condition did not yet exist. A surgery may be cosmetic without being curative or 
preventive. Therefore, it appears that in the UK view no form of surgery, whether it 
is curative, prophylactic or cosmetic, is patentable. 62 There is a high degree of 
consistency between UK Patent Courts' decisions and those issued by the Boards 
of Appeal. 
In summary, the case law in relation to the exclusion of therapeutic methods, 
methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery indicates the 
following: 
• the Art 52(4) exclusion affects only the surgical methods performed on a 
living body; 
• the presence of a surgical step in a multi-step method of the treatment 
normally confers a surgical character on that method; 
57 
 
135/99, point 8; T 82/93 1996 OJ EPO, 274; T 820/92 1995 OJ EPO 1995; T 182/90. 
58 KE Panchen, 'Patentability in the Field of Therapy and Diagnosis' (1991) 22 International Review of 
Industrial Property & Copyright Law 879. 
59 [1977] RPC 612. 
60 Panchen, above n 57, 880. 
61 [1983] RPC 219,220. 
62 Panchen, above n 57. 
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• as matter of policy, the terms 'treatment' and 'surgery' in Art 52(4) cannot be 
considered as constituting two distinct requirements for the exclusion 
provided therein; 
• the exclusion encompasses any surgical activity, irrespective of whether it is 
carried out alone or in combination with other medical or non-medical 
measures; 
• in the UK, no surgery whether it is curative, prophylactic or cosmetic, is 
patentable; and 
• the UK view is not as broad as the EPO's and the exclusion of s 4(2) of the 
1977 Act is not interpreted as one that encompasses any surgical activity. 
2.4.1.2 The field of therapy (prophylaxis and relief of pain) 
The second category excluded from patentability by Art 52(4), is the category of 
methods of therapeutic treatment. Here the exclusionary scope of Art 52(4) has 
been clearly outlined by the EPO decisions and national case law. 
A dictionary meaning of the term 'therapy' refers to the medical treatment of 
disease. The first definition of the term was given in T 144/83. 63 According to this 
decision therapy relates to the treatment of a disease in general or to a curative 
treatment in the narrow sense as well as the alleviation of the symptoms of pain 
and suffering. 
According to the EPO decisions, both prophylactic and curative treatments of 
disease have been held to come within the meaning of 'therapy' as used in Art 
52(4). 64 Moreover, 'therapy' has been held to include the treatment of pain, 
discomfort and incapacity, regardless of origin. 66 For instance, in T 81/84, 
Dysmenorrhea/Rorer66 the application was for the treatment of dysmenorrhea and 
one of the claims concerned a method for relieving discomfort of women during 
menstruation. The Board of Appeal considered that pain could stem both from 
illness and from natural causes. Such causes could overlap and were often 
indistinguishable. The Board of Appeal found that it was neither possible nor 
63 OJ 1986, 301. 
64 T 19/86, Pigsll/ Duphar, 1989 OJ EPO, 24, point 7. 
65 T 81/84, Dysmenorrhea/Rorer, 1988 OJ EPO 207, 1988 GRUR Int 777, 19 International Review of 
Industrial Property & Copyright Law 803 (1988). 
66 1988 OJ EPO 207, 1988 GRUR Int 777, 19 International Review of Industrial Property & Copyright Law 
803 (1988). 
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desirable to distinguish between basic and symptomatic therapy, i.e. healing or 
cure, and mere relief. Therefore, the relief of pain, whatever its origin, was a 
'therapy' within the meaning of Art 52(4). 
Another example of broad interpretation of the term 'therapy' is found in the case T 
116/85, Pigs I/VVellcome , 67 concerning pigs. In this case the Board of Appeal held 
that a treatment against parasites found on the human or animal body is very close 
to disease prevention, and it was not possible to distinguish a method applied by a 
farmer from the same method as applied by a veterinarian, and to say that the 
former, being an industrial activity, is patentable, whereas the latter is not. 68 The 
Board of Appeal made no distinction between treatments against transient and 
permanent ectoparasites, nor between ectoparasites and endoparasites. 
Consequently, the treatment at issue was held unpatentable. 
As with surgery, both EPO and UK Patent Office practices have drawn a distinction 
between treatment carried out on the human or animal body and treatment carried 
out on a dead body. The latter is patentable, but the former is not. 68 From this 
approach, the inference could be drawn that a patent can be granted for treatments 
carried out on tissues and fluids removed from the body. 76 On this basis, treatment 
of blood by dialysis should also be patentable, as it would be possible to patent a 
treatment of the blood itself as it is removed from a patient. 71 Such an interpretation 
of the Art 52(4) would likely result in granting patents to inventions, which are 
currently excluded from patentability. However, the case law suggests that this 
approach is unlikely to prevail. 72 This provides clear authority for the proposition 
that treatments carried out on tissues and fluids removed from the body will not be 
granted a patent protection in Europe. 
T 245/87 is an example where a medical competence of the practitioner may be an 
indication whether the method step is objectionable under Art 52(4) EPC. Claim 1 
of the patent in issue in this case concerned a method by which an electrically 
conductive liquid containing a drug was introduced into the body through the pump 
of an implantable device for controlled drug administration. The method could be 
performed without involvement of a doctor." The application was refused by the 
67 1989 OJ EPO 13, 1989 GRUR Int 581, 20 International Review of Industrial Property & Copyright Law 
188 (1989). 
68 Pigs 1/Wellcome, 1989 OJ EPO 13, point 4.3. 
69See the Guidelines C-IV, 4.3; Ca/mac Engineering (1973) RPC 684. 
70 Panchen, above n 57, 881. 
71 See the Guidelines C-IV, 4.3 
72 T 655/92 1998 OJ EPO, 17, points 5.2 and 5.3, head notes 2 and 3; T 329/94 1998 OJ EPO, 242, point 4. 
T 964/99 2002 OJ EPO, 1, point 6.2. 
73 OJ 1989, 171 
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examining division on the basis of Art 52(4) EPC. The Board of Appeal held that 
the steps described in claim 1, even when applied to an implanted device for 
controlled drug administration, only involved measuring the volume of the drug 
solution flowing into the body. The flow itself was not affected. These steps could 
be performed without any medical knowledge and had no therapeutic effect. Based 
of these conclusions the Board of Appeal held that the method did not fall within 
the scope of Art 52(4) EPC, first sentence. The Board of Appeal also concluded 
that when there is no physical causality, between operations effected using a 
therapeutic apparatus and the therapeutic effect produced on the organism by that 
apparatus, a method will not be excluded under Art 52(4) EPC. 
The key points of the case law regarding exclusion of methods of therapeutic 
treatment are listed below: 
• the Art 52(4) exclusion affects only therapeutic treatment performed on a 
living body; 
• both prophylactic and curative treatments of disease have been held to be 
within the meaning of `therapy'; 
• 'therapy' has been held to include the treatment of pain, discomfort and 
incapacity, regardless of origin; 
• it is not possible to draw a distinction between a method applied by a farmer 
and the same method as applied by a veterinarian and to say that the 
former, being an industrial activity, is patentable, but the latter is not; 
• the treatment of blood by dialysis will be excluded; 
• methods will be susceptible of industrial application if they could be used 
with the desired result by a technician without specialist medical knowledge 
and skills; 74 
• a method will not within the scope of Art 52(4) EPC when there is no 
physical connection between operations effected using a therapeutic 
apparatus and the therapeutic effect produced on the organism by that 




• 	Prophylactic treatment 78 and method for preventing pregnancy 77 might 
amount to a 'therapy'. 
2.4.1.3 The field of diagnosis 
Art 52(4) also excludes methods of diagnosis. Generally, the term 'diagnosis' refers 
to examination leading to the identification and treatment of disease. Diagnosis 
may also be performed on a body for the determination and maintenance of health. 
A few difficulties have arisen with regard to this interpretation of the methods of 
diagnosis exclusion. The exclusionary scope of Art 52(4) covers only methods of 
diagnosis that are carried out on a living human or animal body. Thus, according to 
the prevailing opinion of the EPO decisions and national case law, diagnostic 
methods performed on tissues, organs or fluids permanently removed from the 
body may not be subject to the exclusionary scope of the Art 52(4). 78 However, 
more recent decisions of the Boards of Appeal suggest that this is not always so. 79 
On the basis that diagnosis leads to disease identification, the UK Patent Office 
has adopted the following tests: 
1. does the method, unaided by other tests, indicate whether or not a 
person or animal is suffering from a medical disorder; and 
2. does the method identify the disorder where it is found to be present?8° 
In the event of an affirmative answer to both of these questions, the method in 
question will be regarded as a method of diagnosis practiced on the human or 
animal body, and therefore excluded by the 1977 Act. 
According to the Guidelines, Part C-IV, 4.3, methods for obtaining information from 
the living human or animal body are not excluded by Art 52(4) if the information 
obtained merely provides intermediate results. This is because methods providing 
only interim results do not, on their own, enable a decision to be made on the 
treatment. They merely aid an eventual diagnosis. Thus, methods using nuclear 
magnetic resonance to obtain measurements (such as temperature and pH), 81 or X- 
76 G 5/83, 1985 OJ EPO 64. 
77 T 820/92, 1995 OJ EPO, 113. 
78 Bernard & Kraber, Lehrbuch des Patentrechts, (4th ed., Munich, 1986), 129; Panchen, above n 57, 885; 
Moufang, above n 3, 45. 
79 T655/92, 1998 OJ EPO; T 329/ 94, 1998 OJ EPO; T 964/99, 2002 OJ EPO. 
80 Panchen, above n 57, 886. 
81 Diagnostizierverfahren, 1985 GRUR 278 (German Fed. Pat. Ct.). 
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ray investigations and blood pressure measurements 82 do not, generally, comprise 
a method of diagnosis. 
The Board of Appeal in T 385/86, Non-Invasive Measurement/Bruker, 83 having 
considered the historical origins of the exclusion made by the Art 52(4), held that 
its exclusionary scope covers only methods of diagnosis that: 
• are carried out on a living human or animal body; 84 
• include examinations whose results immediately make it possible to decide 
on a particular course of medical treatment: 88 
• contain all the steps involved in reaching a medical diagnosis. 
Thus, according to the Boards of Appeal, methods providing only interim results 
are not diagnostic methods in the meaning of Art 52(4), first sentence, even if they 
can be utilised in making a diagnosis. This decision had been widely accepted and 
confirmed in subsequent decisions. 88 
However, in T 964/99, Cycnus Inc87 the Board of Appeal expressed the opinion 
that a strict adoption of the above principles would lead to the conclusion that 
typical diagnostic procedures practised on the human body, like percussion, 
auscultation or palpation could, in principle, be patentable. This would be the case 
because they do not constitute a complete diagnosis (as they do not contain all the 
steps involved in reaching a medical diagnosis) and do not fall within the 
categories of 'surgery' and 'therapy' referred to in Art 52(4). The Board of Appeal 
considered that this approach would go against the spirit of Art 52(4). 88 
It follows that the Boards of Appeal are of the opinion that Art 52(4) is meant to 
exclude from patent protection all methods practised on the human or animal body 
that relate to diagnosis or which are of value for the purpose of diagnosis. This 
meaning of 'diagnostic methods' adopted by the Boards of Appeal come from the 
82 T 61/83, Dated 21 November 1983, not published in the OJ EPO; T 385/86 Non-Invasive 
Measurement/Brulcer,T 385/86, 1988 OJ EPO 308, 1988 GRUR Int 938, (1989) 20 International Review of 
Industrial Property & Copyright Law 75. 
83 1385/86, Non-Invasive Measurement/Bruker, 1988 OJ EPO 308, 1988 GRUR Int 938, (1989) 20 
International Review of Industrial Property & Copyright Law 75. 
84 T 385/86, Non-Invasive Measurement/Bruker point 3.2. 
85 Ibid. 
86 T 83/87, T 400/87 and T 530/93 (Not published in OJ EPO). 
87 2002 OJ EPO. 
88 T 964/99, Cycnus Inc 2002 OJ EPO, point 3.5. 
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strict interpretation of the terms 'diagnosis' and 'diagnostic' in the Oxford English 
Dictionary. 89 Hence, the straightforward meaning of 'diagnostic methods' would be 
'methods pertaining to, or of value for the purposes of, diagnosis'. 9° By employing 
this meaning, it would appear that any medical activity concerning the gathering of 
information in the course of establishing a diagnosis qualifies as a diagnostic 
method. 
In summary, the case law on exclusion of methods of diagnosis indicates the 
following: 
• the exclusionary scope of Art 52(4) covers only methods of diagnosis that 
are carried out on a living body; 
• methods for obtaining information from the living human or animal body are 
not excluded by Art 52(4) if the information obtained merely provides 
intermediate results; 
• methods of diagnosis will be excluded where their results immediately make 
it possible to decide on a particular course of medical treatment and contain 
all the steps involved in reaching a medical diagnosis; 
• with regard to exception to patentability, Art 52(4) must be construed 
narrowly; 
• methods will be susceptible of industrial application if they could be used 
with the desired result by a technician without specialist medical knowledge 
and skills; and 
• Art 52(4) is meant to exclude from patent protection all methods practiced 
on the human or animal body which relate to diagnosis or which are of value 
for the purpose of diagnosis. 
2.4.2 Cosmetic products and therapeutic treatments 
In principle, cosmetic methods are not included in the category of therapeutic 
methods, because cosmetic treatment is interpreted by the Boards of Appeal as a 
method designed or intended to improve appearance of the human body. 91 
89 Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 1999. 
90 T 964199,Cycnus Inc 2002 OJ EPO, 1, point 4.2. 
91 1290/86 (OJ 1992,414); T 144/83 (0J 1986, 301) T 36/83 (OJ 1986, 295). 
43 
'Therapy', on the other hand, as discussed earlier, clearly relates to medical 
treatment of disease, and includes both prophylactic and curative treatments of 
disease in the narrow sense, 92 as well as the treatment of pain, discomfort and 
incapacity, regardless of origin.93 
However, the cases involving cosmetic product claims are not always clear-cut. A 
complex situation arises when a method of treatment displays both a therapeutic 
and cosmetic effect. The EPO Technical Board of Appeal (the Technical Board) 
has generally favored the proposition that in the case where a non-therapeutic 
effect can be distinguished from a therapeutic one, a claim only to the therapeutic 
effect is excluded from patent protection. 94 
In T 144/83, Appetite Suppressant/Du Pont95 , for example, the Technical Board 
admitted that no core distinction could be drawn between the cosmetic treatment in 
question for improving the bodily appearance and the medical treatment for curing 
obesity. The Technical Board's view was that the fact that a chemical had both a 
cosmetic and therapeutic effect did not render the cosmetic treatment 
unpatentable. The Technical Board held that Art 52(4) must be construed narrowly 
so as not to work to the disadvantage of an applicant seeking patent protection for 
the cosmetic treatment only. The decision has since been criticized by 
commentators 96 and distinguished by later decisions." 
Although there was no clear distinction between the therapeutic and the cosmetic 
effect, the Technical Board allowed the method for cosmetic treatment. It is 
submitted that it would be wrong to view this case as authority for the propositions 
that if there is any doubt as to whether the prohibition of Art 52(4) applies it must 
be resolved in the applicant's favour, or that something described as a 'cosmetic' 
treatment can ipso facto be construed as non-therapeutic. 98 This is because a 
'cosmetic' treatment might have therapeutic as well as cosmetic effect and 
therefore, treated as method of medical treatment of disease. 
92 T 19/86, Pigs/// Duphar, 1989 OJ EPO, 24, point 7. 
93 T 81/84, Dysmenorrhea/Rorer, 1988 OJ EPO 207, 1988 GRUR hit 777, 19 International Review of 
Industrial Property & Copyright Law 803. 
94 T 144/83, 1986 OJ EPO, 301, point 4. 
95 T 144/83 Appetite Suppressant/Du Pont, 1986 OJ EPO 301, 1986 GRUR Int 720, (1987) 18 International 
Review of Industrial Property & Copyright Law 258. 
96 Panchen, above n 57; Moufang, above n 3; Todd Martin, 'Patentability of Methods of Medical Treatment: 
A Comparative Study' (2000) 82 Journal Of The Patent And Trademark Office Society 381. 
97 1290/86, 1992 OJ EPO 414; T 820/92 1995 OJ EPO 113. 
98 36/83 Thenoyl Peroxide/Roussel-Uclaf, 1986 OJ EPO 295, 1986 GRUR Int717. See also T 582/88 
Unreported, cited in the 1990 case law report, 1991 OJ EPO 19 and 290/86 1992 OJ EPO 414. 
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The cases involving cosmetic product and/or treatment claims indicate that: 
• where a non-therapeutic effect can be distinguished from a therapeutic one, 
a claim only to the non-therapeutic effect is not excluded from patent 
protection; and 
• where a treatment has overlapping and therefore indistinguishable effects, 
which are inextricably linked with therapy, a claim for anything other than a 
second medical use is excluded from patentability. 
2.4.3 Conclusions on the case law relating to the interpretation of Art 52(4) 
From this line of EPO and UK decisions it follows that 'pure' surgical, therapeutic 
and diagnostic methods are excluded by Art 52(4). In considering whether a 
request is allowable under Art 52(4), the critical questions are whether it is going to 
be performed on a living body and whether the claimed steps involve either a 
method for the treatment of the human or animal by therapy or surgery. 
With methods of diagnosis, it has been suggested that a strict interpretation of the 
T 385/86 Non-Invasive Measurement/Bruker case, 99 results in the practical 
dissolution of the legislative exclusion of diagnostic methods. 199 However, the later 
EPO cases did not consider the reason in T 385/86 Non-Invasive 
Measurement/Bruker as a good law, and adopted significantly broader approach, 
which would make it even more difficult to obtain a patent protection for methods 
that provide only interim results. 
When a method of treatment displays both a therapeutic and cosmetic effect, the 
methods that have agents or compounds that demonstrate different properties, 
rather than different effects, are more likely to obtain the patent protection. 
99 The strict interpretation is that Article 52(4) EPC covers only methods of diagnosis whose results 
immediately make it possible to decide on a particular course of medical treatment, and thus, methods 
providing only interim results are not diagnostic methods in the meaning of Article 52(4): T 385/86, Non-
Invasive Measurement/Bruker point 3.2. 
'°° Moufang, above n 3. 
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2.5 	SWISS-TYPE CLAIMS UNDER ART 54(5) EPC 
From the above discussion of the exclusionary scope of Art 52(4) it is clear that 
claims directed to methods of treatment are excluded from patentability. However, 
claims directed to the 'use of compound X in the manufacture of a medicament for 
a new therapeutic use' fall outside of the exclusion. These claims, called 'Swiss—
type claims', are also referred to as 'second medical use'. 
Swiss—type claims are named after the practice adopted by the Swiss Office of 
Intellectual Property, which allows patents for the use of compounds for therapeutic 
treatment when worded as follows: 'Use of a compound.. .for the manufacture of 
means intended to treat the disorder...' Claims of this nature have been developed 
as a result of the interpretation of Art 54(5) and the pharmaceutical industry's 
pressure to provide protection for second and further medical uses. It has been 
argued by the pharmaceutical manufacturers and their representative 
organizations that patent protection operates as an incentive to engage in research 
for new pharmaceutical uses of known substances, and is needed to enable 
recovery of the research and development expenditure. 101 It is submitted that these 
same arguments could be equally raised against exclusions of methods of 
treatment of the human body by surgery or therapy and diagnosis in Article 52(4). 
Art 54(5) states: 
1. An invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form part of the state 
of the art. 
2. The state of the art shall be held to compose everything made available to the 
public by means of a written or oral description, by use or in any other was, 
before the date of filing of the patent application. 
5. The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 4 shall not exclude the patentability of any 
substance or composition, comprised in the state of the art, for use in a method 
referred to in Art 52, paragraph 4, provided that its use for any method referred 
to in that paragraph is not comprised in the state of the art. 
101 Eisai/Second Medical Indication (1985) OJ EPO 60; John Wyeth & Brother Ltd's Application and 
Schering A.G's Application [1985] RPC 545. 
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2.5.1 First Therapeutic Use 
The exclusion of patents for methods of treatment of the human body by surgery or 
therapy and diagnosis created problems for inventors who discovered that a known 
substance, used in a field of human activity completely unrelated to medicine, has 
a medical use; for example, the first use of silicone rubber as an implant in 
cosmetic surgery. 102 Since the compound is known, it would not meet the 
requirement of novelty under patent legislation, and so it would not be possible to 
obtain patent protection for the substance per se. 
Although, according to Art 54(1), the law denies novelty to a substance if it does 
not go beyond the state of the art, Art 54(5) creates an exception for a substance 
for use in a method referred in Art 52(4). Thus, the wording of Art 54(5) is taken to 
imply an authorization for patent protection for the first therapeutic use of a 
substance even when there is no novelty in the substance itself. 103 
2.5.2 Second Therapeutic Use 
Further problems arise when a drug is already known for one or more therapeutic 
applications, and another, unexpected discovery has been made about the curative 
properties of that drug. To understand the problem, consider the example of the 
use of aspirin. It is well known that aspirin is used for its anti-inflammatory property 
in treating humans. Take a newly discovered use for aspirin, namely its use in 
prophylaxis of strokes. There is no novelty in the substance since the drug is 
already known. The first therapeutic use is also known. The question arises: 'Can a 
newly discovered second use for aspirin be patentable?' 
The difficulty is that such new manner of use is directed to treat a disease in 
human beings, and is thus a method of therapeutic treatment, which is excluded 
under Art 52(4) as not being susceptible of industrial application. Can the discovery 
of a new pharmaceutical use be protected in such a way as to leave the medical 
practitioner unrestrained, and at the same time remain outside of the exclusionary 
scope of Art 52(4)? The Swiss-type claim serves as the means of achieving such 
protection. In order to understand how such a new pharmaceutical use claim may 
circumvent the exclusionary scope of Art 52(4), it is necessary to review the case 
law of the Members States of the EPC and the Boards of Appeal of the EPO. 
102 Panchen, above n 57, 883. 
103 Commissioner of Patents v Wellcome Foundation Ltd (1983) 2 IPR 156, 163 (Somers J). 
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	2.5.2.1 	Germany: Hydropyridine1°4 
In Germany, in the Hydropyridine case the Federal Supreme Court allowed a claim 
for the use of a compound to treat cerebral insufficiency, even though it was 
already known as a drug for treating coronary disorders. The court took the view 
that a claim to the use of a substance to treat an illness extended beyond the 
giving of the substance to a patient, and included the preparation of formulation of 
the substance for use in treating the illness by therapy. 105 The court concluded that 
although s 5(2) of the German Patents Act is worded identically to Art 52(4), it does 
not exclude from patentability an invention involving the use of a known substance 
to treat illness. 
2.5.2.2 	The European Patent Office: Eisai106 
The approach in Hydropyridine differed fundamentally from the view taken by the 
Boards of Appeal and the UK Patents Court, created a problem of harmonisation. 
For example, in case Re Eisai Co. Ltd (Decision Gr 05/83) 107 (Eisai) the Board of 
Appeal said: 
... it is therefore difficult for the Patent Office to follow the practice of a superior 
court of only a single Contacting State in a matter which has a bearing on 
questions of infringement.., however eminent that court may be. 108 
In Eisai the Board of Appeal said that 'a claim directed to the use of a substance or 
composition for the treatment of the human or animal body by therapy is to be 
regarded by the European Patent Office as confined to the step of treatment', 109 
and it therefore prohibited by Art 52(4). The Board then considered the possibility 
of protecting a second medical use claim according to the practice followed by the 
Swiss Office of Intellectual Property of allowing claims for uses of compounds for 
therapeutic treatment, described above. According to the Board of Appeal, the 
novelty of such applications resided in the new therapeutic use, and since the 
claim was to the manufacture of the substance, it was not a claim to a method of 
treatment. 
104 BGH 20 September 1983; 1983 GRUR 729; (1984) OJ EPO 26. 
105 Hydropyridine (1984) OJEPO 26, 28 para 2. 
106 Eisai/Second Medical Indication (1985) OJ EPO 60. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid, point 18. 
109 Ibid. 
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The interpretation of Art 54(5) was one of the main issues discussed in the 
judgment in Eisai. The Board of Appeal stated that an exception was provided in so 
far as the first use of a substance is concerned. Thus, in the first use claim the 
novelty derived from the new pharmaceutical use. It found that it would be 
justifiable 'by analogy' to derive the novelty for the process from the newly 
discovered therapeutic use of the medicament irrespective of whether or not any 
pharmaceutical use of the medicament was already known. 11° 
The Board of Appeal held that it was legitimate in principle to allow claims directed 
to the use of a substance or composition for the manufacture of a medicament for 
a specified new and inventive therapeutic application, even in a case where the 
process of manufacture as such does not differ from known processes using the 
same active ingredient. 
2.5.2.3 	The United Kingdom: Wyeth and Scheringill 
The reasoning in Eisai has since been the subject of considerable discussion 
amongst patent lawyers. In 1985, the UK Patents Court sitting en banc (Whitford 
and Falconer JJ) in the Wyeth and Schering cases recognized the importance of 
Eisai and held that this case must be followed in the UK. The Court accepted 
claims to an invention directed to the use of a substance X to obtain a drug for a 
new therapy and involving an inventive step. 
The Court confirmed that the approach of the Boards of Appeal to the novelty of 
the Swiss-type claim directed to a second and subsequent therapeutic use is 
equally possible under the corresponding provisions of the 1977 Act and should be 
adopted. However, it is worth noting that even though the Court formed the view 
that a Swiss-type claim was clearly a claim to method of manufacture and an 
invention capable of industrial application, it stated that it was the requirement of 
novelty that 'provides the real difficulty'. The Court expressed the view that the 
device of putting a claim into Swiss-form did not confer novelty: 
...we think the better view would be that a claim in the Swiss form to an invention 
directed to the use of a known pharmaceutical to a manufacture a medicament, not 
in itself novel, for a second or subsequent and novel medical use would not be 
patentable as lacking the required novelty. 112 
11° Ibid, 66. 
111 John Wyeth & Brother Ltd's Application and Schering A.G 's Application [1985] RPC 545. 
112 Ibid, 565 (Emphasis added). 
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However, 'having regard to the desirability of achieving conformity' the Court 
decided not to follow what it regarded as the better view, but rather, it decided to 
follow Eisai. 113 
2.5.2.4 	Sweden and Netherlands 
In 1986, the Swedish Court of Patent Appeals in Patentbesvarsratten 114 followed 
the decision on the Enlarged Board in the Hydropyridine/SE case1l5 and stated that 
the patentability of the Swiss-type claim directed to a second or subsequent 
medical use was accepted in Sweden prior to her membership in the EPC. 
In 1987 the Netherlands Patent Office Appeal Division in Octooiraad116 rejected the 
criterion of novelty in Eisai. The Appeal Division in this case took the view that 
novelty did not derive from the mere fact that the known compound had a new 
therapeutic use. However, the wording of the Netherlands legislation differs from 
that of the EPC and this justified the different approach as regards patentability of 
the Swiss-type claims taken by the Appeal Division. It appears therefore, that 
interpretation of Art 54(5) was not involved. 
2.5.3 Criticism of Swiss-Type Claims 
Taking into account the cases discussed, the following points can be made on the 
patentability of the Swiss-type claims: 
• a European patent cannot be granted to a claim directed to a newly 
discovered second use of the substance as it is viewed as being a 
therapeutic treatment of the human or animal body; 
• a European patent can be granted to a claim directed to the use of a 
compound for the manufacture of a medicament intended for a specified 
new and inventive therapeutic treatment; and 
• the novelty of the medicament claimed may derive from the novelty of the 
new therapeutic application, whether or not it is first. 
113 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc [1999] RPC 253, 255 (Jacob J). 
114 Commented by Pierre Lancon, 'Patentability in the Field of Therapy and Diagnosis' (1991) 22 
International Review of Industrial Property & Copyright Law 893, 900. 
115 1988 OJ EPO 198, 1988 GRUR Int 788, (1988) 19 International Review of Industrial Property & 
Copyright Law 815. 
116 1988 OJ EPO 405, 1989 GRUR hit 588, (1989) 20 International Review of Industrial Property & 
Copyright Law 220. 
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The English case of Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals 
Inc 117 is an example where a claim drafted in the Swiss-type form may 
nevertheless not secure patent protection. In this case the claim for invention 
arising from the discovery of new efficacy of a known anti-cancer chemical was 
drafted as follows: 'Use of taxol for the manufacture of a medicament for the 
treatment of cancer.' 
Jacob J, in considering the validity of this Swiss-type claim, expressed reluctance 
in following the Eisai decision. His Honour found the patent invalid for want of 
novelty and obviousness on the ground that it was not a case of second and new 
medical use but simply involved discovery and disclosure of more information 
about a known use. Jacob J expressed his concern about the problems the Swiss-
type claims create and said: 
In my view it is essential for the granting authority to consider fully the implications 
of the claims it grants in relation to both validity and scope. It is not helpful to take 
a view on validity (particularly novelty) which simply leaves intractable problems for 
an infringement court- and for the public who need to know what they can and 
cannot do. 118 
Jacob J proceeded to comment on the Eisai decision: 
There are obvious difficulties with Eisai. Take a newly discovered use for aspirin 
(one was discovered not so long ago, namely its use to reduce risks of heart 
attacks). The manufacture of aspirin pills is old. So why is the manufacture 
rendered new because there is a new use? Or why does adding the purpose of the 
manufacture of aspirin to the claim make the manufacturing process any newer? 119 
As a judge of first instance, however, Jacob J did not go against Eisai as this would 
have involved not only refusing to follow a decision of law made by the Boards of 
Appeal, but refusing to follow the considered judgments of the English Patents 
Court in Wyeth and Schering. In highlighting his inability to declare such authorities 
'bad law' 120 , Jacob J was clearly looking for another reason for refusing a second 
medical use patent. 121 Ultimately, his Honour followed Wyeth and Schering, and 
117 [1999] RPC 253. 
118 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc [1999] RPC 253, 272. 
119 Ibid. 
I20 Ibid, 277. 
121 See John Wyeth & Brother Ltd's Application and Schering A.G's Application [1985] RPC 545, 565; 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc [1999] RPC 253, 272. Jacob J's ground for 
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accepted that novelty may rest on disclosure for the first time of a newly discovered 
technical effect even though a method of treatment could not be claimed. 
Jacob J added that the thinking behind the exclusion from patentability of methods 
of medical treatment was 'not particularly rational'. 122 He pointed out that in the US 
any such exception has been removed and so far this removal has caused no 
trouble to the physician's freedom of treatment. 
2.6 	INVENTIONS CONTRARY TO `ORDRE PUBLIC' OR MORALITY 
The technical criteria in Art 52(4) EPC should be read in conjunction with the 
exclusionary provisions of Art 53 EPC. Art 53 defines the exceptions to 
patentability as follows: 
(a) inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to 'ordre 
public' or morality, provided that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so 
contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the 
Contracting States; and 
The necessity to protect social values and public interest has a long-established 
tradition in patent law. It goes back to the early cases of the Tudor period that led 
to the enactment of the 1624 Statute of Monopolies. Although the origins of the 
Statute of Monopolies and the meaning of the proviso to s 6 will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 5, for the purpose of the present discussion it is necessary to note 
that Statute of Monopolies made all monopolies void, except those that the Statute 
recognised itself. Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies expressly limits the ambit 
of patentable subject matter and treats inventions void when they are contrary to 
the law, mischievous to the State, to the hurt of trade or generally inconvenient. 
According to Hindmarch, the phrase '[the patent grant] must not be contrary to law' 
refers to common law as well as the patent statute itself so as one law cannot grant 
patents that serve as a reward to persons for providing the means of violating any 
other law. 123 As it will be revealed from the discussion in Chapter 5, the meaning of 
the term 'generally inconvenient', however, is far from clear as it is incapable of 
being translated by literal statutory interpretation. 
refusal was that it was not a case of a second or other medical use, but rather a case of a mere discovery about 
an old use. 
122 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc [1999] RPC 253, 272. 
123 W M Hindmarch, A Treatise on the law relating to patent privileges for the sole use of inventions (1846), 
142. 
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Notwithstanding the ambiguity of some terms of s 6, it is said that '[Section 6] 
established as a rule that all prerogatives must be for the advantage and good of 
the people, otherwise they ought not to be allowed by the law'. 124 It would appear, 
therefore, that public good was always intended to be part of the patent system, 
right from its origins in the Statute of Monopolies. Consequently, in the Guidelines 
and Directive of the EPC, ethical and moral principles are acknowledged as being 
supplemental to the legal requirements under patent law irrespective of the 
particular technical field under examination. 125 
The term 'ordre public' is a French term, which cannot be readily translated into 
English. For this reason the original French term is used in Art 53 (a) as well as in 
Art 27.2 of the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
1995 (TRIPS) . 126 
Since 'ordre public' is retained in original French words, one would argue that it 
cannot be translated into 'public order' directly. However, this is what the 
Guidelines effectively indicate. Thus Part C-IV, 3.1 provide that the purpose of Art 
53 (a) is to 'exclude from protection inventions likely to induce riot or public 
disorder, or to lead to criminal or other generally offensive behaviour'. This seems 
to indicate that the Guidelines identify 'ordre public' as akin to the English concept 
of public order. Similarly, s 1(3)(a) of the Patents Act 1977 (UK) provides that a 
patent shall not be granted 'for an invention the publication or exploitation of which 
would be generally expected to encourage offensive, immoral, or anti-social 
behaviour'. 
In respect of interpretation of 'ordre public' by the Boards of Appeal, the case law 
indicates that any exceptions to patentability must be narrowly construed. 127 T 
19/90 was the first decision to deal with ethical issues under Art 53(a). This case 
concerned a transgenic non-human mammalian animal whose germ cells and 
somatic cells contain in the genome an activated oncogene which increases the 
124 MA Bacon, New Abridgement of the law, (7th ed, 1832 ) vol VI, 384. 
125 See, eg European Commissions, Council Directive, On The Legal Protection of Biotechnological 
Inventions (1998) [44] (The Directive); The Directive provides a list of specific exclusions as well as a 
general provision regarding application of Art 53(a) EPC. By virtue of the Directive examples of inventions 
are given to provide national courts and patent offices with a general guide to interpreting the reference to 
ordre public and morality in Art 53(a). 
126 See Article 27.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, which provides that Members may exclude from patentability 
inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to 
protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious 
prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is 
prohibited by their law. 
127 T 356/93 (OJ 1995, 545). 
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probability of neoplasm development in the animal, and a method for producing 
such an animal. According to the Boards of Appeal, before deciding whether to 
grant or refuse the patent application, an examining division had to carefully weigh 
• up of the suffering of animals and possible risks to the environment on the one 
hand, and the usefulness of the invention on the other. 128 After remitting of the 
case to the examining division by the Boards of Appeal, the patent was granted. 
Since this decision, amendments to the Implementing Regulations of the EPC give 
guidance on the definition of certain terms, providing that the relevant provisions of 
the EPC shall be applied and interpreted in accordance with the provisions of these 
rules, as amended. New R 23d EPC provides that patents shall not be granted in 
respect of biotechnological inventions which inter alia concern processes for 
modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them suffering 
without any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals 
resulting from such processes. 
Another case that considered the issue of morality was T 356/93. 129 The invention 
concerned a method that promotes resistance in plants and seeds to a particular 
class of herbicides so that they could be selectively protected against weeds and 
fungal diseases. The method involved integration into the genome of the plants a 
heterologous DNA encoding a protein capable of inactivating or neutralising the 
herbicides. The patent was opposed under Art 53(a) EPC on the grounds that the 
exploitation of the invention was likely to cause serious damage to the 
environment. The Boards of Appeal emphasized that even though it might be 
difficult to judge whether or not a claimed subject matter was contrary to 'ordre 
public' or morality, the provisions of Art 53(a) EPC could not be disregarded. Each 
case had to be considered in accordance with its circumstances. 
The Boards of Appeal interpreted the concept of 'ordre public' as covering the 
protection of public security and the physical integrity of individuals as part of 
society. It also included the protection of the environment. 139 Accordingly, 
inventions, the exploitation of which was likely to seriously prejudice public security 
and/or the environment, were to be excluded from patentability as being contrary to 
'ordre public'. 
In relation the concept of morality, the Boards of Appeal commented that it related 
to the belief that while some behavior was acceptable, other behavior was not. This 
'28 0J 1992, 588. 
129 OJ 1995, 545. 
13° Ibid. 
54 
belief was founded on the totality of the accepted norms and deeply rooted in a 
particular culture. For the purposes of the EPC, the culture in question was the 
culture inherent in European society and civilisation. It followed, therefore, that 
those inventions the exploitation of which was not in conformity with the 
conventionally accepted standards of conduct adopted by this culture were to be 
excluded from patentability as being contrary to morality. 
In this case the Board of Appeal ruled that, although there were chances of 
possible hazards from the application of genetic engineering techniques to plants, 
they did not lead to the conclusion that the exploitation of any of the claimed 
subject-matter would seriously prejudice the environment. Consequently, Art 53(a) 
EPC did not constitute a bar to patentability of the invention. 
Accordingly, an invention will be excluded from patentability under Art 53(a) if it 
raises serious social and ethical concerns. The discussion of the UK case law in 
Chapter 1 revealed that for the last 30 years the exclusion of methods of medical 
treatment from patenting is based on public policy and ethical grounds. It could be 
argued therefore that if methods of medical treatments should be excluded under 
European patent law, the exclusion should be made under Art 53(a). On the other 
hand, given that Art 53(a) has been narrowly applied, 131 it will be invoked in 
extreme cases, where an invention is likely to seriously induce public disorder or 
lead to criminal offences and/or endanger the environment. Since methods of 
medical treatment bring potential relief to numerous sufferers, can their patents be 
viewed to be contrary to the ordre public and morality? Based on current 
interpretation of Art 53(a), it is unlikely. 
Yet, as it will be demonstrated by discussion in Chapters 5 and 6, the scope of any 
term in legislation, is a matter of interpretation. It is submitted, therefore, that 
instead of express prohibition of patents to methods of medical treatment, each 
patent application must be reviewed against the 'ordre public' and morality 
exclusion. Each case should be considered in accordance with its circumstances. 
131 T 356/93 (OJ 1995, 545). 
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2.7 	CONCLUSION 
• A long history of the prohibition of methods of medical treatments in the UK and 
other European countries led to the enactment of Art 52(4) of the EPC, which 
expressly excludes 'methods of medical treatment of the human or animal body by 
surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods practiced on the human or animal body' 
from patentability by treating them as not 'susceptible of industrial application'. 
The interpretation of the wording of Art 52(4) 'shall not be regarded as' seems to 
suggest that such methods would in fact be susceptible of industrial application but 
for that prohibition. Therefore, though with some reservations, it is an artificially 
created state of affairs to disallow patentability of methods of medical treatment. 
With the introduction of the Swiss-type claims format, Art 52(4) is left with no scope 
for exclusion of methods of medical treatment involving second therapeutic 
applications. Accordingly, the effect of the acceptance of the Swiss-type claims by 
the EPO Board is to emasculate the methods of medical treatment exclusion 
contained in Art 52(4) and, thus, allow patenting of such methods when they 
involve the use of a substance. 
Hypothetical Example: Procedure For The Preparation Of A Donor Bone 
Marrow Transplant 
To form a clear picture of the implications of the law related to the patentability of 
methods of medical treatment, consider a hypothetical physician who invented and 
patented a cure for a current unsolved problem with so-called graft-versus-host 
disease, which makes a bone marrow transplant procedure hopeless for many 
leukemia patients. This disease is an immune reaction of the donor bone marrow 
against the recipient tissues. In other words, the donor bone marrow does not take 
properly in the recipient's body, and attacks the recipient's tissues instead. 
Essentially, our hypothetical physician has invented a method for the preparation of 
donor bone marrow. This preparation has the effect of decreasing the immune 
reaction against the recipient's tissues so that the donor bone marrow 'takes' well. 
Under UK and EPC law, that physician may or may not be able to patent this 
invention. The result depends upon the format used for the patent application. 
• 'The method for...' format 
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Assume the hypothetical physician wishes to obtain a patent for the pure 'method 
for the preparation of a donor bone marrow'. Under UK and the EPC law, he may 
not be able to patent this invention. This claim would fall into the narrow view of 
the term of 'medical treatment', since its performance requires the use of 
professional medical knowledge and skill. 
• 'The use of a device' format 
Assume the hypothetical physician has invented a new device that can be used for 
preparation of bone marrow. By making general patent claim for 'the use of a 
device' and omitting the step of performing a medical procedure, he would be able 
to obtain patent protection for this invention. 
• 'The new use of a known drug X' format 
Suppose the hypothetical physician discovers that an already known drug X can be 
used in a new way to suppress the immune system to allow donor bone marrow to 
'take' well. Under UK and the EPC law, the physician can patent the new use of the 
drug X, using Swiss-type claiming, provided that claim is not seeking patent 
protection for administering this drug. 
• 'The procedure, using the drug X' format 
Suppose that the hypothetical physician discovers that drug X, when used as 
described in the patent specification, in combination with a surgical procedure 
invented by her, substantially decreases the graft-versus-host disease. If the 
physician chooses to obtain a patent on the procedure, using the drug X, it is likely 
that the patent would not be allowed, since it would be treated as a 'pure' method 
of medical treatment claim. 
Summary of key findings 
It follows from the above example that only 'pure' surgical, therapeutic and 
diagnostic methods are excluded from patent protection in Europe, which in 
practice makes the exclusion of minimum value. The justification for this conclusion 
is that, with possibility of securing patent protection via the Swiss-type format, it is 
highly unlikely that a medical practitioner would make a patent claim for a 'pure' 
method. Rather, a surgeon who wishes to patent a new medical procedure 
involving therapeutic substances in Europe will almost certainly draft their claim in 
the Swiss-type format. 
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Swiss-type claiming is a creation of patent attorneys, accepted by courts as a 
means of providing an indirect way to secure patent protection for methods of 
therapeutic treatment. It means that an applicant can secure a claim to novelty 
through new therapeutic use, and can avoid the method of treatment exclusion by 
redrafting the claim to the manufacture of a medicament. It is a fiction' created by 
the courts to justify patent protection for a second or subsequent medical use 
directed to the medical treatment of humans and animals and has, as a result led 
to considerable debate both in the academic literature and in the courts. 132 
Although Swiss-type claiming is a solution to the problem of patentability of medical 
treatment, it suffers from lack of clarity as it is difficult, in practical terms, to define 
the validity and precise scope of a claim. This creates problems for potential 
infringers, since it is difficult to determine the nature of the act of infringement: is it 
the manufacture of the medicament, its use, or manufacture with a view to use? 133 
Moreover, it leaves uncertainty for the public who need to know what they allowed 
to do with known compounds. 134 
In accepting Swiss-type claiming, the Courts and Patent Offices in Europe have 
clearly made a policy decision to allow indirect protection of certain methods of 
medical treatment, despite the express prohibition in European patent law. Looking 
back at Chapter 1, the main justification for the exclusion of methods of medical 
treatment in modern law would seem to be centered on ethical considerations. 
There is scope to consider such matters in European patent law in the form of the 
ordre public and morality exclusion. Indeed, when considering whether a claimed 
subject-matter should be given patent protection, examiners are obliged to 
consider whether the exploitation of the invention is against public interest or likely 
to seriously prejudice public security and/or cause serious damage to the 
environment. If so, the invention will be excluded from patenting for being contrary 
to Art 53(a). To date, this provision has not been considered by the Courts or the 
various EPO Boards with regard to methods of medical treatment. It will be 
proposed in Chapter 6 that provisions in Art 53(a) warrant further scrutiny with 
regard to inventions relating to methods of medical treatment. It will be proposed 
that this provision might provide a feasible alternative to the proviso of s 6 of the 
Statute of Monopolies located in s 18(1) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth), which treats 
the patent void if it is contrary to the law, mischievous to the State, to the hurt of 
132 See, eg, J Savina, 'The Patentability of the Second Therapeutic Application — Why must the Law by 
Changed?' (1995) 8 Patent World 32; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc [1999] 
RPC 253. 
133 Savina, above n 118, 34. 
134 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc [1999] RPC 253, 272. 
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trade or generally inconvenient. It will also be argued that a provision of this nature 
is more suitable than outright exclusion of methods of medical treatment. European 
experience shows that such outright exclusions can and will be worked around by 
skilled patent attorneys. 
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CHAPTER 3: PATENTABILITY OF METHODS OF MEDICAL TREATMENT 
IN OTHER COUNTRIES OUTSIDE AUSTRALIA 
3.1 	INTRODUCTION 
Chapters 1 and 2 revealed that in the UK there is long standing authority for the 
exclusion of methods of medical treatment, although the justification for such 
exclusion has changed over time. All European countries that are members of the 
European Patent Convention (EPC), including the UK, are required to have an 
express exclusion in their legislation. However, as Chapter 2 concludes, the value 
of the European exclusion is questionable because of the legal fiction created by 
Swiss-type claims. As a consequence, it will be argued that Australian legislators 
should be wary of introducing a provision of this nature into the Patents Act 1990 
(Cth). 
Before discussing the patentability of methods of medical treatment in Australia, it 
is necessary to address the situation in other jurisdictions that have similar 
patenting system to Australia. This Chapter provides a review and comparative 
analysis of the common and statutory law of Canada, Israel, New Zealand and the 
US. Although the patent systems of these countries are no longer aligned the UK 
patent system, they are all derived from the same English patent legislation - the 
Statute of Monopolies 1624. It is intended that the analysis in this Chapter will 
assist in providing a backdrop against which the Australian position regarding 
patentability of methods of medical treatment is considered in Chapter 4. It will be 
suggested in later Chapters that the experiences of these countries, particularly 
Canada and the US, in the field of patenting of medical treatments might provide 
useful directions or alternatives in addressing issue of patentability of medical 
treatments in Australia. 
This Chapter consists of six parts. In Parts 3.1 - 3.5 a brief review of the legislation, 
case law and patent office practice in each jurisdiction is provided. The key 
features of the law and practice regarding patenting of methods of medical 
treatments in the country under observation are summarised at the end of each 
part A full account and comparative analysis of the reviewed laws and practice is 
made in the final Part 3.6. Hypothetical examples will be used in this part of the 




3.2.1 	Relevant Statutory Provisions 
In Canada the grant of patents is governed by the provisions of the Patents Act, 
R.S.C. 1985, P-4 (the Canadian Act). The Act provides for the patenting of 
inventions. An 'invention' is defined in s 2.as: 
any new and useful art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement in any art, process, machine, manufacture or 
composition of matter. 
Section 2 of the Canadian Act is a mirror provision of its predecessor, s 2 of the 
Patent Act, R.S.C. 1952. There is nothing in the Canadian Act that expressly 
excludes methods of medical treatment from patentability, and as a consequence 
the issue has been left to the courts to address. The position of the courts 
regarding this issue appears to be similar to the UK approach prior to the inclusion 
of an express exclusion in the Patents Act 1977 (UK) in compliance with the EPC. 
Accordingly, the Canadian courts have considering methods of medical treatment 
as inherently unpatentable, following the Supreme Court decision in Tennessee 
Eastman Co v The Commissioner l 
3.2.2 	Case Law 
3.2.2.1 Tennessee Eastman Co v The Commissioner 
In 1972 the Supreme Court of Canada had to decide whether a new surgical use 
for a known substance could be claimed as an invention under Patent Act, R.S.C. 
1952, s 2(d). The inventor made an unexpected discovery that a previously known 
adhesive could be used in a new surgical method of joining or bonding the 
surfaces of incisions or wounds in living animal tissue by applying the compound 
in a liquid state, directly to at least one of the tissue surfaces to be bonded. Since 
the substance was already known, the claim was limited to the method. 
The Examiner had refused a patent for the method on the basis that granting a 
monopoly on the use of the material would hamper the medical profession, and 
thus was not in the public interest. 2 This conclusion was upheld by the acting 
1 (1972) 33 DLR (3d) 459. 
2  Ibid, 460. 
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Commissioner in July 1968. Subsequently, the court of first instance affirmed the 
decision of the Commissioner, holding that the method under review did not lie in 
the field of manual or productive arts, nor, when applied to the human body, did it 
produce a result in relation to trade, commerce or industry or a result that was 
essentially economic. 3 Consequently, the court decided that the method was not 
an art or process or an improvement of an art or process within the meaning of the 
Patent Act, R.S.C. 1952, s 2(d). 
On appeal, the Supreme Court's decision, delivered by Pigeon J, was not based 
on the reason that medical treatments could not satisfy the economic element, but 
on an interpretation of s 41(1) of the Patent Act, R.S.C. 1952. Section 41 restricted 
the granting of patents 'relating to substances prepared or produced by chemical 
processes and intended for food or medicine'. It might be supposed that this 
provision prohibited patenting of substances prepared by chemical processes and 
intended to be applied therapeutically but not their methods of preparation. 
However, the Supreme Court reasoned that if the medical substance was not 
patentable, neither was its use, and therefore, methods of medical treatment were 
excluded as wel1. 4 
In deciding this case, the court referred to UK, 5 New Zealand6 and Australian' 
case law. However, due to substantial differences between the legislation in these 
countries and Canadian statutes, the court concluded that those authorities did not 
assist. Moreover, none of that case law related to a medical or surgical method as 
such. Pigeon J said that while those decisions could be of some interest in dealing 
with the patentability of inventions related to slaughtering or agricultural 
processes, they did not provide assistance in interpreting s 41(1) with respect to 
the exclusion of a surgical or medical method. 
3.2.2.2 Decisions After the Tennessee Case 
In 1985 s 41 of the Patent Act, R.S.C. 1952 was repealed. Consequently new 
medical substances no longer needed to be limited to its use. Thus, it might be 
expected that the basis for the refusal to patent methods of medical treatment laid 
down by the court in the Tennessee case, would have disappeared. Yet, in reality 
it has not. In /C1 v The Commissioner, 8 for example, the Federal Court of Appeal 
3 
 
Ibid. 464 (Kerr J). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Re Schering AG 's Application [1971] RPC 337; Swift & Company's Application [1962] RPC 37. 
6 SW ift & Co v Commissioner of Patents [1960] NZLR 775. 
7 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252. 
8 (1986) 9 CPR (3d) 289. 
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followed the Tennessee case, and held that a method of cleaning teeth involving 
the use of a known substance was a method of medical treatment. The court took 
this view because at least one of the leading functions or purposes of the cleaning 
of teeth was medical method, therefore unpatentable. 
In 1996, the case of Visx v Nidek, 9 concerning a patent for a laser apparatus for 
performing ophthalmologic surgery, was decided by Rothstein J, of the Federal 
Court of Canada, Trial Division. The defendant argued that since the apparatus 
was designed to perform surgical procedures and since surgical procedures have 
been held to be inherently unpatentable in Canada, the patent claiming the 
apparatus must be invalid. However, Rothstein J, held that when the claim 
involves a medical apparatus and its use the claim did not constitute a method of 
medical treatment. 1° Consequently, the claim was upheld. 
This decision raises a question as to whether a claim for an apparatus and its use 
is of the same nature as a claim for a method of medical or surgical treatment. The 
view taken by the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office," the 
UK Patents Court12 and, at that time, by the Patent Office of Canada, 13 was that a 
method of use of a medical apparatus or medical substance was considered to be 
a method of medical treatment. Rothstein J's judgment in Visx v Nidek would seem 
to be contrary to this line of authority. However, as was explained by one Canadian 
commentator, 'the use by Rothstein J of the words 'and its use' must be treated as 
inadvertent, and should not be considered as a change in the law.' 14 On this basis, 
it would seem that a claim to the apparatus itself would be patentable, but not a 
claim to the use of the apparatus in surgical procedures. 
Notwithstanding Justice Rothstein's 'inadvertent' terminology in Visx v Nidek, since 
that case several rejections of applications for patents directed to inventions 
relating to the human body have been successfully appealed to the Patent Appeal 
Board of the Canadian Patent Office. 15 This suggests that the Board is willing to 
take a narrow view of the phrase 'medical treatment' in the strict sense, only 
disallowing patenting of pure surgical and therapeutic procedures, which require 
the use of professional knowledge. 
9 (1996) 66 CPR (3d) 178 (FCTD). 10  Visx v Nidek 1996) 66 CPR (3d) 178 (Rothstein J). 
"See Eisai/Second Medical Indication (1985) OJ EPO 60. 
12 John Wyeth & Brother Ltd's Application and Schering A.G's Application [1985] RPC 545. 
13 B Garland, 'Methods of Medical Treatment Revised' (1997) 8 Patent World 1, 8; Canadian Patent Office, 
Manual of Patent Office Practice (1998), Government of Canada, Ottawa, see http://patentsLic.gc.ca/ (date 
accessed: 15 Septembert 2007). 
14 Garland, above n 16, 8. 
15 See Re Application No. 016, 962; Re Application No. 880, 719; Re Application No. 372,233. 
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	3.2.3 	'Use Of Claims 
Though pure methods of medical treatment are not directly patentable in Canada, 
it has been suggested by Canadian Patent and Trademark Agents 16 that such 
methods can be patented indirectly. Making general patent claims for the use of a 
drug or device and omitting the step of performing a medical procedure or 
administering a drug can still protect this type of invention. This type of claim 
would not purport to incorporate the professional skill needed to constitute a 
method of medical treatment. Like the Swiss-type claims in Europe, these use of 
claims has become very popular in Canada. 
The Trial Division of the Federal Court of Canada in Merck & Co v Apotex17 made 
it clear that claims to pharmaceutical compounds and compositions are not 
equivalent to claims for methods of medical treatment. The situation, however, is 
not clear in respect of second medical use. As noted in Apotex v Wellcome l8 such 
patents might be seen to lie in between methods of medical treatment and 
compounds used in methods of medical treatment. Since in second medical use 
claims, the compound is not new, the only scope for the patent claim remains in 
the new use of that compound in a course of treatment. According to Apotex v 
Wellcome19 it was at least arguable that a claim for a new medical use of a known 
substance was, in effect, a method of medical treatment and could be potentially 
denied patent protection. 
3.2.4 	Summary of Canadian Position 
This brief review of the Canadian legislation and case law indicates that methods 
of surgical and prophylactic treatments are not patentable in Canada.2° This 
approach results in a similar outcome to the express exclusion of surgical and 
therapeutic methods adopted in Europe under Art 52(4) EPC, first sentence. 
However, as a claim to the apparatus itself would be patentable, it follows that, 
unlike Europe, diagnostic methods may be patentable in Canada. 21 
16 See Intp://patentsl.ic.gc.ca/ (date accessed: 5 October 2007); Deeth Williams Wall LLP - Patent and Trade 
Mark agents: www.dww.com (date accessed: 25 August 2007). 
1 7 (1995) 59 CPR (3d) 133. 
1 8 (1996) 68 CPR (3d) 23. 
19 Ibid. 
2° Re Application of Ackerman (1977)105 CPR 14-xviii. 
21 ViSX v Nidek 1996) 66 CPR (3d) 178; Re Application for patent of Goldenberg (1988) 22 CPR 159. 
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Furthermore, while a pharmaceutical substance that would be used in preventing 
or treating a medical condition of a patient could be patented in Canada, the 
treatment itself would be unpatentable. This distinction is questionable as the 
patentable compound usually consists of the drug itsetf and its use of treatment. 
The rationale behind the distinction is based on the view that the treatment 
consists of the judgment applied by the physician on a case-by-case basis as to 
the dose and duration of therapy that is required to treat the particular patient, and 
the drug compound is merely a substance used in this treatment. 22 Accordingly, 
while the compound for a particular use or uses is patentable, the treatment 
consisting of the application of the patentable compound is not. 
It could be argued, therefore that in Canada, since a method of medical treatment 
is distinguished from the use of a compound in that treatment, there remains a fair 
amount of latitude for patenting the compounds and devices used in medical 
treatments. 
3.3 	ISRAEL 
3.3.1 	Relevant Statutory Provisions 
In Israel the relevant patent legislation is the Patents Act 1967 (the Israeli Act). 
Section 3 defines patentable subject matter and includes inventions that are 
susceptible to industrial or agricultural application. Industrial applicability has been 
broadly interpreted and practically all commercially important inventions are 
considered today as being 'industrially applicable'. 23 
Section 7 of the Israeli Act lists several express exclusions from patentability, 
including methods of therapeutic treatment of the human body, new varieties of 
plants and animals and microbiological organisms derived from nature. It states, in 
part: 'Notwithstanding the provision of Section 2, no patent shall be granted for - 
(1) a methods of therapeutic treatment of the human body'. 
It must be noted that the previous law, the Mandatory Patents and Designs 
Ordinance 1924 (the Israeli Ordinance), contained no express prohibition on 
patenting of methods of medical treatment, and in the absence of any statutory 
directives, the issue was considered by the courts. In the administration of the 
22 Merck & Co v Apotex (1995) 59 CPR (3d) 133. 
23See general reports of the International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property 
http://www.aippi.org (date accessed: 20 September 2007). 
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Ordinance the Israeli courts were guided by the relevant English legislation at the 
time, the Patents and Designs Act 1949 (UK), which also did not explicitly exclude 
medical method patents. 
3.3.2 	Case Law 
The issue of patentability of methods of medical treatment of humans was raised 
before the Supreme Court of Israel in 1973 in Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Plantex 
Ltd24 (Wellcome Foundation). The case involved an action for infringement of a 
patent relating to the use of a known chemical substance, allopurinol, in the 
treatment of gout. The defendants, Plantex, challenged the validity of the patent on 
a number of grounds, particularly upon the allegation that the invention was 
excluded from patentability in that it concerned a method of medical treatment of 
humans. Plantex also argued that the antimetabolic activity of allopurinol was 
known and that no new properties were disclosed or claimed by the patent. 
Since the patent had been granted before the Israeli Act came into force, the issue 
about patentability of medical treatment and the validity of patent was decided 
under the previous law, the Ordinance. It was agreed by the defendants that in the 
general administration of the Ordinance, the Israeli Courts should be guided by UK 
law. Although UK courts had accepted that there was a treatment exception in that 
jurisdiction, the court of first instance in Wellcome Foundation held that the UK 
exception derived from UK Patent Office practice, not law. On this basis, the court 
found in favour of the plaintiff, Wellcome Foundation, holding that the patent was 
valid and infringed. 
The defendant unsuccessfully appealed to the Israeli Supreme Court. The judges 
of the Supreme Court agreed that although Israel should generally be guided by 
English law, the practice of the UK Patent Office was not binding on the Israeli 
courts in the interpretation of the Ordinance. Thus, the court was free to consider 
this question on its merits. 25 
Witkon J delivered the leading judgment. The first inquiry His Honour dealt with 
was whether there was patentable subject matter in the discovery of novel 
properties in a known substance, which discovery enabled the application of the 
substance for new and useful purposes. His Honour had no doubt that the reply to 
this inquiry should be in the affirmative. In support of his view, Witkon J referred to 
the Australian landmark judgment in the matter of National Research Development 
24 [1974] RPC 514, published in Hebrew in PD! (Supreme Court Judgments), vol. 27, 29. 
25 Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Plantex Ltd [1974] RPC 514, 533. 
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Corporation v Commissioner of Patents26 (NRDC), from which it followed that 
although in the past there had been opinions against the grant of a patent for such 
an invention, the patentability of such an invention could no longer be 
challenged 27 
Witkon J then turned to the question of whether it was possible to obtain a patent 
on a method of medical treatment of humans. Even though it was found in the 
affirmative that there was an invention, the appellant argued that the invention 
merely consisted of finding a new use for an old substance, allopurinol. The 
appellant further argued that since the inventive step resided in the new use, the 
patent was directed to the method of medical treatment itself, an was therefore not 
patentable. Here Witkon J was again guided by NRDC. Although that case focused 
on patenting of agricultural process, it assisted Witkon J for what it said about 
English Patent Office practice regarding interpretation of the word linvention'. 28 In 
NRDC the Australian High Court disagreed with such practice and did not follow its 
decisions. On this basis, Witkon J did not hesitate to disregard the practice of 
exclusion of medical treatment patents. After reviewing the case law on this matter, 
he concluded that the rule by which no patent is granted for methods of medical 
treatment of humans is not desirable, since 'there is nowadays a tendency in 
favour of inventors in order to foster and support science and to ensure a proper 
reward to the investigator and investor'. 29 Witkon J continued: 
There is no logic in such an exclusion as long as it is lawful to obtain a patent on a 
pharmaceutical product, since in both cases there is an equal need for patent 
protection. ... There is thus no ground, either in law or in logic, for holding that a 
methods of therapeutic treatment is unpatentable and any consideration that at one 
time might possibly have justified such a holding, is nowadays devoid of any 
substance. It may certainly not be said that such an invention is not within the 
realm of economic endeavour in accordance with the test laid down in NRDC 
[1961] RPC 134, or that it is within the realm of 'fine art' as distinct from 'useful 
art'.3° 
Both Kahn and Kister JJ agreed with Witkon J on the point that the Israeli courts 
were not bound by the English Patent Office practice because of the different 
statutory provisions in the two countries. However, both expressed reservations 
26 (1959) 102 CLR 252. 
27 Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Plantex Ltd [1974] RPC 514, 519. 
28 See National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252, 270- 
272, 277. See also the discussion of NRDC in Chapter 4, Parts 4.4.2 and 4.5.1.2. 
29 Ibid, 536. 
"Ibid. 
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about the creation of a monopoly by a patent in respect of areas concerned with 
saving human life or alleviation of human suffering. 
Since this case was heard after the new Patents Act 1967 come into force, which 
explicitly prohibited patents for methods of medical treatment of humans, Witkon 
J's judgment was the last contribution to the debate about granting patent 
protection to methods of medical treatment in Israel. It is perhaps unfortunate that 
the case was decided after the new legislation was debated and enacted by the 
Israeli Parliament. Otherwise, the case might have influenced legislators in making 
their decisions as to whether or not to accept the inclusion of the method of 
medical treatment exclusion in the new legislation. 
3.3.3 	'Use Of Claims 
Similarly to the position in Europe, the ban on the patentability of methods of 
medical treatment in Israel has caused problems where a known substance 
already used to treat a particular medical condition is found to be useful in treating 
some other medical condition. In Europe, where methods of medical treatment are 
also unpatentable, the Swiss-type claim was devised to enable second medical 
uses to obtain some patent protection. 
In Israel, according to the Practice Directives of the Registrar made in 1993 and 
still in force at the present time, 31 a claim in the form 'Use of X in the 
manufacture/preparation of Y' is considered to be a process claim and as such 
complies with s 3 of the Israeli Act. 32 For a first medical use, the claim in the form 
'Use of X in the manufacture/preparation of a medicament substantially as 
described in the specification' would be prima-facie acceptable. In addition, the 
claim 'Compound X for use as a medicament' would also be considered to comply 
with the provisions of the Israeli Act. 33 
For a second medical use to be allowable it is necessary to specify such new use 
embodying the inventive step, for example: 'Use of X in the 
manufacture/preparation of a medicament having anti-inflammatory activity 
substantially as described in the specification'.34 The following forms would be also 
allowable: 'Compound X for use as anti-inflammatory agent', or 'Compound X for 
use in the treatment of Aids'. 
31 See Israel Patent Office Claims Practice in Materials, Chemical and Pharmaceutical Cases- Part II (Claims 
Practice). 
32 Claims Practice, Directive No.38. 
33 Claims Practice, Directive No.40. 
34 Ibid. 
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3.3.4 	Summary of Israeli Position 
The Israeli position is different from that of the Canadian as the Israeli Act 
expressly prohibits patenting of methods of medical treatment by virtue of s 7. This 
approach is similar to that of the UK and Europe. Furthermore, the approach taken 
with regards to the first and second medical use is similar to the UK and European 
approach — a pharmaceutical substance, whether itself, or in respect of second 
medical use will be patentable. 
3.4 	NEW ZEALAND 
3.4.1 	Relevant Statutory Provisions 
In New Zealand, the grant of patents is governed by the provisions of the Patents 
Act 1953 (the NZ Act). The Act contains no express prohibition for methods of 
medical treatment. The question of patenting of such methods has been reserved 
for the courts to decide. The courts, therefore, have to determine whether methods 
of medical treatment fall within the meaning of 'invention' under s 2 (1) of the NZ 
Act, which• provides: 
'Invention' means any manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent and 
grant of privilege within s six of the Statute of Monopolies and any new method or 
process of testing applicable to the improvement or control of manufacture; and 
includes an alleged invention. 
The Statute of Monopolies' means the Act of the twenty-first year of the reign of 
King James the First, chapter three, entitled 'An Act concerning monopolies and 
dispensations with penal laws and the forfeiture thereof'. 
The New Zealand legislation has been under review for possible reform since 
1990. 35 In 1992 and in 1994, after considering the reform process the Ministry of 
Commerce recommended that the current definition of 'invention' be repealed. 36 
The Ministry proposed that the three criteria - newness, inventive step and 
industrial applicability - should determine a patentable invention. This approach 
35 Philip Culbert, 'Patent Law Reform in New Zealand: Should Methods of Medical Treatment be 
Patentable?' (1997) Patent World 32; Todd Martin, 'Patentability of Methods of Medical Treatment: A 
Comparative Study' (2000) 82 Journal of the Patent & Trademark Office 381. 
36 Reform of the Patents Act 1953 Proposed Recommendations (Ministry of Commerce, Wellington, 1992). 
69 
would have brought New Zealand standards of patentability into line with those in 
the EPC. However, the Ministry also recommended that there should be no 
exclusions from patentability, a view significantly different from that adopted by the 
EPC. It also proposed an Intellectual Property Law Reform Bill to implement the 
above recommendations. 37 
It has been argued that the effect of these changes would have been to allow 
patents for methods of medical treatment. 38 However, due to internal government 
changes and other delays, the proposals have never been implemented. Policy 
approval was given in August 2000 for a new three-stage review of the Act by the 
Ministry of Economic Development. The reason for three stages was to break such 
a major reform project into more manageable pieces. To date, the review of patent 
legislation continues with the release of the draft Patents Bill in December 2004. 
The Bill is yet to be passed in Parliament. The new legislation is not expected to 
come into force until 2008. 
The most significant changes relate to the requirements for patentability. Under the 
Bill an invention must be novel, inventive (ie, non-obvious) and useful in order to 
receive patent protection. These amendments bring the New Zealand patent 
examination criteria into accordance with international patent examination 
requirements. The Bill will also introduce exclusions from patentability for 'human 
beings and biological processes for their generation' and 'diagnostic, therapeutic or 
surgical methods for the treatment of human beings', as well as plant varieties. 39 
For the present, however, the NZ Act remains in force and given that it is silent on 
the patentability of methods of medical treatment it is necessary to review the case 
law. 
3.4.2 	Development of New Zealand Case Law 
Since under New Zealand patent law an alleged patent must fall within the 
meaning of 'invention', the courts must first decide whether it is a 'manner of new 
manufacture' within s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. This approach is identical to 
the one used by the English courts under the Patents and Designs Act 1949 (UK), 
and, as we will see in Chapter 4, by the Australian courts under current Australian 
patent law. 
37 Tom Sydall, 'Method of Treatment Claims and Patent Law Reform in New Zealand' (1996) The Charted 
Institute of Patent Attorneys Journal 423. 
38 Sydall, above n 36. 
39 New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development, A Review of the Patents Act 1953: Boundaries to 
Patentability: A Discussion Paper (2002), New Zealand, see 
www.med.govt.nz/busItlint_prop/patentsreview/index.html (date accessed: 15 October 2007). 
70 
New Zealand case law reveals the same progressive approach to the manner of 
manufacture concept as adopted in the UK. The early cases dealing with medical 
inventions patents and the phrase 'manner of new manufacture' adopted the same 
interpretation of the concept as English courts after the decision In the Matter of C 
& Ws Application for a Patent4° (C & W's Application), where the court refused 
the application for method of medical treatment since it did not employ any form of 
manufacture or of trade, and thus lacked commercial value.41 
3.4.2.1 Maeder v 'Ronda' Ladies' Hairdressing Salon 42 (Maeder) 
This case involved an action for infringement of a patent granted in respect of an 
improved process of, and means for, producing permanent waves on hair growing 
on the human head. In the lower court, giving judgment for the defendants on the 
ground that the patent was invalid for technical reasons, Smith J nevertheless was 
of the opinion that a process for the permanent waving of the human hair' on the 
scalp may be 'a manner of new manufacture'. 
On appeal in the Court of Appeal, Myers CJ and Johnston J held that for a process 
to be patentable, if it did not produce a vendible art, it must at least have relation in 
some way, directly or indirectly, to the production of a vendible art, an art of 
commerce. Thus, a process for 'permanent waving' of hair growing on the human 
head was not patentable, as it did not result in the production of a vendible art, an 
art of commerce. In so ruling the court followed the principles set out in C & W's 
Application (1914) 31 RPC 235. 43 
3.4.2.2 Swift & Co v Commissioner of Patents" 
In this case the court considered whether a new method of 'tenderizing' meat 
through enzymatic action was 'a manner of manufacture' within the meaning of s 6 
of the Statute of Monopolies. This case was decided after the Australian High 
Court decision in NRDC, and clearly followed the reasoning of the court in that 
case.45 In delivering his judgment, Barrowclough CJ referred with approval to the 
following observation of the Australian High Court: 
4° (1914) 31 RPC 235. 
41 Ibid., 236. 
42 [1943] NZLR 122. 
43 Maeder v 'Ronda' Ladies 'Hairdressing Salon [1943] NZLR 122, 123. 
44 [1960] NZLR 775. 
45 It must also be pointed out that a few months later, a similar patent application was decided before the 
Patent Appeal tribunal in UK, Swift 's & Co 's Application [1961] RPC 129 discussed in Chapter 1 Part 1.3.3. 
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It is, we think, only by understanding the word 'product' as covering every end 
product produced, and treating the word 'vendible' as pointing only to the 
requirement of utility in practical affairs that the language of Morton J's 'rule' [in the 
GEC case (1942) 60 RPC 1] may be accepted as wide enough to convey the broad 
idea which the long line of decisions on the subject has shown to be 
comprehended by the Statute. 46 
Even though the process of 'tenderizing' meat was not related to an agricultural or 
horticultural enterprise, and was a biological invention, the Chief Justice pointed 
out that the conclusion reached in NRDC was as applicable to biological inventions 
as it was to horticultural and agricultural enterprises. He stated that if the alleged 
invention fell with a specific category, one could not negate patentability of that 
invention solely on the ground that the process is within that category. 47 
Barrowclough CJ concluded that though the process at issue was not within the 
ordinary everyday concept of 'manufacture', it was clearly a 'manner of 
manufacture' because the phrase 'must be interpreted in relation to a modern 
word's ever expanding knowledge of science and technology. ,48 
In reaching his decision, Barrowclough CJ did not refer to the earlier case of 
Maeder. For this reason, in a later decision of the Patent Office° the Assistant 
Commissioner expressed some doubt as to whether Barrowclough CJ was correct 
in law in coming to the decision that he did. It is also noteworthy that the decision 
of Barrowclough CJ was not followed in the following year in the UK by Lloyd-
Jacob J, when he refused a patent for a similar process of 'tenderizing' meat in the 
UK Swift case. 5° 
3.4.2.3 	Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents51 (Wellcome) 
Wellcome Foundation Ltd made an unexpected discovery that a previously known 
compound (which was not patentable per se) was considerably effective in the 
treatment of meningeal leukemia or neoplasms in the brain of humans and other 
mammals. Previously known drugs used in contemporary antileukemic therapy did 
not pass the blood-brain barrier with the result that the central nervous system 
The facts of the case were identical to the UK Swift case. However, unlike the decision in the NZ Swift, 
Lloyd-Jacob J in the UK Swift case refused a patent for a similar process. 
46 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252, 276. 
47 SWift & Co v Commissioner of Patents [1960] NZLR 775, 779. 
48 Ibid, 781. 
49 Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1979] 2 NZLR 591. 
5° See discussion of the UK Swift case in Chapter 1, Part1.3.3. 
51 [1979] 2 NZLR 591. 
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could serve as a sanctuary for leukemic cells, resulting in the probability that the 
patient would develop meningeal leukemia. The new discovery could overcome 
this problem, because the compounds were capable of crossing the blood-brain 
barrier and concentrating within the brain. However, since the product itself was 
already known and not patentable, the subject matter of the alleged invention had 
to be restricted to a method of treating meningeal leukemia or neoplasms in the 
brain such as lymphoma of the central nervous system, and the preparations used 
for such treatment. The examiner rejected the application, following the decision in 
Maeder. He concluded that the method claimed did not relate to an invention within 
the meaning of the NZ Act, s 2, as they related to a m ethod of treatment of man 
and thus did not result in a vendible product. 52 
The Chief Justice, Sir Ronald Davison, handed down the judgment of the Supreme 
Court in 1979. Davison CJ examined relevant authorities from New Zealand, the 
UK, Australia and Israel. From this examination he concluded that there was 
neither statutory provision nor court decision prohibiting the grant of a patent 
protection for methods of medical treatment in New Zealand. 53 
The Chief Justice pointed out that there was no case in the Australian jurisdiction 
where a matter concerning patenting of such methods has arisen for consideration. 
Though in the NRDC and Joos v Commissioner of Patents54 (Joos) Australian 
High Court judges have referred to such methods, they expressed doubts about 
their patentability. For example, in NRDC a small remark was made about methods 
of medical treatment: 'even if only in order to put aside, as they apparently must be 
put aside'. 55 In Joos Barwick CJ allowed methods of medical treatment of a 
cosmetic nature but expressed no clear view as to whether methods of medical 
treatment were excluded. The Chief Justice discussed the exclusion in carefully 
worded phrases such as nor the purpose of deciding this question it may be 
granted', 56 'if it to be accepted', 57 and 'if it is to be maintained'. 58 
The review of English case law led Davison CJ to conclude that Schering, 59 Eli 
Lilly69 and Upjohn61 did not provide a satisfactory basis on which to prevent the 
52  Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1979] 2 NZLR 592. 
53 Ibid, 620. 
54 (1972)126 CLR611. 
"National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252, 270. 
56 Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 611, 619. 
57 Ibid, 622. 
58 Ibid, 623. 
59 Schering AG 's Application [1971] RPC 337. 
6° Eli Lilly & Company's Application [1975] RPC 438. 
61 Upjohn Company (Robert's) Application [1977] RPC 94. 
73 
development of the law relating to patentability of methods of medical treatment in 
New Zealand. In commenting those decisions, he said: 
The considerations which persuade me that there is no impediment in law to grant 
of a patent for a process for the medical treatment ... appear not to have been 
argued fully before the Courts in these cases.62 
The Chief Justice continued that in Schering and Joos 'the Courts established 
distinctions without a difference'. 63 His Honour put the matter in this way: 
Is there any justification in law or in logic to say that simply because, on the one 
hand, substances produce a cosmetic result or a functional result as opposed to a 
curative result, the one is patentable and the other is not? I think not. The Court 
must now take a realistic view of this matter in the light of current scientific 
developments and legal progress. The law must meet the needs of the age.64 
Following on from this analysis, Davison CJ felt no hesitation in passing over the 
barrier of so called 'non-patentability' and holding that a method of medical 
treatment may be the subject of a patent under the New Zealand Patents Act 1953. 
In his consideration of the proviso of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies - that requires 
the method concerned not to be contrary to the law, or mischievous to the State, by 
raising prices of commodities at home or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient - 
Davison CJ noted that the method in the issue was not contrary to the law. He 
added that in Eli Lilly the basis on which a method of medical treatment has been 
denied patent protection for many years was because such a grant might be 
'mischievous to the State or generally inconvenient', and the denial was based on 
'ethics rather than logic'. 65 
Davison CJ strongly disagreed with this view and stated that an examination of the 
development of the law on this topic indicated that the exclusion was based solely 
on the Patent Office practice, which existed prior to the C & W's Application in 
1914 and that Lord Buckmaster's decision in C & W's Application simply reaffirmed 
the practice. Ethical considerations did not apply. 66 The Chief Justice continued: 
62 Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1979] 2 NZLR 591, 621. 
63 Ibid,621. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Eli Lilly & Company's Application [1975] RPC 438, 445. 
66 Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1979] 2 NZLR 591, 619-620. 
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Now the foundation for the decision in the C & W case has been removed by 
subsequent decisions, the Courts have been grasping for some other ground on 
which to base a refusal to exclude process for medical treatment from patent 
protection. I find no warrant in law for grounding such refusal on ethical 
considerations. 67 
In support of this conclusion, the Chief Justice said that since the researchers who 
discovered that new properties and new uses exist for known chemicals cannot 
obtain any patent protection for the chemicals themselves, they must be provided 
with other incentives for expending the time, effort and money to make such 
discoveries. Those incentives can only be created if a patent protection is available 
for new methods of medical treatment.68 
The Commissioner of Patents appealed the decision of Davison CJ to the Court of 
Appea1.69 Somers J, after reviewing English case law, the law of the EPC and the 
New Zealand case law on this matter, concluded that logic is not always a safe 
guide to the law, especially in the case of methods of medical treatment. This is 
because the treatment of human beings is of a special character, and it might be 
'generally inconvenient' to grant a patent protection for methods of such 
treatment. 79 
McMullin J admitted that patent protection might encourage research for new 
methods of medical treatment. Therefore, human suffering may be alleviated to the 
greater good of mankind. However, his Honour also pointed out that, on the other 
hand, the grant of a patent is the grant of a monopoly and may lead to abuse. 
Therefore, a shift in emphasis that favours one interest might be achieved only at 
the expense of the other. For these reasons, his Honour concluded that it was not 
for the court, but for the Parliament, to decide whether, and to what extent, any 
significant innovative movement was justifiable. 71 
The third member of the Court of Appeal, Cooke J (as he then was) reached a 
similar conclusion. He said that while there have been developments in the law 
concerning this matter, they have not been acted upon, except in the judgment of 
Davison CJ. His Honour added that logically, no doubt, this approach could go so 
far, but the field of medical or surgical treatment and drugs is one in which special 
67Ibid, 620. 
68 Ibid. 




considerations have to be born in mind. 72 He concluded that the art of the 
physician or the surgeon in alleviating human suffering does not belong to the area 
of economic endeavour or trade and commerce. 
The decision of the New Zealand Commissioner of Patents to appeal from Davison 
CJ's decision warrants some further consideration. Since the function of the Patent 
Office is to administer the patent law as it is, and not to seek to influence it, it has 
been argued that the case should have been decided on its facts. 73 That is, once 
the court had decided that the invention satisfied all the requirements of the New 
Zealand legislation, as Davison CJ concluded it did, the Commissioner should 
have simply accepted this decision and granted the patent. 
3.4.2.4 The Practice of the New Zealand Patent Office 
Following the Wellcome case, the New Zealand Patent Office continued to refuse 
patent applications for methods of medical treatment of the human body. However, 
claims for methods of cosmetic treatment have since been allowed. 76 Moreover, 
developments in patent law around the world were reflected in a Commissioner's 
Practice Note issued in October 199876 (Practice Note) where it was stated that 
claims for methods for treatment of humans would be allowed except where the 
identified treatment related to the treatment of illness or disease. 
This practice, which must be read in conjunction with the appeal decision in the 
Wellcome case, allows patenting of some treatment of humans, which appears to 
include claims to the treatment of conditions that do not cause suffering or that 
might be matters of choice. 
72 Ibid,175. 
73 See, eg, A. White, 'Patentability of Medical Treatment Wellcome Foundation's (Hitching's) Application' 
(1980) 11 European Intellectual Property Review, 364, 366. 
74 Since 1 August 1997, the New Zealand Patent Office was renamed as the Intellectual Property Office of 
New Zealand (IPONZ). 
75 Martin, above n 34, 394; Joseph Handelman 's Application, NZPOJ No. 1367, Vol.82, issue No.3 (23 April 
1993). 
76 IPONZ Practice Note, October 1998. See: http://www.iponz.govt.nz/p1s/web/dbssiten.main, (date accessed: 
15 October 2007). 
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3.4.3 	'Use Of' Claims 
3.4.3.1 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of 
Patents77 
This broad approach of the New Zealand Patent Office was confirmed by the 
recent judgment in Pharmaceutical Management Agency Limited v Commissioner 
of Patents78 (Pharmaceutical Management Agency), where the Court of Appeal 
stated that methods of medical treatment are now considered to be 'inventions' in 
New Zealand, and their exclusion is only based on public policy grounds. 79 This 
case also upheld the validity of Swiss-type claims for new uses of known 
substances. 
This case arose as a result of a Practice Note issued by the Commissioner on 7 
July 1997 which reviewed Patent Office practice, in the light of the continuing 
international trends to liberalise the definition of 'invention'. The Commissioner 
came to the conclusion that it was appropriate that the Swiss-type claims should be 
allowed. The Practice Note also stated that claims to therapeutic treatment of 
human would continue to be disallowed. At around the same time, the Patent 
Office began accepting Swiss-type claims directed to the 'use of a known 
compound X in the manufacture of a medicament for a new therapeutic use'. 
However, shortly after the Practice Note was released, Pharmaceutical 
Management Agency Ltd (Pharmac) filed an application for judicial review in the 
High Court, seeking an order setting aside the practice decision, any accepted 
patent applications which had not yet progressed to the granting of a patent and 
any patents which, by the time the proceeding was heard, may have been granted 
as a result of the practice decision. 8° 
Pharmac is the body responsible for managing the public funding and subsidization 
of medicines in New Zealand. It strongly advocated the view that grants of patents 
for inventions in respect of second or subsequent uses of pharmaceutical 
compounds could prevent competition among pharmaceutical suppliers, with 
adverse effects on the pricing of pharmaceuticals. 81 It challenged the right of the 
Commissioner of Patents to accept patents drafted in the Swiss-type form. If 
successful, the orders sought by Pharmac would have resulted in granted patents 
77 [1999] NZCA 332. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid, 333. See further discussion regarding this point. 
8° Ibid, 333. 
81 Ibid, 334-5. 
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being revoked for some 24 international pharmaceutical companies and the 
Researched Medicines Industry Association of New Zealand (RMI). Although the 
New Zealand Commissioner of Patents was named by Pharmac as the defendant, 
the affected pharmaceutical companies and RMI reached an agreement that they 
would also join as defendants. 
(a) 	The Judgment of Gallen J in the High Court 
In the High Court Pharmac argued that a Swiss-type claim is simply a way around 
methods of medical treatment exception. Pharmac also relied on some obiter 
observations of the Court of Appeal in the Wellcome case. Gallen J rejected 
Phamiac's submission that since the Court in the Wellcome case held that no 
method of use in medical treatment could be patented, it was obvious that a 
medicament could not be patented for a second use. 
Gallen J accepted that all three judges in Wellcome had expressed the view that 
although it was accepted that a substance intended for use in treatment was 
entitled to a protection for a first use, it was not so entitled for a second or 
subsequent use. However, he distinguished Wellcome by noting that the question 
before the court in Wellcome was whether or not methods of treatment, where a 
first therapeutic use of a known substance was used, were in fact, patentable. The 
distinction between methods of treatment and substances intended to be used for 
such treatment was never analysed. 
Since the court in Wellcome did not finally determine the question in issue, Gallen 
J stated that the conclusion in that case was not necessarily helpful for the 
determination of the case before him. 82 Thus, it was appropriate to look at 
subsequent developments in the international patent law. In doing so, Gallen J 
found the EPO decision in Re Eisai (Decision Gr 05/83)83 (Eisai) of particular 
interest, though admitting that the case was not decisive of a matter arising in New 
Zealand because the practice of the EPC differed from the practice in New 
Zealand. Nevertheless, Gallen J stated that in so far as it involved a logical 
analysis, it had significance and supported the position for the defendants. 84 
Looking at the rationale for Swiss-type claims, Gallen J noted that the decision in 
Re Eisai did not run contrary to the conclusions in the Wellcome case. 
82 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents, CP. 141/98, 17 December 1998 
(NZHC), 15. 
Eisai/Second Medical Indication (1985) OJ EPO 60. 
84 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents, CP. 141/98, 17 December 1998 
(NZHC), 28. 
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After referral to the evidence and the competing claims for public interest Gallen J 
concluded that the positions of the plaintiffs and the defendants in this regard might 
be said to be equally supportable. Ultimately, His Honour held in favour off 
patentability of Swiss-type claims 85 
(b) 	The Court of Appea1 86 
In the Court of Appeal, Pharmac submitted a different argument. It accepted that a 
Swiss-type claim was not a method of medical treatment claim. The new argument 
presented by Pharmac was that the European basis for finding novelty in a Swiss-
type claim rested in Arts 52(4) and 54(5), provisions which were not part of, or 
analogous to, New Zealand legislation. Moreover, it was noted that Eisai had been 
the subject of growing criticism amongst patent lawyers. 
Pharmac placed considerable reliance on the obiter observations made by the 
court in the UK in Wyeth and Schering", which stated that the lack of novelty 
provided real difficulty to accepting the Swiss-type claim. The UK Court in Wyeth 
and Schering pointed out that the device of putting a claim into Swiss-type was not 
sufficient to confer novelty. 88 Although the UK Court ultimately followed Eisai, 
Pharmac pointed out that the reason for this was the desirability of achieving 
conformity in the EPC, and in fact the UK Court preferred the other view. The 
concern expressed by Jacob J in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton 
Pharmaceuticals lnc89 about the problems created by Swiss-type claims was also 
drawn to the Court's attention. In Bristol Myers, Jacob J had to consider the validity 
of a Swiss-type claim and expressed great reluctance in following the Eisai 
decision. His Honour found the patent invalid for want of novelty and obviousness. 
Pharmac also argued that the grant of Swiss-type claims would be 'generally 
inconvenient' within the meaning of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, and that the 
issue of extension of patent protection to this type of claim was better left for 
Parliament. 90 
The pharmaceutical companies, on the other hand, argued that if the comments 
made in the Wellcome case led the Court to conclude that Swiss-type claims were 
85 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents, CP. 141/98, 17 December 1998 
(NZHC), 35. 
86 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1999] NZCA 330. 
87 John Wyeth & Brother Ltd's Application and Schering A.G 's Application [1985] RPC 545. 
88 Ibid, 565. 
89 [1999] RPC 253. 
9° Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1999] NZCA 330, [32]. 
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not valid, then the whole reasoning of Wellcome should be reviewed. 91 However, it 
was also submitted that it would not be necessary to go that far since Swiss-type 
claims can exist in conjunction with the Wellcome decision, without violating any 
prohibition on claims to methods of medical treatment. 
Gault J delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal. His Honour recognized that 
in claims to medically related inventions, such as the pharmaceutical compositions 
or compounds in pharmaceutically pure forms, inventiveness actually lies in the 
medical use, notwithstanding that the new use does not form part of the claim. The 
novelty in such claims is considered to lie in the fact that the pharmaceutical 
composition is new, though the truly inventive step is in the discovery of the new 
use.92 The Court noted that to claim the compound or the composition as 
'pharmaceutical' is, in effect, to claim by reference to the purpose for which the 
compound or composition is to be used and rests on the inventiveness of the use. 
Consequently, when claimed in this form, it could be said that the novelty resides in 
the intended use. 93 After consideration of the 'analogy' approach taken in the Eisai 
case, the Court stated that the step necessary to render Swiss-type claims 
acceptable would be to recognize that novelty as well as inventiveness resided in 
the newly discovered purpose for which the medicament was to be used. 94 
After reviewing the UK cases of Wyeth and Schering and Bristol-Myers Squibb the 
court concluded that it had not been persuaded that there was anything in the NZ 
Act or in New Zealand case law that directly precluded a similar process of 
reasoning to that adopted in the Eisai case. The court also rejected the proposition 
that the European basis for finding novelty in a Swiss-type claim differed 
significantly from the provisions in the New Zealand legislation. 
The Court accepted that: 
• claims to methods of medical treatment were precluded; 
• new methods of treatment of the human body were recognized as 
inventions and might be claimed except in areas of surgery, therapy and 
diagnosis; and 
• product claims for the first therapeutic use were allowed. 95 
91 Ibid, [18]. 
92 Ibid, [30]. 
93 Ibid, [31]. 
94 Ibid, [38]. 
95 Ibid, [52]. 
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The key difference between New Zealand and European law, however, related to 
the question of where novelty was perceived to reside. The Court explained that 
under Art 54(5) novelty might be found in the new use. Under the New Zealand 
practice, on the other hand, novelty could be found in the product formulation. 
However, the court's view was that this distinction seemed blurred where first 
pharmaceutical use claims were permitted in forms such as 'a pharmaceutical 
composition [of the known compound]' or 'a pharmaceutical pure form [of the 
known compound]' that really focuses on the new use. 96 
In its conclusion, the court emphasised that by its accession to the Agreement on 
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 97 New Zealand had 
undertaken to make available patents 'for any inventions, whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology, provided they are new, involve an inventive 
step and are capable of industrial application'. 98 Thus, once it was accepted that 
there could be new invention in the discovery of previously unknown properties in a 
compound, the obligation to make patent protection available applied. For these 
reasons, the court concluded that the provisions of the NZ Act should, if possible, 
be construed so as to give effect to TRIPS, and held that Swiss-type claims were 
valid in New Zealand. 99 
The Court of Appeal also discussed the issue of patentability of methods of 
medical treatment. It is noteworthy to list the following points made by the court in 
this regard. 
• It could no longer be said that a method of medical treatment should not be 
an invention. 166 The Court departed from the view adopted in Wellcome and 
agreed on this point with the view adopted by the Australian Federal Court 
in Bristol—Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd. 101 
• The exclusion from patentability of such methods rests on public policy or 
moral grounds. 162 
Ibid, [53]. 
97 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Including Trade in Counterfeit 
Goods (1994) 25 IIC 209 (TRIPS). 
98 TRIPS, Art 27:3. 
99 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1999] NZCA 330, [64] and [65]. 
1°° Ibid, [26]. 
1°1 [2000] FCA 316. 
102 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1999] NZCA 330 at [29]. 
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• It is doubtful whether the exclusion of inventions, which are 'generally 
inconvenient', remains part of the law of New Zealand, since the s 17 of the 
NZ Act expressly deals with inventions which are contrary to law or 
morality.' °3 
• It would be logical to permit claims to extend to the methods of medical 
treatment of human beings but to require from the patentee a disclaimer of 
any right to sue the medical practitioner. 104 This approach is very similar to 
one adopted by amendment to 35 US Constitution, paragraph 287(c). 
Pharmaceutical Management Agency is important case because firstly, it put New 
Zealand patent law in line with European patent law with regard to second 
therapeutic use claims. Secondly, this decision is the first common law appellate 
level review of the validity of Swiss-type claims. 105 The court provided a well-
reasoned basis for development by 'analogy' with existing law and reached a fully 
reasoned conclusion that such claims are allowed in New Zealand. Thirdly, the 
court also provided well-reasoned findings mentioned above in relation to methods 
of medical treatment, though it did not go so far as to say that patents must be 
granted for such methods. 
One further point needs to be made about the patent in issue in the Wellcome 
case. Since the invention concerned an unexpected discovery that a previously 
known compound was effective in another therapeutic treatment, it could be 
viewed as a 'second therapeutic use' claim and, subsequent to Pharmaceutical 
Management Agency, it would allowable in New Zealand. The point is that if at the 
time of the Wellcome case decision this type of claim was allowable, and the claim 
was drafted in the Swiss-type format, Wellcome Foundation Ltd could have been 
granted a patent. 
3.4.3.2 Pfizer Inc v Commissioner of Patents 106 (Pfizer) 
In this case, the appellant, Pfizer Inc, appealed from judgment of Ellis J in the High 
Court."' Ellis J had upheld the decision of the Assistant Commissioner of Patents 
to refuse patents to Pfizer Inc for methods of medical treatment of psychotic 
103 'bid at [20]. Section 17 prohibits patents where 'the use of the invention in respect of which the application 
is made would be contrary to morality'. 
104 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1999] NZCA 330, [65]. 
105 G Arthur, 'Swiss Type Claims Held Valid in New Zealand' (2000) 20(8) European Intellectual Property 
Review, 380, 384; Michael Hawkins, 'Swiss' Type Patent Claims on Hold' (1997) 9 Patent World, 8. 
106 [2004] NZCA 104. 
107 Re Pfizer Inc, HC WN AP257/2000 20 August 2002. 
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disorders using a new compound. His Honour held that such applications must be 
denied patenting based of the policy grounds located in the proviso to s 6 of the 
Statute of Monopolies that the invention must not be 'generally inconvenient'. 108 
On appeal Pfizer Inc argued that further to the Australian decisions in NRDC and 
Joos, and the New Zealand decisions in Wellcome and Pharmaceutical 
Management Agency, there was no longer any basis for methods of medical 
treatment exclusions; and that it was doubtful whether the Commissioner could 
refuse an application under the 'general inconvenient' proviso to s 6 of the Statute 
of Monopolies. 109 
In dismissing the appeal, Court of Appeal 11° held unanimously that although 
methods of medical treatment might be inventions, based on 'longstanding 
authority', it would be generally inconvenient to protect them with letters patent. 111 
The Court also concluded that neither Pharmaceutical Management Agency nor 
Pfizer overruled Wellcome in relation to patenting of medical methods. The Court 
recognised that interpretation of meaning of 'invention' in s 2 of the NZ Act involves 
'an unusually complex exercise, because of the drafting of incorporating, by 
reference, s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, rather than expressing Parliament's 
intention in contemporary language'. 112 This, the Court explained, had led to 
judicial interpretation of the archaic words of s 6 in a contemporary context. That, in 
turn, had led to the judicial pronouncements on s 6 rather than on the archaic 
words of the section itself. 113 
In relation to the interpretation of "generally inconvenient" in s 6, the Court stated 
the following: 
The importance of case law in this area results from the flexibility that has, of 
necessity, been introduced into the exercise of statutory interpretation in this area of 
the law to accommodate the archaic language of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. But 
the process is still a process of statutory interpretation, to determine the scope of the 
108 Pfizer Inc v Commissioner of Patents [2004] NZCA 104, [26]. 
109 Ibid, [36]. 
110 Anderson P, Glazebroolc, Young, O'Regan and Hammond JJ. 
111 Pfizer Inc v Commissioner of Patents [2004] NZCA 104, [7]. 
112 Ibid, [61]. 
113 Ibid, [61]. The author disagrees with this approach and argues in Chapter 5 that the judicial interpretation 
of words in the proviso to s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies by modern courts does not correspond with the 
original meaning of those words. The author further argues in Chapters 5 and 6 that courts should not simply 
make pronouncements on archaic sections. Instead, the courts must interpret the words in accordance with 
their original intended meaning, text and purpose. 
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definition and the extent of patentability permitted under it. In our view the medical 
treatment exclusion does have a statutory base... • h14 
On the basis of this interpretation of the proviso to s 6, the Court pronounced that 
in New Zealand patents to methods of medical treatments would be against public 
policy and thus, generally inconvenient. 115 
3.4.4 	Summary of Position in New Zealand 
There is yet no express exclusion of methods of medical treatment from 
patentability, and the issue has been dealt with by the courts. This position, until 
the NZ Act is amended, will remain similar to that of Canada and different to that of 
UK and Europe. Following Pfizer, although methods of medical treatment might be 
considered to be inventions in New Zealand, it would be generally inconvenient to 
grant them letters patents. 116 Nevertheless, although pure methods of medical 
treatment are not directly patentable in NZ, such methods can be patented 
indirectly by using the Swiss-type claims. 
Following the cases discussed above, claims to treatment would be allowed in New 
Zealand in the following circumstances: 
• in the situation when the human does not require medical assistance or 
professional medical skill; 
• in the cases of baldness, precocity, infertility, obesity, skin atrophy, ageing, 
fertilization, dryness or oiliness of skin; 
• in the case of reducing desire of smoke, methods of contraception; 
• for diagnostic testing not requiring surgery; 
• for inhibiting toxic shock syndrome; 
• for the treatment of lice on the body; 
• for the treatment of teeth; and 
114 Pfizer Inc v Commissioner of Patents [2004] NZCA 104, [64]. 
115 Ibid, [63]. 
116 Ibid. [7]. 
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• 	in the case of improving health and hygiene by the products that might be 
found on health counters in supermarkets, including herbal remedies, 
vitamins, 117 as these do not require involvement of professional medical 
skill. 
Accordingly, the position of New Zealand Patent Office regarding treatment of 
human beings is broader than that adopted by the European Patent Office or the 
UK Patent Office, in that in some circumstances the claims to treatment would be 
allowed In New Zealand. 
3.5 	THE UNITED STATES 
3.5.1 	Relevant Statutory Provisions 
Like the patent systems of the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Israel, the US 
patent system derived from early English law, which originated from Letters Patent 
and the Statute of Monopolies. Though current US patent law is not identical to the 
current legislation in Australia, it nevertheless can provide useful directions or 
alternatives for solving the debate concerning patentability of medical treatments. 
After the US gained independence from Britain, each of the states retained the 
authority to issue patents. 118 However, since enactment of the US Constitution in 
1781, which empowered the federal government with the authority to grant patents, 
the states have not issued patents. 119 
There are essentially three levels of American patent law: the US Constitution, 
which grants an authority for Congress to create patent legislation; 129 the 
Congressional legislation; 121 and the interpretive case law. The Constitution 
provides that Congress shall have the power No Promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writing and Discoveries.' 122 In accordance with 
this provision, Congress enacted the first patent statute, the Patent Act of 1790 
(the 1790 US Act), which together with the case law, set out the standards for 
American patent law. 
117 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1999] NZCA 332. 
118 The Encyclopedia of Patent Practice and Invention Management edited by R Calvert (1964) 384, 393-94. 
119 Ibid, 396-97. 
120 See US Constitution, Art I, Para 8, c1.8. 
121 See generally 35 US Code (1994). 
122 US Constitution, Art I, Para 8, c1.8. 
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Since the 1790 US Act, there have been four major revisions, the most recent in 
1952, when Congress replaced the word 'art' in the definition of invention 
patentable with the word 'process'. Title 35 US Code §101 (1994) defines 
'inventions patentable' as: 
[a]ny new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to 
the conditions and requirements of this title. 
Title 35 US Code §100(b) (1994) defines the term 'process' as follows: 
The term process means process, art, or method, and includes a new use of a 
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material. 
Under this broad definition, almost any process, machine, manufactured art, or 
chemical compound would appear to be patentable. 123 Since the statutory limitation 
of the scope of patentable subject matter is flexible, it appears that methods of 
medical treatment are covered by the definition of the 'inventions patentable' 
contained in § 101. Therefore, the present interpretation of § 101 allows 
patentability of methods of medical treatment in the US. However, as early law 
indicates, this was not always so. 
3.5.2 	Early Case Law and Legislation 
3.5.2.1 	The Vulcanized Rubber Story 
The earliest historical evidence regarding patenting of medical inventions in the US 
was the dramatic case involving a medical breakthrough in dentistry in 1844. 
Charles Goodyear discovered a method of vulcanizing rubber to make it hard and 
durable. One of the uses of this technology was to make denture material. After 
realizing the possible commercial applications of this promising technology, the 
Goodyear Company patented the method of using vulcanized rubber to make 
dentures. 124 
The Company then devised a system to extract patent royalties from the dental 
profession for every denture made. Since the discovery was soon widely adopted 
123 Steven Nichols, 'Comment: Hippocrates, The Patent-Holder: The Unenforceability Of Medical Procedure 
Patents' (1997) 5 George Mason Law Review 227, 234. 
124 Malvin Ring, 'The Rubber Denture Murder Case: The True Story of the Vulcanite Litigations' (1984) 32 
Bull of the History of Dentistry 1, 3-4. 
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by dentists, in the 1860s the Company began filing a series of infringement 
lawsuits against dentists across the country seeking royalties for Goodyear. Josiah 
Bacon, the Treasurer of the Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Company, for many years 
successfully prosecuted the infringement cases • 125 
The litigation led to considerable opposition from the dental profession. One 
particularly frustrated dentist, Dr Samuel Chalfant, even choose to move his 
practice across the country to avoid paying royalties for the patent. Finally, the 
Vulcanite litigations were dramatically terminated in 1879, when Dr Chalfant 
pursued Mr Bacon to a hotel in San Francisco and shot him dead. 126 
The vulcanized rubber story concerned a patent for a substance, device and the 
method of making it. Clearly, it was not a method of medical treatment. However, 
this story illustrates that a combination of patents and human health can produce 
emotive responses. 127 
3.5.2.2 Morton v New York Eye Infirma ry128 
Methods of medical treatment were first patented in the US in the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. One of the first patents involving a medical procedure dates 
back to 1846, and concerned a use of ether as an anesthetic: Morton v New York 
Eye Infirmary129 (Morton). 
In 1846 Morton obtained a patent for a procedure of administering ether to surgical 
patients as an anesthetic. In 1862 Morton sought to recover damages for 
infringement of his patent by New York Eye Infirmary. New York Circuit Court 
invalidated the patent based on the following reasons. The existence of ether's 
intoxicating effect on animals was well known to chemists, and so the origin and 
existence of ether formed no part of the discovery. The discovery was in the fact 
that inhalation of increased quantities of ether caused a state of complete 
insensibility to pain. This effect 'alone was new and to that only [could] the term 
'discovery' apply'. 13° On this basis, the court determined that the patent was not 
valid. 
125 Ring, above n 110, 5 
'26 Ring , aboven 110, 16. 
127 Noonan, above n 101, 653. 
128 17 F. Cas. 879 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862). 
129 Morton v New York Eye Infirmary 17 F. Cas. 879 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862). 
13° Ibid, 882. 
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The court concluded that such discoveries were patentable only in combination 
with a means of operation or other type of embodiment for utilizing the new 
effect. 131 However, 'the natural functions of an animal', such as inhaling, could not 
constitute any part of this requisite combination. 132 
The rationale of the case is far from clear. Nonetheless, Morton had a substantial 
impact on patentability of methods of medical treatment. Mistakenly, the phrase 
'the natural functions of an animal' 133 was interpreted as prohibiting patents for all 
methods of medical treatment. A careful reading of the case reveals no such 
prohibition. Clearly, the patent in Morton was invalidated for technical reasons, 
and not for a lack of the patentable subject matter. Many authors argue that it could 
not stand as authority for exclusion of methods of medical treatment in the US. 134 
3.5.2.3 Ex Parte Brinkerhoff 135 
Some twenty years after the Morton case, the Patent Office Board of Appeals in Ex 
Parte Brinkerhoff (Brinkerhoff) relied on that case to affirm the refusal by the 
Patent Office of a patent for a method of treating hemorrhoids by injecting already 
patented medication into them. The Commissioner of Patents interpreted Morton 
as prohibiting patenting medical methods, and stated that 'methods or modes of 
treating... diseases are not patentable.' However, the rationale for this decision 
was neither ethical considerations nor the fact that the alleged invention was a 
method of medical treatment. Rather, it was the uncertainty of the result of the 
medical method. The Commissioner stated that the medical treatment was so 
uncertain and its results so speculative that patenting of such a method would 
mislead the public into believing the method would produce the desired result in all 
cases. 136 
Thus, the uncertainty of results was the only specific reason for the prohibition of 
the patent claimed. This does not appear to be a valid reason for categorically 
refusing all methods. This is the question of utility, which is one of the requirements 
of 35 US Code § 101, which requires that an invention achieve its purpose. It is 
submitted that the inclusion of this utility requirement in US patent legislation 




134 Beata Gocyk —Farber, 'Note, Patenting Medical Procedures: A Search for a Compromise Between Ethics 
and Economics' (1997) 18 Cardozo Law Review 1527, 1535; Noonan, above n 101, 654. 
135 24 Comm'r Dec. 349, (1883) 27 Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 797; 146 US 515 
(1892). 
136 Ex Parte Brinkerhoff (1883) 27 Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 797, 798. 
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treatment as expressed in Brinkerhoff. Moreover, this rationale proved to be 
unworkable in the second half of the twentieth century due to the rapid 
development of medical science and the considerable increase in the cost of the 
research. To ensure fast progress in medicine, patent protection was an essential 
condition of the funding of medical research. 137 Thus, even though inventions of 
this nature might not provide certainty in their results, they were still granted patent 
protection for these reasons. 
3.5.2.4 	57th Congress in 1902 and 58 th in 1903 
The controversy concerning methods of medical treatment brought about by the 
Goodyear Company litigation and the uncertainty of the rationale in Morton led to 
the introduction Bill HR 12451 into 57th Congress in 1902, which proposed to 
exclude medical and surgical methods from the field of patentable subject 
matter. 138 Bill 12451 sought to relieve medical and dental practitioners from 'unjust 
burdens imposed by patentees holding patents covering methods and devices for 
treating human diseases... :139 
Before failing in Congress, the Bill was approved by 38 state dental associations. If 
passed, the Bill would have allowed qualified dentists to perform operations 'free of 
royalties for the benefit of society'. 14° A House Committee on Patents submitted to 
the House of Representatives a Report where it did not approve the proposition 
against patents. Even though the Committee Report concluded that it had been the 
practice of the Patent Office to grant such patents, it emphasized that the law 
about patenting of methods of medical treatment was unsettled, and therefore 
required clarification. 141 
The Bill, however, never reached a floor vote, and no action was taken by 
Congress to enact this legislation. After failures in 1902 and 1903, Congress lost 
interest in excluding medical procedures from statutory subject matter. 142 
Notwithstanding this failure, the 1902 Bill played an important role some 90 years 
later when, in 1994, modern proponents introduced a new amendment to the 
patent legislation. 143 Many of the objections cited by the Committee in support of 
the 1902 Bill were reviewed and cited in 1994 by the proponents in support of the 
137 William Noonan, 'Patenting Medical Technology' (1990) 11 The Journal of Legal Medicine 263, 268. 
138 H.R. 12451, March 12, 1902. 
139 Ibid, 17. 
140 Ibid, 1. 
141 Noonan, above n 101, 654. 
142 See Howard Forman, Law of Chemical, Metallurgical and Pharmaceutical Patents 64-71 (1967), cited in 
Noonan, above n 101, 654. 
143 Public Law No 104-208, Section 287(c). 
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amended legislation. Thus, it could be said that the early controversy was never 
resolved but shelved for some time. 
	
3.5.2.5 	The Situation After the 1902 and 1903 Bills 
Congress inaction in 1902 and 1903 was interpreted by the Patent Office as a sign 
that it could properly issue patents on medical methods.'" Consequently, despite 
the ruling in Brinkerhoff, the Patent Office frequently issued patents on therapeutic 
methods during the following fifty years. 145 
Moreover, development of the pharmaceutical industry and medical research 
progressed very quickly during World War I. World War II gave medical research 
even greater priority, since researchers discovered new, processes for mass 
producing penicillin, synthetic quinine substitutes and gamma globulins. 146 By 1950 
medical research had become enormously expensive and required adequate 
protection. The American Medical Association (AMA) acknowledged this, and in 
1948 its Judicial Council issued an Official Opinion stating that it did not consider 
medical process patents unethical. It stated that lo]ur law governing patents are 
based on the sound doctrine that one is entitled to protect his discovery.' 147 A few 
years later, in 1952, patent law was codified as Title 35 of the US Code and two 
years after that the Patent Office overruled Brinkerhoff in Ex Parte Scherer. 148 
3.5.2.6 	Ex Parte Scherer149 
This landmark case was a significant breakthrough in the field of patentability of 
medical inventions. The Board of Patent Appeals in Ex Parte Scherer (Scherer) 
expressly rejected Brinkerhoff and ruled that medical processes were patentable 
subject matter. 15° Since then, methods or processes of medical treatment have 
been patentable in the US. 
In this case, Scherer applied for a patent for surgical methods of injecting fluid into 
the human body through the epidermis by a pressure jet instead of a hypodermic 
144 Noonan, above n 101, 654. 
145 See, eg, Er Parte Wappler, 26 U.S.P.Q. 191 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1935); Ex Pane Kettering, 35, U.S.P.Q. 
342 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1936). 
146 P. Starr, 'The Social Transformation of American Medicine' (1982), 340-341, sited Noonan, above n 123, 
268. 
147 Official Opinion of the Judicial Council, 163 JAMA 1156, 1157. 
148 103 U.S.P.Q. 107 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1954). 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid, 110. 
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needle. 151 The accurate 'placing of the fixed quantity of medicament at a 
predetermined position beneath' the skin layer was the claimed result. The 
applicant argued that this result was 'useful' within the statute. The examiner, as 
required under Brinkerhoff, refused the application. The Patent Office concluded 
that the only useful result of the claimed method was a change in the human body 
through its reaction to the medicine. This result was not dependent on the methods 
by which the medicine was injected. 152 
Taking into account the importance of the issues raised by the claim, the appeal 
was heard by an expanded panel of the Board. The Board found that the claimed 
method had utility and held that 'it cannot be categorically stated that all such 
methods are unpatentable subject matter merely because they involve some 
treatment of the human body.' 153 The Board stated that there was nothing in the 
patent statute that categorically excluded such methods, nor had any general rule 
of exclusion been developed by decisions. It distinguished Morton on the grounds 
that Morton may be read to be a patentability rejection due to lack of novelty or 
obviousness. 1' 
The significance of Scherer is that it reversed a 150-year-old prohibition of 
methods of medical treatment patents in the US. It established the validity of 
medical procedure patents. Since then the Patent Office has issued many patents 
protecting the inventions of surgical and therapeutic procedures. 155 However, the 
controversy surrounding patenting of methods of medical treatment was far from 
over. Opponents of such patenting viewed Scherer only as a decision within the 
Patent Office and preferred to rely on the court decision in Martin v Wyeth 156 
(Martin). 157 In Martin a District Court invalidated a claim for a method of treating 
mastitis in cows. Although the court raised ethical issues about the patenting of 
medical methods, it did not base its rejection on ethical grounds. It invalidated the 
claims because they constituted 'merely the application of an old and well-known 
device to a new use:155 
151 Ex Parte Scherer 103 U.S.P.Q. 107 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1954). 
152 Ibid,109. 
153 Ibid. 
154 1bid, 109-110. 
155 Noonan, above n 101, 658-60, Table 1. Noonan provides a very useful table with examples of medical 
process patents granted from 1862 to 1995. 
156 96 F. Supp. 689, aff'd, 193 F. 2d 58 (481 Cir. 1951). 
157 See Chemetron Corp. v Airco Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 119 (N.D.I11. 1976), where the Court raised the 
question whether medical processes should be patentable. 
158 T. Martin v Wyeth 96 F. Supp. 689, affd, 193 F. 2d 58 (4 81 Cir. 1951), 695. 
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However, the AMA itself was more willing to accept the patentability of methods of 
medical treatment following the decision in Scherer. In 1955, only one year after 
Scherer, the AMA again acknowledged that medical research expenses justified 
the patenting of medical procedures, and concluded that it would be ethical for a 
physician 'to patent surgical instruments, appliances and medicines, or copyright 
publications, methods, and procedures.' 159 
3.5.3 	The PaIlin Patent and its Consequences 
3.5.3.1 	PaIlin v Singer16° 
In the 1990s, the situation regarding patenting of medical treatments in the US 
began to change. The medical professional associations led the revolution by 
arguing strongly against• medical procedure patents. 161 One reason for the 
controversy was a patent infringement lawsuit filed by Dr Samuel PaIlin, an 
ophthalmologist from Arizona. Unintentionally Dr.Pallin provoked one of the most 
emotional patent debates in American history, 162 and the case soon invoked a 
legislative response resulting in a substantial reduction in remedies available for 
physicians whose medical methods patents were infringed. 
Pal/in v Singer was the first known lawsuit to enforce a medical procedure patent. 
In 1990 Dr Pallin made an upside-down V-shaped incision in a patient's eye while 
removing a cataract. Due to the patient's heart condition, Dr Pallin did not stitch the 
incision after surgery. Two weeks later, he unexpectedly discovered that the scar 
had healed without a suture and had far less scar tissue than a normal sutured 
incision. 163 Traditionally, the incision was closed by sutures to prevent wound 
separation. However, this often led to astigmatism. 164 
Dr Pallin submitted an article describing his findings in a leading medical journal, 
the Journal of Cataract and Refractive Surgery. The Journal rejected the 
submissions on the ground that Pallin's findings offered no true innovation. 165 To 
159 AMA Principles of Medical Ethics 11-12, Para.7 (1955). 
16° 36 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1050 (D. Vt. 1995). 
161 Scott Anderson, 'A Right Without a Remedy: The Unenfoceable Medical procedure Patent' (1999) 3 
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review 117, 125. 
162 Gocyk —Farber, above n 120, 1527. 
163 Jodie Snyder, 'A Patent for a Eye Surgery? Court Case Arises Over the Technique' The Phoenix Gazette, 
Apr. 4, 1995, Al, sited by Joseph Reisman, 'Physicians and Surgeons as Inventors: Reconciling Medical 
Process Patents and Medical Ethics' (1995) 10 High Technology Law Journal 355, 366. 
164 Pallin v Singer 36 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA), 1050. 
165 See Hearings on H.R. 1127 before the Subcomm. On Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. 
On the Judiciary, 104 th Cong. Pt 	(1995), 4 (testimony of Dr Samuel Lear Pallin) (Hearings). 
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be recognized in his profession, Dr PaIlin then turned to the US Patent Office to 
document his discovery. In 1992 Dr PaIlin was granted a patent for 'Method of 
Making Self-Sealing Episcleral Incision.' Then, he offered to donate the patent to a 
national cataract surgeons group, but that offer was also rejected. Finally, since the 
PaIlin patent resulted in a saving of $17 per operation, Dr PaIlin offered a minimal 
royalty of $4-5 for the procedure. 166 Although very few surgeons had been willing 
to pay the royalty (notwithstanding a $17 saving), the technique became very 
popular. 
In 1994 Dr PaIlin sued several of his peers, including fellow eye surgeon, Dr Jack 
Singer, for the infringement of his patent. Dr PaIlin alleged that Dr Singer not only 
used his patent incisions, but induced others to infringe the patent by publishing an 
article in a medical journal about the surgical technique with instructions of how to 
use the procedure. 167 Despite the savings that resulted from the invention, the 
defendants objected to paying either the patent royalty fee per operation or a flat 
fee for a clinic of $2,500 to $10,000 per year. 168 In the court proceeding, Dr Singer 
and others motioned for a summary judgment due to invalidity of the patent. 169 The 
defendants asserted that Pallin's chevron cut was not new and it was obvious to 
other eye surgeons. However, the court found that the defendants failed to 
demonstrate invalidity of the patent and denied the motion. 
Yet the defendants ultimately prevailed, as a federal district judge entered a 
consent order, effectively decreeing Pallin's patent invalid. This consent order 
finally resolved the case. Dr PaIlin agreed to dismiss his suit after a two day 
hearing in the court. 179 
Pal/in v Singer received widespread attention from the media, professional 
associations, academia and politicians. 171 Physicians across the country expressed 
strong opposition to medical process patents, calling them 'horrendous' and 
warning that if Dr PaIlin won, the victory might have 'profoundly devastating and 
mind-boggling consequences' for medicine. 172 In response to this opposition, in 
166 Medical Procedures Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 1127 before the Subcomm. On Courts and Intellectual 
Property of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 39, 41 (1995) (Medical Hearing), 4, Hearings, 
above n 151. 
167 Lee Bowman, 'Physicians Stake Claims to their Art of Healing; Courts will rule on Patents, While Medical 
Societies Denounce Them as Unethical, Harmful, S.F. Exam' (1995) July 16, B-1. 
168 See Hearing on H.R. 1127 before the Subcomm. On Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. 
On the Judiciary, 7. 
169 Pal/in v Singer 36 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1050, 1051. 
17° See Medical Procedure Patent Claims Are Invalidated in Consent Judgment, (1996) 51 Patent Trademark 
and Copyright, April 11, 688. 
171 Scott Anderson, above n 147, 118. 
172 Gocyk —Farber, above n 120. 
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1994 the AMA reversed its position, stating that medical process patents are per se 
unethica1, 173 and promised to 'work with Congress to outlaw this practice'. 174 
3.5.3.2 Attempts to change US law following Pal& v Singer 
The effective lobbing by the AMA influenced members of Congress to propose a 
Bill seeking to prohibit the patenting of medical processes. In March 1995, a new 
Bill, The Medical Procedures and Affordability Act, House Bill 1127, was 
introduced. The Bill proposed to prohibit the issuance of patents 'for any invention 
or discovery of a technique, method or process for performing a surgical or medical 
procedure, administering a surgical or medical therapy or making a medical 
diagnosis'. 178 
Opponents of the Bill criticised it as being too broad and vague. The Clinton 
administration testified that excluding surgical and medical procedures from 
patentability was not the proper way to address the concerns surrounding medical 
patents. 178 Also, the Executive Director of the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association, Dr Michael K. Kirk, opposed the Bill arguing that it would undesirably 
remove patent incentives and create an undesirable international precedent. He 
stated that the 'underlying concepts of [House Bill 1127] is so failing in merit that all 
of the technical problems are not worth addressing', and concluded that 'the need 
for this legislation has not been established.' 177 
In response to the criticism of House Bill 1127, Representative Ganske offered a 
modified version as an amendment, House Bill 3814. 178 This Bill passed the 
House, but was not passed by the Senate. In the alternative, Senator Bill Frist of 
Tennessee, a thoracic surgeon, introduced Senate Bill 1334, 179 which did not pass 
either. Senator Frist then introduced a further Bill, Senate Bill 2105, 180 which 
likewise was unsuccessful. 
173 Sabra Chartrand, 'Why Is This Surgeon Suing? Doctors Split Over Patenting of Their Techniques' (1995) 
New York Times, June 8, DI, D5. 
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176 Hearing on H.R. 1127, Statement of G. Lee Skillington, Counsel, Office of Legislative and International 
Affaits, US Patent and Trademark Office. 
177 Hearing on H.R. 1127, Statement of Dr Kirk. 
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3.5.3.3 	Current legislation -35 US Code §287 (c) 
Although Senate Bill 2105 never passed into law, a substantial portion of it became 
incorporated into § 616 of 35 US Code, which provides that § 287 is amended by 
adding at the end a new sub-s (c). In less than one week, on September 30, the 
Senate passed House Bill 4278, which was signed by the President Clinton, 
creating an amendment to 35 US Code § 287 (c) (Public Law 104-208). 
§ 616 provides that § 287 is amended as follows: 
(c)(1) With respect to a medical practitioners performance of a medical activity that 
constitutes an infringement under s 271(a) or (b) of this title, the provisions of ss 
281, 283, 284, and 285 of this title shall not apply against the medical practitioner 
or against a related health care entity with respect to such medical activity. 
(2) For the purpose of this subs: 
(A) the term 'medical activity' means the performance of a medical or surgical 
procedure an a body, but shall not include 
(i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter in violation of such a patent, 
(ii) the practice of a patented use of a composition of matter in violation 
of such patent, or 
(iii) the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent. 
(Emphasis added) 
The new law applies only to 'medical activities', not to drugs or devices, since it 
makes a clear distinction between patents for medical procedures on one hand, 
and compositions/drugs and machine/devices on the other. Therefore, patents on 
medical and surgical procedures are unenforceable against medical practitioners 
and related health care entities, unless they fall under one of three exceptions 
(§ 616(c)(2)(A)(i-iii)). 
Public Law 104-208 allows a physician to enforce a patent for a medical or surgical 
procedure provided that the infringer's activity also infringes an unexpired patent 
for a medical machine/device, composition/drug or method of their use. 
Accordingly, there remains a fair amount of latitude for a physician to enforce 
patents involving methods of medical treatment. Alternatively, a patent for a 
medical or surgical procedure using a device, drug or method of their use, would 
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not be enforceable if such device, drug or method of their use are not patented or 
their patent is already expired. 
The main effect of the new law is that it gives medical practitioners and related 
health care entities a statutory exemption from liability for infringement of medical 
procedure patents. Thus, although the Patent Office will grant a patent for medical 
procedure, such patent will be unenforceable against these users. 181 It means that 
the patent owner is deprived of the right to sue for damages or seek injunctive 
relief when licensed medical practitioners engaging in medical activities infringe the 
patents. 182 This transforms medical method patents into '...a rather expensive 
certificate of merit' 183 and makes them meaningless. Therefore, the suggestion is 
that the new law can be seen as an equivalent to a prohibition on medical process 
patents. 
Some commentators have argued that the way in which the Public Law 104-208 
became law undermines its legitimacy. 184 The reasons for this is that neither House 
Bill 1127 nor Senate Bill 1334 appeared close to becoming law 'until § 616 was 
slipped' into an appropriations bill during the closing days of the 104 th Congress. 185 
Normally, before a Bill becomes law, it will be debated in one or more 
Congressional committees. By adding the amendment to an Appropriations Bill it 
'by-passed' the usual committee hearings. 188 Thus, the new law came into 
existence 'by-passing the legislative channels such laws usually go through'. 187 
Since the law was passed as an amendment to an Appropriations Bill, it is argued 
that it was valid for only one year. 188 Yet, the law still continues to be in the statute. 
Also, § 616 became a subject of criticism led by Senator Orin Hatch, Chairman of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, who expressed concern that § 616 was bad 
policy and a possible violation of US obligations under international treaty. 189 
181 United States Patent and Trademark Office, 'Utility Examination Guidelines' (2001) 66 FR 1092. 
182 See § 616 (c)(1). 
183 Michael Garvey, 'New Medical-Procedure Patents Can't Be Infringed' (1996) The IP Strategist 5. 
184 Nichols, above n 109, 229; Martin, above n 34, 402 and 406. 
185 Nichols, above n 109, 229. 
186 Bradley Meier, 'The New Patent Infringement Liability Exception For Medical Procedures' (1997) 23, 
Journal of Legislation 265, 275. 
187 Martin, above n 34, 402. 
188 Linda Judge, 'Issues Surrounding the Patenting of Medical Procedures' (1997) 13 Computer & High 
Technology Law Journal 181, 190. 
189 Bill with PTO Funding and Patent Reform on Medical Procedures is Signed into Law, 52 Patents, 
Trademark & Copyright Journal 597, 597 (BNA 1996). 
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3.5.4 	Summary of US Position 
As in the UK, the controversy about patenting of medical inventions in the US is 
longstanding. However, in contrast to the UK and other reviewed countries, the law 
of the US regarding the patentability of such inventions is very liberal. Indeed, the 
US Patent and Trademark Office and courts have found methods of medical 
treatment patentable since 1954. 190 In 1948, together with the courts, the AMA 
acknowledged that investment and research into medical processes needed 
adequate protection, and did not consider medical methods patents unethical. 191 
However, further to a single patent lawsuit, Pal/in v Singer, 192 which provoked 
extensive debate over medical procedure patents and lobbying of the US Congress 
by the AMA coalition, the American patent code was radically changed by 
excluding medical practitioners and related health care entities from liability for 
infringement of medical procedure patents. 193 
3.6 	CONCLUSIONS — COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The above review of patenting of methods of medical treatment in countries 
outside Australia reveals that there is no clear-cut pattern. Each country deals with 
this matter in its own way, either by expressly prohibiting methods of treatment 
from patenting; 194 or by providing no prohibition in the statute and leaving the 
matter for the courts to deal with; 195 or even by allowing such methods to be 
patentable, by placing a broad definition of 'invention' in the legislation, but 
protecting some users from infringement actions. 196 
In cases where patent legislation does not expressly prohibit surgical or 
therapeutic methods from patenting, it appears that the courts have been reluctant 
to allow patents for such methods. The Canadian and New Zealand courts, for 
instance, consider methods of medical treatment as inherently unpatentable. 197 
Furthermore, the New Zealand courts treat patents to such methods as generally 
190 See & Parte Scherer, 103 USPQ (BNA) 107. 
191 See William Noonan, 'Patenting Medical Surgical Procedures' (1995) 77 Journal of the Patent and 
Trademark Office Society 651, 654. 
192 36 USPQ 2d (BNA) 1050 (D Vt 1995). 
193 HR 3610, 104 th Congress (1996), which become Public Law No 104-208 (Public Law No 104-208). 
194 See Section 7 of the Patents Act 1967 (Israel). 
195 See Section 2 of the Patents Act, R.S.C. 1985, P-4 (Canada) and Section 2 of the Patents Act 1953 (New 
Zealand). 
196 See 35 US Code § 101 (1994). 
197 Tennessee Eastman Co v The Commissioner (1972), 8 CPR (2d) 202; (1972) 33 DLR (3d) 459; Pfizer Inc 
v Commissioner of Patents [2004] NZCA 104. 
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inconvenient within s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. 198 The courts in the US also 
originally were opposed to patentability of methods of medical treatment. However, 
the long practice of prohibition was rejected in Scherer199 where the Board of 
Patent Appeals ruled that medical processes were patentable subject matter in the 
us . 200 
After observation of legislation and case law of each jurisdiction, it is now possible 
to highlight the important features of the relevant law in each of those jurisdictions, 
as follows. 
3.6.1 	Key Features of Canadian Law 
Although methods of medical treatment are not directly patentable in Canada, 
using a format 'for the use of a drug or device' and leaving the step of performing 
a medical procedure or administering a drug outside of the scope of the claim, 
such methods can be patented indirectly. 
It is important to emphasise that while the format 'for the use of...' would be 
allowed in Canada, it would likely be disallowed in Europe, Israel and New 
Zealand since it is viewed as being a therapeutic treatment of the human or animal 
body. 201 A European, Israeli or New Zealand patent can only be granted to a claim 
directed to the use of a compound for the manufacture of a medicament intended 
for a specified new and inventive therapeutic treatment. While some might argue 
that both formats are similar, as they are directed to the purpose, it seems that the 
format 'for the use of...' is not considered as being a Swiss-type claim in Canada. 
It is submitted that by allowing this format in Canada the Patent Appeal Board of 
the Canadian Patent Office has taken a more flexible approach to the existing 
position with patentability of medical treatments. The Canadian format 'for the use 
of...', is not required to be for the manufacture of a medicament. It is directed to 
the use, and is the same as the claim directed to treat a disease in human beings, 
thus can be considered as a 'method of medical treatment'. 
198 Pfizer Inc v Commissioner of Patents [2004] NZCA 104. 
I " 103 U.S.P.Q. 107 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1954). 
200 Ex Parte Scherer 103 U.S.P.Q. 107 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1954), 110. 
20 ' See Eisai/Second Medical Indication (1985) OJ EPO 60; John Wyeth & Brother Ltd's Application; and 
Schering A.G's Application [1985] RPC 545; Israel Patent Office Claims Practice in Materials, Chemical and 
Pharmaceutical Cases- Part II, Directive No.40; Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of 
Patents [1999] NZCA 332. 
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The Canadian cases202 also suggest that the Board is willing to take a narrow view 
of the phrase 'medical treatment' and allow the claims where it is possible to 
obtain a claimed result without the use of professional medical knowledge and 
skill. It seems clear that diagnostic methods, apparatus and substances are 
patentable in Canada. However, there are still some genuine issues of 
characterization as to whether or not a new medical use of a known substance is, 
in effect, a method of medical treatment, and therefore unpatentable. 
	
3.6.2 	Key Features of Israeli Law 
The scope of the Israeli Act is clear: it expressly excludes methods of therapeutic 
treatment of the human body by virtue of s 7. This situation is similar to that of the 
UK and the EPC. On the other hand, Israeli position is in contradiction to the 
provision in Art 52(4) EPC, which prohibits all methods of surgery, therapy and 
diagnosis. These methods are in fact allowable in Israel when applied to non-
human animals. This situation is similar to that of New Zealand. Furthermore, Israel 
is in line with European and New Zealand approach in allowing the first and second 
therapeutic use claims in the form 'use of X in the manufacture of the medicament 
Y. 
Though methods of medical treatment are currently not patentable in Israel, the 
case law of this country includes the valuable decision of the Wellcome 
Foundationm case. Although this case has had little influence on current Israeli 
law to date, arguably, it made significant contributions towards changing attitudes 
about patentability of such methods in Australia, as will be seen in the next 
Chapter, and it may still play a valuable role in Israeli patent law in the future. 
3.6.3 	Key Features of New Zealand Law 
After the decision in Pharmaceutical Management Agency the New Zealand Patent 
Office has adopted two distinct approaches: while it recognized new methods of 
treatment of humans as inventions and allowed all claims for the methods of 
treatment of humans, at the same time it did not allow claims where the identified 
treatment related to the surgery on humans or to the treatment of illness or 
disease. The exclusion from patentability of methods of medical treatment is based 
on policy grounds, 204 mainly, that the use of such methods would be contrary to 
202 Merck & Co v Apotex (1995) 59 CPR (3d) 133; Re Application No. 016, 962; Re Application No. 880, 719 
and Re Application No. 372,233. 
203 Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Plantex Ltd [1974] RPC 514. 
204 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1999] NZCA 332, [29]. 
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morality.205 From this it could be followed that the definition of 'methods of medical 
treatment' is broader, in some circumstances, than that adopted by the European 
Patent Office or the UK Patent Office. 
Further, the decision in Pfizer, where the Court of Appeal ruled that methods of 
medical treatment do not meet the definition of 'invention', such methods cannot be 
patented in New Zealand. This position is in line with Canadian position. Though 
Pfizer Inc suggested permitting claims under consideration on the condition that 
the patentee makes a disclaimer of any right to sue the medical practitioner (similar 
to that of required under the addition to 35 US Code, § 287(c)) the court in Pfizer 
rejected that suggestion and left this issue for Parliament to decide. However, 
according to the draft Patents Bill 2004 released by the New Zealand Government, 
this suggestion will not be followed. It seems that the draft Bill seeks to bring the 
New Zealand patent legislation into line with global norms. As stated above, the 
draft Bill contains specific exclusions to patentability of diagnostic, therapeutic or 
surgical methods for the treatment of human beings. This exclusion for methods of 
medical treatment is in line with the exclusion adopted in Israel, Europe under Art 
52(4) EPC and the UK. 
With regards to second therapeutic use claims, New Zealand patent law is now in 
line with European and Israeli patent law and allows Swiss-type claims in the form 
'use of X in the manufacture of the medicament Y. It clearly goes some way 
towards satisfying the concerns of the pharmaceutical industry. 
It should also be noted that New Zealand's patent law stands in marked contrast to 
the Australian regime, which is discussed in the next Chapter. 
3.6.4 	Implications of Canadian, Israeli and New Zealand Laws on the 
Medical Profession in Each Country. 
Hypothetical example: procedure for the preparation of a donor 
bone marrow transplant 
Notwithstanding that there is no clear-cut pattern in approach of prohibiting 
methods of medical treatment in Canada, Israel and New Zealand, overall, these 
countries have a number of similarities in terms of outcome. In particular, although 
'pure' methods are not patentable, some such methods are indirectly patentable 
through the vehicle of the first and second therapeutic use, or Swiss-type claims 
involving a use of medicament. The only slight difference in dealing with Swiss- 
205 By virtue of s 17 of the Patents Act 1953. 
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type claiming in these countries relates to the format 'for the use of...' . As 
discussed above, this format would be allowed in Canada, and disallowed in UK, 
Europe, Israel and New Zealand. 
As a consequence of these findings, the impact of Canada, Israel and New 
Zealand laws relating to the patentability of methods of medical treatment on the 
medical profession in each country can be illustrated by using a single hypothetical 
example. 
Consider a hypothetical physician who has invented and patented a cure for a 
current unsolved problem with so-called graft-versus-host disease, which makes a 
bone marrow transplant procedure hopeless for many leukemia patients. This 
disease is an immune reaction of the donor bone marrow against the recipient 
tissues. In other words, the donor bone marrow does not take properly in the 
recipient's body, and attacks the recipient's tissues instead. 
Our hypothetical physician has invented a method for the preparation of donor 
bone marrow. This preparation can decrease the immune reaction against the 
recipient's tissues and make a donor bone marrow 'take' well. Under Canadian, 
Israeli and New Zealand laws, that physician may or may not be able to patent this 
invention. The result depends upon the format used for the patent application. 
• 'The method for...' format 
Assume the hypothetical physician wishes to obtain a patent on a pure 'method for 
the preparation of a donor bone marrow'. Under these laws, he will not be able to 
patent this invention as this claim will clearly fall into the narrow view of the term of 
'medical treatment', since its performance requires the use of professional medical 
knowledge and skill. 
'The use of a device' format 
Assume the hypothetical physician invents a new device that can be used for 
preparation of bone marrow. Making a general patent claim for 'the use of a device' 
and omitting the step of performing a medical procedure, he would be able to 
obtain a patent protection for this invention. 
• 'The new use of a known drug X' format 
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Suppose the hypothetical physician discovers that an already known drug X for a 
certain method, can be used in a new way to suppress the immune system to allow 
donor bone marrow to 'take' well. Under Canadian, Israeli and New Zealand laws, 
the physician can patent the new use of the drug X, provided that the claim is not 
seeking a patent protection for administering this drug. 
• 	'The procedure, using the drug X' format 
Suppose that the hypothetical physician discovers that the drug X, when used as 
described in the patent specification, in combination with a surgical procedure 
invented by the hypothetical physician, substantially decreases the graft-versus-
host disease. If the physician chooses to obtain a patent on the procedure, using 
the drug X, the patent would not be allowed, since it would clearly be a 'pure' 
method of medical treatment claim. 
The above examples illustrate that some methods are indeed indirectly patentable. 
The basis for this argument is that in a case of a second therapeutic use claim, the 
underlying compound is not new and therefore cannot be the subject of the patent 
claim, all that remains to be patented is the new use of that compound, which 
primarily directs to the medical treatment. 
3.6.5 	The United States 
3.6.5.1 	Key Features of US Law 
The main feature of US law is that new Public Law 104-208 gives medical 
practitioners and related health care entities a statutory exemption from liability for 
infringement of medical procedure patents. 
On one hand it could be argued that the Public Law 104-208 is rigid in that even 
though it does not exclude methods of medical treatment from patentability, it 
makes such patents unenforceable against medical practitioners and related health 
care entities, unless they fall under one of three exceptions (§ 616(c)(2)(A)(i-iii)). 206 
Further, it could be said that the new law deprives the patent owner of the right to 
sue for damages or seek injunctive relief when licensed medical practitioners 
engaging in medical activities infringe their patents. Accordingly, it could be 
concluded that, due to Public Law 104-208, the law in the US is not different from 
206 Many American authors argue that § 287(c) is practically equivalent to a ban on medical methods patents, 
as it renders such patents meaningless. See, eg, Gocyk —Farber, above n 120; Nichols, above n 109; Anderson, 
above n 147. 
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that in Canada, Israel, New Zealand or UK. Thus, from practical point of view, the 
US position is in line with the international position of exclusion of methods of 
medical treatment from patentability. 
On the other hand one must admit that by allowing a physician to enforce a patent 
for a medical or surgical procedure when the infringer's activity also infringes an 
unexpired patent for a medical machine/device, composition/drug or method of 
their use, the Public Law 104-208 still provide some scope for physicians to 
enforce patents involving methods of medical treatment. In this way, in contrast to 
the UK and other reviewed countries, US law regarding such patents is much more 
liberal. 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the new amendments, the practice of the US, in 
allowing patenting of methods of medical treatment, still could provide useful 
directions or alternatives for solving the debate concerning patentability of such 
methods in Australia and around the globe. This conclusion will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 6. 
In relation to indirect patenting of methods of medical treatment via vehicles of 
Swiss-type claim, compare to the Canadian, Israeli and New Zealand's 
approaches, US' approach clearly eliminates any need for such claims. This is 
because Public Law 104-208 provides protection for 'uses of compositions'. 207 In 
this way methods of medical treatments can also be indirectly enforced in the US. 
The following hypothetical example illustrates the difference between the US 
approach and approaches adopted by other reviewed countries in dealing with 
patenting of medical inventions. It will be evident from this example that similar 
cases will be treated differently under US' and other approaches. 
3.6.5.2 	Implications of US patent law on the US medical profession 
Hypothetical example: procedure for the preparation of a donor 
bone marrow transplant 
Adopting the hypothetical discussed above, let us consider another hypothetical 
physician, this time in the US, who has invented and patented a cure for a current 
unsolved problem with so-called graft-versus-host disease. Under US law, that 
physician may or may not be able to enforce his patent. The result depends on 
whether one of three exceptions in § 616(c)(2)(A)(i-iii) applies. 
207 See § 616 (c)(2)(A) of Title 35 US Code § 287 (c). 
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• § 616(c)(2)(A)(i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter in violation of such a patent 
Assume the hypothetical physician has invented a new machine that can be used 
for preparation of bone marrow and has obtained a patent for 'the machine and its 
use'. Under this provision, the physician may enforce the patent on the machine 
and on the procedure for using this machine. 
Suppose our hypothetical physician has discovered that an already patented 
composition can be used in a new way to suppress the immune system to allow 
donor bone marrow to 'take' well. If the physician is able to satisfy the patenting 
requirements and obtain a patent on the new method of using the composition, the 
patent would be enforceable under this provision. 
• § 616(c)(2)(A)(ii) the practice of a patented use of a composition of matter 
in violation of such patent 
Suppose someone else had already patented drug X, to suppress the immune 
system to allow donor bone marrow to 'take'. Suppose that the hypothetical 
physician discovers that drug X, when used as described in the patent 
specification, in combination with a surgical procedure invented by her, 
substantially decreases the graft-versus-host disease. If the physician is able to 
satisfy the patenting requirements and obtain a patent on the procedure using the 
drug X, the patent would be enforceable under this provision. 
• § 616(c)(2)(A)( iii) the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology 
patent 
Assume someone else had already patented a biotechnological invention to 
generate new cells that would suppress the immune system to allow donor bone 
marrow to 'take' well. Suppose, in combination with a surgical procedure invented 
by the hypothetical physician, these new cells would substantially decrease the 
graft-versus-host disease. If the physician is able to satisfy the patenting 
requirements and obtain a patent on the procedure, using the patented cells, the 
patent would be enforceable under this provision. 
• Enforcement of an unexpired patent for a machine/device, 
composition/drug or method of their use that fall under one of three 
exceptions above (§ 616(c)(2)(A)(i-iii)) 
Assume the hypothetical physician is the owner of a patent for a machine that can 
be used for preparation of bone marrow or the procedure using the drug X 
discussed above. Assume someone infringes this patent. Public Law 104-208 
allows the hypothetical physician to enforce such patents provided that they are 
unexpired patents. However, the hypothetical physician will not be able to enforce 
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his right under a patent for a medical or surgical procedure using a machine, drug 
or method of their use when such machine, drug or method of their use are not 
patented or their patents are already expired. 
• 	Enforcement of a patent for medical and/or surgical procedure that falls 
outside one of three exceptions above (§ 616(c)(2)(A)(i-iii)) 
Assume the hypothetical physician is the owner of a patent for medical and/or 
surgical procedure that falls outside one of three exceptions under § 616(c)(2)(A)(i- 
iii), and someone infringes this patent. The hypothetical physician will not be able 
to enforce his right under this patent against medical practitioners and related 
health care entities. 
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CHAPTER 4: 	PATENTING OF METHODS OF MEDICAL TREATMENT 
IN AUSTRALIA 
'No one has advanced a just and logical 
reason why reward for service to the 
public should be extended to the inventor 
of a mechanical toy and denied to the 
genius whose patience, foresight, and 
effort have given a valuable new 
[discovery] to mankind' l 
H.R. Rep. No. 71-1129, at 2 (1930) 
4.1 	INTRODUCTION 
The review of the law in relating to the patentability of methods of medical 
treatment the UK, Europe and other common law countries presented in Chapters 
1 — 3 of this thesis provides the backdrop against which relevant Australian law can 
now be critically analysed. 
Similar to the United Kingdom patent law prior to the Patents Act 1977 (UK), 
Australian patent law originates from the Statute of Monopolies 1624 (the Statute 
of Monopolies), which remains the touchstone of patentability in the Patents Act 
1990 (0th) (the 1990 Act). The Australian legislation, like its New Zealand and 
Canadian counterparts, does not expressly prohibit patenting of methods of 
medical treatment, and so the issue has been left to the courts to determine. Thus, 
the 1990 Act continues a longstanding legislative tradition of relying on the broad 
and flexible power of the courts to decide what is suitable subject matter for the 
grant of letters patent, and in doing so, provides little or no guidance on whether 
methods of medical treatment could be such a subject matter. 
Until 19922 Australian courts did not directly deal with the issue of whether a new 
method of treating the human body could be protected under patent law. There 
was no Australian judicial decision that, as part of its ratio decidendi, firmly 
pronounced on the exclusion from patentability of methods of medical treatment 
and its basis. However, some obiter observations were made on the issue. 3 
'H.R. Rep. No. 71-1129, 2 (1930). 
2 In Anaesthetic Supplies Ply Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1992) 111 ALR 205. 
3 See, eg, Maeder v Busch (1938) 59 CLR 684, 699; National Research Development Corporation v 
Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252, 270, 275; Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 
611, 619. 
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4.2 RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Patents Act 1903 (Cth) (the 1903 Act), the first patent legislation passed by 
the Commonwealth Parliament, was based on the United Kingdom Patents, 
Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883 to 1888 (amended by the Patents Acts of 
1901 and 1902 and repealed by the Patents and Designs Act 1907). The 1903 Act 
defined 'invention' in s 4 in the same terms used by the 1907 Act (UK) by reference 
to the established ambit of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, and contained no 
specific exclusion for methods of human treatment. 
Following the Swan Committee Report in 1947, the United Kingdom legislation was 
replaced by the Patents Act 1949 (UK). Following these developments in the 
United Kingdom, the Australian Attorney-General established a Committee in 1950 
to review Australian patent law. The Committee reported in 1952 and 
recommended a Bill, which was passed as the Patents Act 1952 (the 1952 Act) 
without substantial alteration. The 1952 Act was similar to the Patents Act 1949 
(UK). The definition of 'invention' in s 6 of the 1952 Act remained unchanged and, 
like its 1903 predecessor, defined the word 'invention' by reference to the s 6 of the 
Statute of Monopolies. Again, the 1952 Act contained no specific provision for 
methods of human treatment. 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, the Patents Act 1977 (UK) completely replaced 
the old system of English patent law. One of the radical changes, in particular, was 
the express prohibition of methods of medical treatment from patenting, declaring 
them as not capable of industrial application. 4 
In Australia, as a result of a reference in October 1979 from the Minister of 
Productivity, the Industrial Property Advisory Committee (IPAC) undertook a major 
review of the patent system. The terms of reference were very wide: to review all 
the economic, legal and administrative complexities of the patent system. 5 In 
August 1984 IPAC submitted its report to the Minister of Science. 6 On IPAC's 
recommendation a working party was established to assist in the drafting of a Bill. 
As a consequence, the Patents Bill 1989 was introduced, which provided for 
replacement of the 1952 Act. The Bill passed both houses in October 1990 and 
resulted in enactment of the 1990 Act, which came into operation on 1 May 1991. 
4 Patents Act 1977, s 4(2). 
5 Donald Speagle and Michael Dowling, 'The 1990 Patents Act: Unfinished Reform' (1993) Australian 
Intellectual Property Journal, 166. 
6 Patents, Innovations and Competition in Australia (the 1PAC Report). 
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Like its predecessor, the 1990 Act is silent about patenting of methods of medical 
treatment. The Australian Parliament chose not to follow the United Kingdom 
approach of excluding methods of medical treatment from the scope of patentable 
subject matter. Instead it decided 'not to build this particular exclusion into its 
legislation', 7 despite having excluded other categories of subject matter, such as 
'human beings, and the biological processes for their generation'. 8 
4.3 THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID PATENT 
4.3.1 Requirements of s18(1) 
Before discussing the patentability of methods of medical treatments, it is 
necessary to make some observations about requirements for a valid patent under 
s18(1) of the 1990 Act, which defines a 'patentable invention' as one that: 
(a) is a manner of manufacture within the meaning of s 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies; and 
(b) when compared to the prior art base as it existed before the priority date of the 
claim: 
(i) is novel; and 
(ii) involves an inventive step; and 
(c) is useful; and 
(d) was not secretly used in the patent area... 
Schedule 1 of the 1990 Act provides that a 'patentable invention' means 'an 
invention of the kind mentioned in S 18'. Schedule 1 provides further that an 
'invention' means: 
any manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent and grant of privilege 
within S 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, and includes an alleged invention. 
It is important to recall that s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies declared all 
monopolies void, but saved those that are manners of manufacture that are not 
'contrary to the law or mischievous to the State by raising prices of commodities at 
home, or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient.' 
7 Anaesthetic Supplies Ply Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 122 ALR 141, 182 (Wilcox J). 
8 See Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 18 (2). 
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Due to the overlapping concepts of 'patentable invention', 'invention', 'newness', 
• 'novelty' and 'manner of new manufacture', identifying the boundaries of each 
requirement is no easy task. This Chapter deals with them in some length to show 
that all Australian patent applications have to go through the complicated channels 
to satisfy the requirements set out in s18(1), including methods of medical 
treatment. 
4.3.2 Novelty and Inventive Step Requirements 
Since the central change made by the 1990 Act was an adjustment of the novelty 
and inventive step requirements, it is necessary to deal with these requirements 
first. 9 Under the 1952 Act the above requirements of invention had to be inferred 
from the provisions in Ss 59(1) and 100(1), dealing with opposition and revocation 
proceedings. Neither the 1903 Act nor the 1952 Act contained an express provision 
giving an examiner power to examine an application for lack of an inventive step. 1° 
This absence of the inventive step requirement had considerable implications on 
the interpretation by the courts of the scope of what was embraced by s 6 of the 
Statute of Monopolies. Thus, the High Court decisions, operating under 1903 and 
1952 Acts, 11 show that the rationale for refusing analogous use claims 12 is 
conceptually consistent with earlier English cases, 13 namely, a failure to meet a 
threshold requirement of inventiveness, independent of the requirement of an 
inventive step. 
The 1990 Act expressly codified the inventive step and novelty requirements of 
patentability. Section 7 lays down the bases of comparison for determining the 
s18(1)(b) requirements that the invention be novel and involve an inventive step. 
These bases require a comparison of the invention against information external to 
the patent specification at issue. For novelty, the basis of comparison is found in s 
7(1). For an inventive step, the basis of comparison is found in Ss 7(2) and (3). 
Schedule 1 provides the definitions of 'prior art information' and 'prior art base'. 
9 It should be noted that the novelty and inventive step requirements have since been further amended by the 
Patents Amendment Act 2001 (Cth) 
I° See, for example s 48(1) of the 1952 Act. 
Commissioner of Patents v Microcell (1959) 102 CLR 232; National Research Development Corporation v 
Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252. 
12An 'analogous use' claims will be the claims where, on the face of the specification, a claim was 'nothing 
but a claim for the use of a known material in the manufacture of a known articles for a purpose of which its 
known properties make that material suitable': See Commissioner of Patents v Microcell (1959) 102 CLR 
232, 251 (Dixon CJ; McTieman, Fullagar, Taylor and Windeyer JJ). 
13 Re Compagnies Reunies des Glaces et Verres Speciaux du Nord de la France (1930) 48 RPC 185; Re L & 
G's Patent (1940) 58 RPC 21. 
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The explicit inclusion of the inventive step in the 1990 Act means that in the case 
when an alleged invention lacks inventiveness, it will be refused at the examination 
stage. Theoretically, the inclusion of separate requirements of novelty and 
inventive step should have solved the confusion about the test of inventiveness. 
However, the High Court's decision in NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken v Mirabella 
International Pty Ltd 14 (Philips) added a further layer of complexity by imposing an 
additional threshold requirement that the claimed subject—matter exhibits 'the 
quality of inventiveness' on the face of the specification. While the definition of a 
valid patent in s 18 of the 1990 Act appears simple in theory, in practice the 
separation of each requirement is a difficult task. 15 For example, to define 
'obviousness' it is necessary to refer to Ss 7 and 18 and several definitions in 
Schedule 1 of the 1990 Act. 
4.3.3 'Patentable Invention' Within the Meaning of the Opening Words of 
Ss18(1) and 18(1)(a) 
The first step in the complicated exercise of determining the patentability of an 
invention involves a determination of the meaning of the following: 
1. 'patentable invention' within the opening words of s18(1), which states that: 
'a patentable invention is an invention that...' (the opening words); and an 
'invention' in Schedule 1, which states that: 'any manner of new 
manufacture16 the subject of letters patent...' (the threshold test of an 
'invention); and 
2. a 'manner of manufacture' within the meaning of s 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies 17 in s18(1 )(a) (a 'manner of manufacture'). 
4.3.3.1 	The opening words of s18(1): 'a patentable invention is an 
invention that...'. 
According to the important patent decision of the High Court of Australia in Philips18 
the fulfillment of the primary or threshold test of an 'invention' is the prerequisite to 
the assessment of any invention. Although this issue is outside of the scope of this 
thesis and not intended to be discussed in depth, since the non-fulfillment of the 
14 (1995) 132 ALR 117, 121(Brennan, Deane and Toohey JJ). 
15 See also Aktiebolaget Hassle v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 59 and Lockwood Security Products v 
Doric Products (2004) HCA 58 regarding application of requirement of inventive step. 
16 Note the inclusion of 'new'. Compare to s 18(1)(a). 
17 Note the omission of 'new' in paragraph (a). Compare to the definition of 'invention' in Schedule I. 
18 (1995) 183 CLR 655. 
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threshold test would continue to exclude from patentability any claimed invention, 
including methods of medical treatment, it will be necessary to briefly discuss the 
meaning of this test. 
The threshold test of invention was applied for the first time in Commissioner of 
Patents v Microce11 19 (Microcell) (decided under the 1903 Act) and derived from 
the issue of whether there was a manner of manufacture and the requirement that 
claimed subject—matter exhibited 'the quality of inventiveness'. This test requires 
an assessment whether claimed invention is 'new' or 'inventive'. As it follows from 
the more recent decision Philips, this requirement is independent of the specific 
provisions of novelty and inventive step (located in s18(1)(b) of the 1990 Act), and 
is the primary requirement that must be addressed by the examiner. The essence 
of the decision in Philips can be seen in the following statement: 
The effect of those opening words of Section 18(1) is that the primary or threshold 
requirement of a 'patentable invention' is that it be an 'invention'. Read in the 
context of Section 18(1) as a whole and the definition of 'invention' in the Dictionary 
in Schedule 1, that clearly means 'an alleged invention', that is to say, an 'alleged' 
'manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent and grant of privilege 
within Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. 20 
A majority of the Court (per Brennan, Deane and Toohey JJ) confirmed the 
existence of the threshold test of patentability when considering the issue of 
whether there is a manner of manufacture, applied in Microcell. However, the High 
Court focused not upon the words of s18(1)(a) 'is a manner of manufacture...', as 
the Full Federal Court had done, but upon the opening words of s18(1) 'a 
patentable invention is an invention that ...'. The court's interpretation of the 
opening words were that: 
...if it is apparent on the face of the specification that the quality of inventiveness 
necessary for there to be a proper subject of letters patent under the Statute of 
Monopolies is absent, one need go no further. 21 
In other words, the threshold test is an assessment of 'newness' or 'inventiveness' 
on the face of the specification. This assessment must be done without need to 
resort to s18(1)(b), a codified provision for novelty and inventive step. If the 
19 (1959) 102 CLR 232. 
20 (1995) 183 CLR 655, 663 (Brennan, Deane and Toohey JJ). 
21 NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken v Mirabella International Ply Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 117,122. 
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examiner finds that there is no 'invention' within the meaning of the opening words 
of s18(1), 'one need go no further'. 22 
This approach is consistent with that taken previously by the High Court in 
Microcell. However, it must be remembered that Microcell was considered in the 
context of the provisions of the 1903 Act, under which the requirements of novelty 
and inventive step had to be inferred from other sources. 23 This Act did not contain 
an express requirement of inventive step. 24 Therefore, the court in Microcell 
interpreted the scope of what is meant by s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies in the 
light of the threshold requirement of inventiveness, independent of the requirement 
of inventive step.25 
The Philips case, however, was decided under the 1990 Act, which expressly 
codified the inventive step requirement of patentability by virtue of s18(1)(b)(ii). 
Therefore, one might expect that the more directed provisions of the 1990 Act 
required a different approach to statutory interpretation of 'patentable invention'. 
Yet, the High Court in Philips confirmed the existence of a threshold test, and so 
created uncertainty as to how the limits of this test are to be established. 26 Philips' 
interpretation of the opening words of s18(1) as the requirement for a threshold test 
raises the question of what operation remains for s18(1)(b)(ii) and requirement of 
inventive step in s 7 (2) and (3), which expressly provide for the inquiry to the 
inventiveness. It gave no guidance as to the criteria the court would apply in 
assessing the requirements for novelty and inventive step. 
The requirement for a threshold test clearly creates overlapping grounds of 
invalidity, such as 'manner of manufacture', 'novelty' and 'inventive step' under the 
1990 Act. It has been proposed therefore that under the 1990 Act an examination 
of inventive step beyond the face of the specification ought only to be undertaken 
within Ss18(1)(b)(ii), 7(2) and (3). 27 
22 Ibid. 
23 For example, Ss 59(1) and 100(1) of the 1952 Act, dealing with opposition and revocation proceedings. 
24 See, for example s 48(1),of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth). 
25 In Lockwood Security Products v Doric Products (2004) HCA 58 the High Court cleared the decision in 
Microcell relating to inventive step. This case confirmed that it is irrelevant whether the invention was arrived 
at as a matter of chance or the result of great intellectual effort. Further this decision it will be harder to 
invalidate a patent on the basis of obviousness. 
26 Miranda Duigan and Michael Dowling, 'Threshold Test of Manner of Manufacture in Australia-What 
Next?' (1998) Patent World, September, 26. 
27 David Brennan and Andrew Christie, 'Patent Claims for Analogous Use and the Threshold Requirement of 
Inventiveness' (1997) 25 Federal Law Review 237, 259. 
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The decision in Philips created confusion and thus was interpreted in various ways 
by academics,28 legal practitioners29 and courts. 39 The most recent interpretation of 
this decision was made by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Bristol—Myers 
Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd (BMS), when the court said: 
In our view, in the light of the authorities to which we have referred, Philips stands 
for the proposition (as a matter of construction of the 1990 Act) that if, on the basis 
of what was known, as revealed on the face of the specification, the invention 
claimed was obvious or did not involve an inventive step- that is, would be obvious 
to the hypothetical non-inventive and unimaginative skilled worker in the field 
(Minnesota at 260 per Barwick CJ) - then the threshold requirement of 
inventiveness is not met. 31 
4.3.3.2 	Section 18(1)(a): 'a manner of manufacture...' 
In considering the meaning of s1 8(1 )(a), the High Court in Philips made the obiter 
remark that the phrase 'manner of manufacture within the meaning of s 6 of the 
Statute of Monopolies' should be understood as referring to a process which is a 
proper subject matter of letters patent according to the traditional principle. 32 In 
other words, s1 8(1 )(a) should be construed to deal exclusively with the 'pure' 
manner of manufacture question dealt with by the High Court in National Research 
Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (NRDC) 33 This matter is not 
considered under the opening words of s1 8(1 ). Therefore, s18(1) and s1 8(1 )(a) 
involve two separate 'manner of manufacture' inquiries, namely: 
1. 	the threshold test of invention, in the sense applied in Microce1134 and 
addressed by Philips35 ; and 
28 Brennan and Christie, above n 27; William van Caenegem, 'Technicality Requirement, Patent Scope and 
Patentable Subject Matter in Australia' (2002) 13 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 41; William van 
Caenegem, Intellectual Property Law and Innovation (2007). 
29 Duigan and Dowling, above n 26; Mary Padbury, 'Inventiveness apart from Novelty and Inventive Step-
The High Court's Decisions on Manner of Manufacture in Philips and Ramsee (1998) Australian Intellectual 
Property Journal, 161. 
3° Advanced Building System Pty & Anor v Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Ply Ltd (1998) 152 ALR 604. 
31 Bristol—Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd [2000] FCA 316, [30]. 
32 NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken v Mirabella International Ply Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 117, 167. 
"Brennan and Christie, above n 27, 258. 
34 Commissioner of Patents v Microcell (1959) 102 CLR 232. 
35 NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrielcen v Mirabella International Pty Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 117; Advanced 
Building System Ply & Anor v Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd (1998) 152 ALR 604. 
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2. 	a 'pure' manner of manufacture test, in the sense of the central 
question discussed in NRDC 36 (pure manner of manufacture 
test). 
This second pure manner of manufacture test requires more detailed treatment 
because this test has played a critical role in determining the patentability of 
medical treatment inventions. In 1984, after reviewing the 1952 Act, IPAC strongly 
recommended that there should not be inflexible codified definition of 'manner of 
manufacture' (as did the European Patent Convention and the Patents Act 1977 
(UK)), and that the manner of manufacture test should be retained in its existing 
forrn.37 The IPAC stated that the concept of 'manner of manufacture' had 'the 
advantage of being underpinned by an extensive body of decided case law which 
facilitates its application in particular circumstances'. 38 IPAC emphasized that the 
real importance of the test lies in its capacity to respond flexibly to new 
technological developments. Consequently, Parliament chose to leave the 
definition of invention uncodified, instead retaining the manner of manufacture test 
in s18(1)(a) of the 1990 Act. 
4.4 	THE PURE MANNER OF MANUFACTURE TEST 
4.4.1 	Historical Development of the Manner of Manufacture Concept 
The concept of manner of manufacture has a long history, and its development can 
be traced back to the early English case law. Numerous attempts were made to 
interpret the meaning of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies by exact verbal formula, 
and to make a precise codified definition. For example, in BouIton v Bu11, 39 which 
involved a patent for a new method of using an old steam engine in a more 
economical way, three of the Judges4° treated the said 'manufacture' within the 
meaning of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies.'" Eyre CJ explained that the word 
'manufacture' extended 'to any new results of principles carried into practice.. .new 
processes in any art producing effects useful to the public'. 42 
In his dissenting judgment, Rooke J, although relying on the Statute of Monopolies, 
was more inclined to support the patent on the basis of the 'spirit' of s 6 and its 
36 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252. 
37 See the IPAC Report, above n 6, 41. 
38 See, the IPAC Report, above n 6, 41. 
39 (1795) 126 ER 651. 
40 Per Eyre CJ, Buller and Heath JJ. 
41 Boulton v Bull (1795) 126 ER 651, 660-1 (Heath J), 663 (Buller J) and 665-7 (Eyre CJ). 
42 Boulton v Bull (1795) 126 ER 651. 
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concept of manufacture.43 According to his Honour, the spirit of s 6 supported the 
patent, for there had been a new and useful improvement in fire engines 
sufficiently described in the specification." This view was accepted over 150 years 
later by the High Court in NRDC. 
In Crane v Price45 it was clarified that the term 'manufacture' was used in the dual 
sense, which combined both a process and a product. However, at that time it 
remained unclear whether it was necessary to produce some tangible article, in 
order to satisfy the requirement of the Statute of Monopolies. For example, Abbott 
CJ proposed in R v Wheeler46 that, to satisfy the word 'manufacture', there must be 
'[s]omething of a corporeal and substantial nature, something that can be made by 
man from the matters subjected to his art and skill, or at least some new mode of 
employing practically his art and skill... 
These attempts to define the word 'manufacture' led to a 'vendible product' test laid 
down by Morton J. In the Matter of an Application for a Patent by GEC 47 (GEC's 
Application), which significantly narrowed the scope of the inquiry. The 'vendible 
product' test was discussed in some detail in Chapter 1. 48 The test was difficult to 
apply in cases where a patent was sought for a new method or process consisting 
of taking advantage of an unsuspected property of a known material. Thus, there 
was a need for Morton J's definition to be clarified, and the ambit of 'manner of 
manufacture' to be expanded by looking at 'manufacture' as a general concept 
founded in the Statute of Monopolies. 
The time for change was not ripe, however, until 1959, when the High Court of 
Australia in NRDC49 redefined the test by giving the concept of 'manner of 
manufacture' an expanded meaning. Although, the question of patentability of 
methods of medical treatment of the human body was not directly considered by 
the High Court in NRDC, the case became an authority to the issue whether a new 
method of medical treatment could be a proper subject matter of letters patent. 
43 Ibid, 658. 
" Ibid. 
45 (1842)! Webb PC 393; 134 ER 239. 
46 (1819) 106 ER 392, 395. 
47 1n the Matter of an Application for a Patent by GEC (1942) 60 RPC 1, 4. 
48 See the discussion of GEC 's Application and the 'vendible product' test in Chapter 1, Part 1.3.2.1 of this 
thesis. 
49 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252. 
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4.4.2 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of 
Patents 
The case concerned a new method for eradicating weeds from crop areas. The 
active substance of the invention was known, and so not novel. The importance of 
the invention lay in the discovery of the relationship between particular chemical 
properties of the known substance and plants, in the way that this known 
substance selectively killed weeds, without damaging crops. The invention was 
based on the fact that certain valuable crops did not have a particular enzyme 
system, which weeds have, so the substance with weedicide properties would only 
be effective against plants with those particular enzyme systems, not against 
crops. 
The examiner of the application stated that as the active substances of the 
invention were known, the main Claims 1-3 in the complete specification lodged in 
support of an application were not directed to any manner of manufacture. Rather, 
they were claims to the 'mere use of known substances - which use also [did] not 
result in any vendible product'. 5° Similarly, the Deputy Commissioner of Patents 
directed that Claims 1- 3 be deleted upon the ground that the method claimed was 
not a manner of manufacture since it did not result in any vendible product. Since 
this direction was an equivalent to a refusal of a patent, the National Research 
Development Corporation appealed to the High Court. 
The High Court51 considered the meaning of the expression 'manner of new 
manufacture' and the whole concept of a 'manufacture' in the light of two issues: 
whether the process claimed satisfied the threshold requirement of inventiveness; 
and whether it had fallen within the category of 'invention' under the 1952 Act. 
4.4.2.1 	The threshold requirement of inventiveness 
In considering the first issue, the High Court concluded that it was clear that what 
was claimed was a new process for ridding crop areas of certain kinds of weeds by 
applying chemicals that were not known to be useful for this kind of purpose at all. 
Therefore, there was a clear assertion of a discovery that a useful result could be 
attained by doing something to be capable of producing that result. 52 As this was 
5° Ibid, 265. 
51 Per Dixon CJ, Kitto and Windeyer JJ. 
52 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252, 265. 
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not a claim for a new use of an old substance, it could not be rejected on those 
grounds. 
Even though the substances were known, they were known only partially and, so 
far as weed-killing potentialities were concerned, were unknown. 53 The Court 
distinguished the claimed process from previously known processes as it employed 
substances 'the suggestion of which for the purpose in hand was new, was not 
obvious, and was to be arrived at only by an exercise of scientific ingenuity, based 
upon knowledge and applied in experimental research'. 54 The Court concluded that 
the fact that substances themselves were already known afforded no valid reason 
for denying inventiveness. 
4.4.2.2 	Whether the process has fallen within the category of 'invention' 
under the 1952 Act 
This was the central question of the case. The court looked at the definition of 
'invention', which meant 'any manner of new manufacture...', and emphasized 
that the meaning of 'manufacture' was its main concern. The Court disapproved of 
any attempt to treat the word 'manufacture' as a rigid statutory formula, and said 
that the inquiry, which the definition demands, is an inquiry into the scope of the 
permissible subject matter of letters patent and grants of privilege protected by the 
s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. 55 The Court noted that it is an inquiry not into the 
meaning of a word, but into the breadth of the whole concept or category under 
which all grants of patents had been made in accordance with the developed 
principles of patent law. 56 By emphasizing the breadth of the Statute of Monopolies 
over its literal forms, the Court justified the approach taken by Rooke J in BouIton v 
BuII57 more than 150 years earlier. 
Thus, the High Court held that: 
It is therefore a mistake, and a mistake likely to lead to an incorrect conclusion, to 
treat the question whether a given process or product is within the definition as if 
that question could be restated in the form: 'Is this a manner (or kind) of 
manufacture?' 58 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid, 268. 
55 Ibid, 269. 
56 Ibid. 
57 (1795) 126 ER 651. 
58 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252, 269. 
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The Court rejected the view that 'manufacture' was confined to the production of 
tangible goods, simply because it is a word in everyday speech and therefore 
generally conveyed that idea. It continued by saying: 
The right question is: 'Is this a proper subject of letters patent according to the 
principles which have been developed for the application of s 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies?' 59 
After reviewing the old English case law, and the 'vendible product' test, laid down 
by Morton J in GEC's Application, 60 the Court pointed out that the concept of 
patentable subject matter has broadened and a process under consideration could 
be viewed within the concept of 'manufacture' notwithstanding that it merely 
improves, restores, or preserves some 'existing thing', provided that it offers some 
economical value to the country. Thus, the Court said, the test should be whether 
the process 'offers some advantage which is material, in the sense that the 
process belong to a useful art as distinct from a fine art - that its value to the 
country is in the field of economic endeavour.'61 
It must be noted that the claims at issue were for a process only and there were no 
claims for a product. Nevertheless, the court concluded that to be patentable, an 
invention need not be a 'thing' in the sense of an article. The 'vendible product' test 
was considered wide enough to convey the broad, modern sense of this concept. 
Accordingly, the agricultural process was held to fall within the limits of 
patentability. 
Since NRDC, the subject matter of patent may include new products, new 
methods, and new uses for old substances. It follows from the decision that any 
method, including method of medical treatment, could be capable of being a proper 
subject of letters patent, provided that it has a commercial application. The 
decision of the High Court received wide support and application not just in 
Australia but other countries as wel1. 62 
" Ibid. 
"In the Matter of an Application for a Patent by GEC (1942) 60 RPC 1. 
61 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252, 275. 
62 SWift & Co v Commissioner of Patents [1961] RPC 147; Schering AG 's Application [1971] 3 All ER 177; 
Eli Lilly &Company's Application [1975] RPC 438; Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v 
Commissioner of Patents [1999] NZCA 330; Pfizer Inc v Commissioner of Patents [2004] NZCA 104. 
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4.5 PATENTING OF METHODS OF MEDICAL TREATMENT 
Following NRDC, the issue of patentability of methods of medical treatment is 
determined by whether the invention is 'a proper subject of letters patent according 
to the principles which have developed for the application of s 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies?' 63 
In order to answer this inquiry, it is necessary to consider two issues: 
1. whether methods of medical treatment are a 'manner of manufacture' within 
s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies; 
2. if they are, whether they fall within the proviso to s 6 so as to be excluded 
from patentability. 
4.5.1 Issue 1: are methods of medical treatment a 'manner of manufacture' 
within s6 of the Statute of Monopolies? 
The question of whether a new method of treating the human body could be 
regarded as a 'manner of manufacture' and protected under Australian patent law 
was first directly addressed by the Full Federal Court in Rescare.64 Before that 
case, there were only some obiter observations made by the Judges of the High 
Court in Maeder v Busch,65 NRDC and Joos v Commissioner of Patents.66 
4.5.1.1 	Maeder v Busch 
This case was an appeal against a decision of the Supreme Court of South 
Australia, which had invalidated a patent for producing permanent waves in human 
hair by reason of prior common knowledge and prior public use. Having affirmed 
the judgment of the Supreme Court, all four Judges of the High Court 67 found it 
unnecessary to consider whether a claim for a new method of conducting an 
operation upon a part of the human body could be protected under the patent law. 
However, Latham CJ and Dixon J expressed doubt, by way of obiter comment, as 
to whether such methods would, in any event, constitute patentable subject matter. 
However, Latham CJ acknowledged the importance of the issue regarding 
63 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252, 269. 
64 Anaesthetic Supplies Ply Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) AIPC 91. 
65 (1938) 59 CLR 684. 
66 (1972) 126 CLR 611. 
67 (1938) 59 CLR 684, 699 (Latham CJ), 707 (Dixon J) 707 (Evatt J) and 708 (McTiernan J). 
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patentability of methods conducting an operation on humans, and stated that the 
issue should not be decided 'until the necessity for doing so arises'. 68 For Latham 
CJ such a claim was quite different from a claim relating to an appliance or a 
substance, which might be used upon or in connection with the human body. 
Dixon J also left the issue unanswered, but was prepared to consider it in some 
detail. After noting that to be patentable an invention must relate to an art, Dixon J 
questioned: 'Can the hair growing upon the human head be regarded as satisfying 
the condition that the process shall in some way relate to the productive arts?'69 In 
answering this question, he referred to the case of C & W's Application, 70 and 
argued that it would be difficult to establish the difference between a patentable 
invention concerning cosmetic procedures and life-saving surgery. His Honour 
expressed doubts as to whether methods of treating the human body fall within the 
concept of invention, since 'the object is not to produce or aid the production of any 
article or commerce'. 71 This reason for this objection, however, is arguably 
weakened by the subsequent expansion of the meaning of 'manner of 
manufacture' by NRDC. 
4.5.1.2 	National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of 
Patents 
This case was discussed earlier in this Chapter in relation to a manner of 
manufacture test. 72 Although the specific question concerning patentability of 
methods of medical treatment of the human body was not directly considered by 
the High Court, the judgment has significance not only because it explored and 
expanded the term 'manner of manufacture', but also because the interpretation of 
this term became wide enough to be applicable for methods of medical treatment 
inventions. Accordingly, provided that a method of medical treatment is useful, 
gives a material advantage, and is of value in the field of economic endeavour, it 
could potentially be a proper subject of the letters patent. 
Though the High Court advocated a more flexible approach to the concept of 
patentable invention, it did not explore the reasoning as to whether methods of 
medical treatment could actually qualify. Since the invention at issue was not a 
method of medical treatment, the court mentioned this matter only briefly, in two 
passages. First, in dealing with the term 'vendible product', the High Court noted: 
68 Maeder v Busch (1938) 59 CLR 684, 699. 
69 Ibid, 706. 
70 1n the Matter of C & W's Application for a Patent (1914) 31 RPC 235. 
71 Maeder v Busch (1938) 59 CLR 684, 706. 
72 See Part 4.4.2 of this Chapter. 
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The need for qualification must be confessed, even if only in order to put aside, as 
they apparently must be put aside, processes for treating diseases of the human 
body: see C & W's Application; Maeder v Busch. 73 
The word 'apparently', in the above passage has since been the object of many 
discussions by legal professionals, academics and judges. Graham and Whitford 
JJ in Schering AG's Application 74 and Witkon J in Wellcome Foundation Ltd v 
Plantex Ltdr75 expressed the opinion that the judges in NRDC must have 
entertained some doubt as to whether this exclusion was justified and whether or 
not all processes for treating the human body should be excluded from 
patentability. Later, Barwick CJ in Joosm commented 'that [passage] was no more 
that a passing reference not intended to be definitive.' 77 
On the second occasion when the High Court mentioned the issue in NRDC, the 
point was made in parenthesis: 
(The exclusion of methods of surgery and other processes for treating the human 
body may well lie outside the concept of invention because the whole subject is 
conceived as essentially non-economic: see Maeder v Busch.) 78 
Again, it could be argued that by making this statement parenthetically, it was no 
more than a passing reference. The Court did not consider the issue of 
patentability of methods of medical treatment in any detail and simply dismissed 
the issue by relying on Maeder v Busch without justifying the basis for considering 
those methods as non-economic. 
4.5.1.3 	Joos v Commissioner of Patents79 
The significance of this case lies in negating the assumption that medical or 
surgical processes do not have commercial application, thus narrowing the 
boundaries of the exclusion of these processes from patenting. The case makes it 
clear that the only legitimate basis on which the patentability of methods of medical 
treatment could be denied was public policy, which treats them as 'generally 
73 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252, 270. 
74 [1971] RPC 337. 
75 [1974] RPC 514, published in Hebrew in PDI (Supreme Court Judgments), vol. 27, p 29. 
76 (1972) 126 CLR 611, 618. 
77 Ibid, 618. 
78 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252, 275. 
79 (1972) 126 CLR 611. 
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inconvenient' within the meaning of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. Joos was the 
first decision in Australia where the proviso to s 6 was ever mentioned. 
It is interesting to note that, three years later, the issue of public policy raised in 
Joos attracted the direct attention of the United Kingdom courts. For example, in Eli 
Lilly & Company's Application, 80 the Patents Appeal Tribunal, for the first time, 
based the exclusion of medical treatments patents on the basis of the public policy 
proviso to s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. 81 
Joos was a successful appeal against a decision of the Deputy Commissioner of 
Patents, who had refused a patent to a process for improving strength and 
elasticity of material, especially human nails and hair. Since nails and hair were 
growing on the human body, the Deputy Commissioner rejected the application on 
the grounds that it concerned a process for the treatment of parts of the human 
body. 
In delivering the judgment of the court, Barwick CJ stated that the appeal must be 
considered on the footing that the use of the process did not produce or improve a 
'vendible article'. However, he held that it was not essential, and thus, not fatal to 
the applicant's case since NRDC, which was a 'watershed in this respect'. 82 It was 
enough that the process had a commercial application. Nevertheless, in the terms 
of NRDC, the question remained whether the process claimed was a proper 
subject matter for the grant of letters patent under the patents legislation. 
In answering this question, Barwick CJ noted that there was no High Court 
authority on whether a monopoly must be refused for a process for treatment of 
human hair or nails whilst still attached to or growing upon the human body. For 
this reason, the Chief Justice distinguished Maeder v Busch, considering the 
comments in that case as obiter and unnecessary to the decision of the present 
matter.83 
The Chief Justice proceeded to make a radical distinction between treatment of the 
diseases of the body and processes for improving the cosmetic appearance of that 
body. This distinction was considered important because of the implications for the 
question regarding a proper subject of letters patent. Accordingly, treatment was 
held to be the application to the body of a substance or process for the purpose of 
80 [1975] RPC 438. 
8 See discussion in Part 1.3.7 of Chapter 1. 
82 Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 611, 617. 
83 Ibid. 
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arresting or curing a disease or diseased condition, or of correcting some 
malfunction or of ameliorating some incapacity.  CJ stated that if the 
process or method was in that sense of 'treatment', it was not a proper subject of 
letters patent. 85 However, Chief Justice noted that the class of such claims should 
be narrowly defined, and cosmetic processes were 'not of a like kind with medical 
prophylactic or therapeutic processes or methods: 88 Cosmetic processes were 
held to be simply processes and methods for improving, or changing the 
appearance of the human body or part of it, and so were not within the narrow 
exception to patentability." 
Barwick CJ clarified that there may be 'borderline instances' where it would be 
difficult to determine whether process constitutes medical or cosmetic treatment. 88 
Since the process at issue was clearly cosmetic, it was allowed to proceed. For the 
same reason, Barwick CJ was not concerned to discuss in depth a basis for the 
exception of methods of medical treatment. However, the Chief Justice made the 
following comment in relation to exception of methods of medical treatment from 
patenting: 
If I had to do so, as at present advised, I would place the exception, if it is to be 
maintained, on public policy as being, in the language of the Statute of Monopolies, 
'generally inconvenient'... 89 
(Emphasis added) 
Considering the question whether methods of medical treatments are a 'manner of 
manufacture', it is submitted that the above passage could be interpreted in such a 
way that, if public policy could be put aside, such methods should be considered as 
a 'manner of manufacture' within the meaning of NRDC and the Statute of 
Monopolies. 
The decision in Joos is significant for the question of patentability of methods of 
medical treatment. First, following NRDC, Barwick CJ confirmed that it was enough 
that the process had a commercial application, without producing or improving a 
'vendible product', and concluded that most surgical and medical processes do 
satisfy the economic element of invention. Second, the decision narrowed down 
the ambit of the exclusion of methods of medical treatment, in finding that the 
84 Ibid, 619. 
" Ibid. 
86 Ibid, 623. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid, 623 (Emphasis added). 
123 
exclusion of such methods must be based on public policy grounds. This was the 
first time when, in considering medical treatment inventions, the proviso to s 6 was 
ever referred to. 
It seems that Barwick CJ's decision was influenced by the decisions of the United 
Kingdom Patent Office, in particularly, the decision in Schering AG's Application, 90 
discussed in detail in Chapter 1. In that case, as in Joos, a narrow view was taken 
as to the meaning of medical treatment, with the emphasis on the element of 
disease prevention. However, as pointed out, Barwick CJ in Joos felt that there 
might be difficult borderline cases. 
4.5.1.4 	Conclusion regarding Issue 1 
In answering the question whether a method of medical treatment invention is 'a 
proper subject of letters patent according to the principles which have developed 
for the application of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies?' 91 , it is necessary to 
consider the first issue of whether the alleged method of medical treatment is a 
'manner of manufacture' within s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. Following the High 
Court decisions in NRDC and Joos, the answer is clearly in the affirmative, 
providing that the method belongs to a useful art as distinct from a fine art and has 
an economic value to the country. The recent decision of the Full Federal Court in 
BMS92 confirmed that this could be so. 
4.5.2 Issue 2: do methods of medical treatment fall within the proviso to 
s 6 so as to be excluded from patentability? 
Before methods of medical treatment inventions would be generally considered to 
be 'proper subject of letters patent' the second issue must be answered in 
negative. 
Since 1624 the courts have been empowered by s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 
to consider whether the patenting of alleged invention is 'not contrary to the law or 
mischievous to the State by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, 
or generally inconvenient'. However, as the previous discussion of the case law 
shows, until Joos this provision was never a factor in considering the basis for the 
exclusion of methods of medical treatment from patenting. The courts appeared to 
be comfortable with the long established grounds for such exclusion, based on the 
9° [1971] RPC 337. 
91 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252, 269. 
92 Bristol—Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd [2000] FCA 316. 
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decision of C & W's Application93 , that such inventions lacked of 'commercial 
value'. 94 The decision in Joos had removed that ground, but offered a new one - 
the forgotten 'generally inconvenient' proviso to s 6. 95 
However, given the ambiguous remarks of Barwick CJ, 96 and the statement that 
the Commissioner ought only to refuse to grant a patent if 'on no reasonable 
ground' the claimed invention could be within the Statute, 97 the Australian Patent 
Office began granting patents for methods of medical treatment, leaving any 
question of invalidity to be handled by the later infringement litigation. 98 
Nevertheless, since Joos, opponents to the patentability of methods of medical 
treatment in Australia have heavily relied on that proviso, arguing that granting a 
patent to such a method will be 'generally inconvenient' within the patent 
legislation, and therefore must be excluded from patentability. However, to date, 
Australian courts have been unpersuaded that public policy is a sufficient ground to 
justify such exclusion. 99 The first case in which the issue of 'general inconvenience' 
was put before the courts was Rescare. 
4.5.2.1 	Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Lte ° 
This case involved patent infringement and revocation proceedings concerning an 
invention comprising of a device for treating snoring sickness and a method for its 
treatment. The inventor was Professor Colin Sullivan of the University of Sydney, 
who had undertaken research in the field of respiratory medicine and sleep 
disorders, especially, obstructive sleep apnoea (OSA). OSA is a syndrome 
associated with an extreme form of snoring with the high risk of repeatedly choking 
on the sufferer's tongue and soft palate whilst asleep. The problem could result in 
severe fragmentation of sleep and in an extreme case, asphyxia. The disease is a 
recognized cause of 'unexpected' death. Since the invention was likely to alleviate 
OSA, it was clearly for public benefit and had economic value for the country. 
93 (1914) 31 RPC 235. 
94 (1914) 31 RPC 235. 
95 Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 611, 623. 
96 For instance, the Chief Justice used the phrases such as 'for the purpose of the decision of this case' (at 
619), 'if it be accepted' (at 622), 'may be taken as an inappropriate' (at 623), and 'if it is to be maintained' 
(at 623). 
97 Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 611, 615. 
98 David Kell, 'Comments: Expanding the Frontier of Patentability: Methods of Medical Treatment of the 
Human Body' (1995) 4 European Intellectual Property Review 202, 203. 
99 Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1992) 25 IPR 119; Bristol—Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & 
Co Ltd [2000] FCA 316. 
1°° (1994) 50 FCR 1. 
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The patent was granted in 1982. The complete specification, lodged by Professor 
Sullivan, comprised 11 claims and described the invention as relating to apparatus 
for the treatment of OSA. Claims 9 and 11 were, on their face, method of process 
claims, as they addressed a method of treating OSA. 
Rescare Ltd was the registered proprietor of the patent. It sued Anaesthetic 
Supplies Pty Ltd for infringement of its patent. At the trial, Anaesthetic Supplies Pty 
Ltd denied infringement and cross-claimed revocation of the patent on a number of 
grounds, including that claims 9 and 11 were not patentable subject matter, as they 
were directed to a method of medical treatment of the human body, 'something 
outside the concept of 'manner of manufacture". 101 
(a) 	The judgment of Gummow J of the Federal Court of Australia 
At the first instance Gummow J held that claims 9 and 11 were not directed to 
unpatentable subject matter. His Honour referred to Barwick CJ's statement in 
Joos that an exclusion of methods of medical treatment patents should be based 
on the public policy considerations of treating them 'generally inconvenient'. While 
accepting that the 'general inconvenience' was one of the tests under the 1952 and 
the 1990 Acts, and also that the question at issue should have been approached in 
the manner propounded in Joos, Gummow J was of the opinion that the judgment 
of Davison CJ of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in Wellcome Foundation Ltd v 
Commissioner of Patents102 had the advantage of greater cogency and was closer 
to that of Barwick CJ in Joos." 3 
By rejecting Anaesthetic Supplies' submission that claims 9 and 11 were 'generally 
inconvenient' within the Statute of Monopolies, Gummow J held that under the 
patent statute there was no normative distinction to be drawn between processes 
for treatment of the human body for disease, malfunction or incapacity and for 
cosmetic processes. 1°4 
1°1 Anaesthetic Supplies Ply Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1992) 25 1PR 119, 124. 
102 [1979] 2 NZLR 591 (where the Chief Justice stated that it would be an illogical result if products for 
treatment of the human body were patentable and methods for treating were not). 
103Anaesthetic Supplies Ply Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1992) 25 IPR 119, 149. See discussion of Wellcome 
Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents[1979] 2 NZLR 591 in Part 3.4.2.3 of Chapter 3. In that case 
Davison CJ questioned the justification in law and/or in logic of granting patents for substances that produce a 
cosmetic result and refusing patents for those that are of a curative result. 
1°4Ibid, 151. 
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(b) 	The majority decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court 
On appeal, the Court confirmed Gummow J's reasoning. By a 2-1, the majority (per 
Lockhart and Wilcox JJ) the Court held that methods of medical treatment were 
patentable under the Australian law. 105 However, whilst all three Judges agreed 
that 'general inconvenience' and the public policy considerations are relevant when 
determining patentability by means of the proviso to s 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies, only Lockhart and Sheppard JJ accepted that it is within the court's 
competence to consider this matter. Wilcox J, on the other hand, was of the 
opinion that the courts 'have no special expertise' on the matters of 'ethics and 
social policy'. 106 
Lockhart J delivered the leading judgment. After an examination of the cases in 
Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Canada, the USA, Germany and 
Israel, his Honour acknowledged that some people have a deep feeling that the art 
of the physician or surgeon in alleviating human suffering does not belong to the 
area of economic value or trade and commerce. 107 Nevertheless, Lockhart J was of 
the opinion that the resolution of this question involved a 'balancing exercise' 
where, on the one hand, there is 'a need to encourage research in connection with 
methods of medical treatment' and, on the other hand, 'the need not unduly to 
restrict the activities of those who engage in the therapy of humansf 108 
His Honour expressed the view that '[o]n both humanitarian and economic grounds 
the search for medical advance is to be encouraged'. 109 Although admitting 
existence of the general inconvenience argument against patentability of methods 
of medical treatment, Lockhart J found this argument unpersuasive. He agreed 
with the decision of Davison CJ of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in 
Wellcome, and concluded that there was `no justification in law or in logic' to say 
that because substances produce a cosmetic or functional result as opposed to a 
curative result, one is patentable whereas the other is not. 11° 
Lockhart J was of the opinion that justification for granting patent protection for 
processes of medical treatment based on the fact that there would be less 
105 Though the patent was held invalid on technical grounds, namely that there was no sufficient description of 
the invention in the provisional specification, and so the claims could not be fairly based upon that 
specification. 
1°6 Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 1, 45. 
1°7 Ibid, 18. 
108 Ibid, 16. 
1°9 Ibid. 
110 Ibid, 19. 
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incentive to expend time, effort and money to make discoveries of new medical 
uses for known chemicals, if no financial return (by means of patents) was to be 
available. 111 Moreover, his Honour noted that there was no binding precedent in 
Australia on patentability of methods of medical treatments, and could see no 
reason why a method of treatment of humans was any less a manner of 
manufacture than a method for ridding crops of weeds as in NRDC. 112 In 
conclusion, his Honour propounded: 
Australian courts must take a realistic view of the matter in the light of current 
scientific development and legal process; the law must move with changing needs 
and times. 113 
In deciding whether the application at issue was a proper subject of letters patent, 
Lockhart J was of the opinion that the court must adopt the test used in NRDC. His 
Honour held that the test was no more than whether the invention was a proper 
subject of letters patent according to the principles developed for the application of 
s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. He felt no hesitation in declaring that the 
application was a proper subject of letters patent, and noted that no statutory 
provision in Australia prohibited the grant of a patent for a process of medical 
treatment of humans. Moreover, Lockhart J found it important that the Parliament 
had the opportunity to exclude such methods when it enacted the 1990 Act, but 
limited the exclusion to s 18(2). 114 
Wilcox J agreed generally with Lockhart J on the point of patentability of methods 
of medical treatment and decided the case on the issue of 'fair basing'. He rejected 
the appellant's argument that the law does not permit to grant a patent in respect of 
such methods. 115 His Honour also found it noteworthy that the Australian 
Parliament had not been persuaded by the public policy arguments against 
patentability, and never excluded methods of human treatment from patentability or 
the definition of 'invention' 116 (as the Parliament of the United Kingdom had 
done). 117 For these reasons, he believed that in the face of apparently deliberate 
decisions by Parliament not to build this particular exclusion into its legislation, 
111 Ibid, 18. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid, 19. 
114 Section 18(2) provides: "Human beings and biological processes for their generation, are not patentable 
inventions". 
115 Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 1, 42. 
116 Ibid. 
117 See Patents Act 1977 (UK), s 4(2). 
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'courts should be hesitant to introduce the exclusion by reference to those very 
general principles.' 118 
(c) 	The dissenting judgment of Sheppard J 
Sheppard J strongly dissented in Rescare on the point that to grant a patent to the 
methods of medical treatment would be 'generally inconvenient' within the public 
policy proviso to s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. Unlike Lockhart J (who 
considered the appeal decision of the New Zealand We//come, but relied on the 
decision of Davison CJ), Sheppard J followed the New Zealand Court of Appeal, 
which overturned Davison CJ's decision and held that the treatment of human 
illness or disease was not a manner of manufacture as it is viewed to be 'generally 
inconvenient', and thus could not be patented. 
Central to his Honour's decision was the idea of not granting a monopoly over a 
surgical procedure, which might be 'greatly beneficial to mankind'. 119 Such 
monopoly, he pointed out, might mean the 'death or unnecessary suffering of 
countless people'. 12° Sheppard J pointed out that all professions develop by 
research and teaching. Since there is a willingness on the part of members to 
share information about new discoveries and new methods of treatment, 'the 
process is an on-going one' in which members of the medical profession learn as 
they go along and thus develop and improve the quality of medical treatment in the 
community. 121 The most important research and discoveries, he said, are 
disseminated through papers, articles, text books or conferences. Sheppard J 
concluded that, even though the subject matter concerning medical treatments 
might have 'its commercial elements', nevertheless it involves 'the treatment and 
relief of human suffering' and thus 'has a direct bearing on the well being of the 
nation'. 122 
By holding that the grant of a patent to an invention at issue would be 'generally 
inconvenient', Sheppard J said: 
It is not going too far, I think, to say that the Court should not contemplate the grant 
of letters patent which would give to one medical practitioner, or perhaps a group of 
medical practitioners, a monopoly over, for example a surgical procedure which 
might be greatly beneficial to mankind. Its denial might mean the death or 
118 Anaesthetic Supplies Ply Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 1, 43. 





unnecessary suffering of countless people. I cannot think that this is really what the 
medical profession as a whole would seek to achieve. Its whole history is a denial 
of the proposition. 123 
In concluding that the invention did not concern patentable subject matter, 
Sheppard J did not base this conclusion on NRDC principles. Rather, his Honour 
considered it relevant to the issue of 'general inconvenience'. 
(d) 	The main points about Rescare case 
The decision of the Full Court was the first Australian case in which it was decided 
that there is nothing intrinsically unpatentable about a method of medical 
treatment. Prior to this decision, there had been clear indications that such 
methods were patentable in the United States. Similarly, in the Israeli decision in 
Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Plantex Ltd, 124 the Supreme Court upheld the patent 
for a use of a known substance in the treatment of gout. 128 Notwithstanding that 
this patent was granted under legislation prior to the new Israeli Patents Act 1967, 
which prohibited patenting of methods of medical treatment, it seems that this 
case significantly influenced the decision of Davison CJ in the New Zealand 
Supreme Court in Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents, 126 which 
in turn, influenced the majority of the Federal Court of Australia in Rescare. 
Thus, at the time of the decision in Rescare, the matter was one free of binding 
authority, 127 and the court had to decide whether it was for the legislature or for the 
court to pronounce the status for methods of medical treatment patents. In terms of 
this issue, Sheppard J noted that the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Wellcome, 
for example, decided that if it was desirable to treat a method of medical treatment 
as a proper subject letters of patent, it was the task for the legislature, not the 
courts. 128 On the other hand, the Judges of the High Court in Maeder v Busch, 
NRDC and Joos concluded that the court had full capacity and power to decide this 
question. The only reason they did not do so 'was because no case which came 
before them raised the matter for decision'. 129 Consequently, the Federal Court in 
Rescare took the matter into its own hands, and pronounced, by majority, that 
methods of medical treatment are a proper subject of letters patent. 
123 Ibid. 
124 [1974] RPC 514, published in Hebrew in PD! (Supreme Court Judgments), vol. 27, p 29. 
125 See discussion of Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Plantex Ltd [1974] RPC 514 in Part 3.3.2 of Chapter 3. 
126 [1979] 2 NZLR 591. 
127 Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 1, 40 (Sheppard J). 
128 Commissioner of Patents v Wellcome Foundation Ltd (1983) 1 TPR 156,172. 
129 Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 1, 40 (Sheppard J). 
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This conclusion reaffirmed the practice of granting patents to such methods, 
adopted by the Australian Patent Office (APO) following the decision in Joos. 
However, Rescare did not close the debate about whether methods of medical 
treatment should be patentable. The strong dissenting judgment of Sheppard J 
indicates that disagreement in relation to this matter continued to exist. Moreover, 
some doubt has been cast upon the APO's practice in Heerey J's judgment in the 
BMS case of 1998. 
4.5.2.2 	Bristol—Myers Squibb Co v F H Fau!ding 14 Co Ltd13° 
In the few years between Rescare and BMS, the position regarding patenting of 
methods of medical treatment remained stable and a number of patents for such 
methods were granted. Then, the BMS case, heard at the first instance by Heerey 
J in the Federal Court in 1998, spurred further debate over the legitimacy of such 
patents. 
The case involved two petty patents, held by Bristol—Myers Squibb Co (BMS Co), 
for methods of dosing and administering the previously known drug taxol in the 
treatment of cancer. Taxol is a naturally occurring compound extracted from the 
bark of Taxus brevifolia (referred to as "Pacific yew"). At the priority date taxol was 
known for its anti-carcinogenic properties. However, it had been proven to cause 
toxic effects on patients and there were other side effects associated with its 
administration. The patented methods of treatment overcame these side effects by 
specifying the amount of taxol and the period of time for which it should be 
administered. 
During the life of the patents, FH Faulding & Co (Faulding) had sold taxol to 
medical practitioners and hospitals around Australia along with instructions 
regarding its administration. Faulding also arranged clinical trials of taxol, where, 
before their commencement, certain protocols had been prepared. 
BMS Co commenced proceedings against Faulding for infringement of its patents. 
Faulding cross-claimed, amongst other things, that the patents were invalid on the 
ground that since the invention at issue concerned methods of medical treatment 
of human beings, it was not a manner of manufacture, and therefore was not 
patentable. Faulding further cross-claimed that the invention had been published 
and so was not novel; did not disclose an inventive step; and was not fairly based 
on the matter described in the specification. 
130 [2000] FCA 316. 
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(a) 	The Judgment of Heerey J 
Heerey J found in favour of Faulding on each of the cross-claims and directed that 
the BMS Co patents be revoked. In approaching this matter, his Honour 
considered whether the alleged invention fulfilled the threshold test of 
inventiveness and the 'pure' manner of manufacture test, in the sense of the 
central question discussed in NRDC. 
His Honour first found that the invention did not satisfy the threshold requirement of 
inventiveness (opening words of s1 8(1 )), 131 propounded by the High Court in 
Philips, by reference to the following passage: 
[i]f it is apparent on the face of the specification that the quality of inventiveness 
necessary for there to be a proper subject of letters patent under the Statute of 
Monopolies is absent, one need go no further. 132 
Following Philips, Heerey J held that since the properties which made taxol 
effective against cancer were already well known, the alleged patent was not 
merely a claim of a new use of an old substance, but a claim for the same use for 
an old substance. 133 For these reasons, the alleged invention must be denied 
patentability. 
The most controversial aspect of Heerey J's decision was his second finding, 
which concerned patenting of methods of medical treatment. This question was 
considered under the 'manner of manufacture' test. By looking at s 6 of the Statute 
of Monopolies, his Honour was of the opinion that in considering this matter, the 
right question that needed to be asked was 'whether the grant of a patent in these 
circumstances would be generally inconvenient'. 134 
In reaching his decision, Heerey J referred to the only Australian authority on the 
question of whether methods of medical treatment are patentable inventions, the 
Rescare case. His Honour was of the opinion that since the case was decided on 
other grounds, the views of the majority on the patentability of methods of medical 
treatment were obiter and thus not binding. Instead his Honour adopted Sheppard 
J's dissenting view. He considered that Sheppard J's comments on the ethics of 
131 See discussion of the threshold test in Part 4.3.3.1 of this Chapter. 
132 NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrielcen v Mirabella International Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 117, 663. 
133 Bristol—Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd [1998] 860 FCA 22, 32. 
134 /bid, 35. 
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allowing patents for methods of medical treatement were equally applicable to the 
case at issue, since it concerned the treatment of a deadly disease, which could 
cause pain and distress. He commented that ?The present case shows in acute 
form the harmful effects which would follow from the granting of monopolies in 
respect of forms of medical treatment.' 135 As a result, the patenting of the alleged 
method was considered to be 'generally inconvenient' for public policy reasons and 
the two petty patents were held to be invalid. 
This decision was inconsistent with the practice adopted by the Patent Office at the 
time, which had been granting patents to methods of medical treatment inventions 
since Joos. It is clearly inconsistent with the majority decision in Rescare. 
Arguably, if upheld, Heerey J's judgment might have had very serious implications 
on the development of medical research and the pharmaceutical industry in 
Australia. 
(b) 	The Decision of the Full Federal Court 
On appeal, the Full Federal Court found that Heerey J was in error in holding that 
the patents were invalid on the grounds of general inconvenience. Two judgments 
were delivered on appeal: a combined judgment of Black CJ and Lehane J, and 
that of Finkelstein J. As a starting point, Finkelstein J discussed at length the 
difference between ratio decidendi (a binding precedent) and obiter (a statement 
that is not binding). His Honour concluded that Heerey J was not free to determine 
for himself whether a medical process was or was not patentable subject matter 
and he was required to follow the majority in Rescare in holding that it was. 
The court upheld Heerey J's findings that the BMS Co patents lacked the novelty 
requirement due to prior publication in Australia before the priority date. Since the 
novelty requirement had not been met, the Full Court held that the BMS Co patents 
should be revoked. Even though the patents were found to be invalid, their 
invalidity was found on very narrow grounds. 
However, the most significant aspect of the Full Court decision was its finding, as a 
general principle, that methods of treatment of the human body are patentable 
under the 1990 Act. The court chose to deal with the issue of patentability of such 
methods in some detail. It unanimously overturned Heerey J's judgment on this 
point. The court followed the majority in Rescare and held that patentability of 
methods of medical treatment is not 'generally inconvenient'. 
1 " Ibid. 
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• 	The judgment of Black CJ and Lehane J 
Black CJ and Lehane J were influenced by two matters: 
1. that in amending the 1952 Act, the Australian Parliament had chosen not to 
exclude methods of medical treatment of the human body from patenting; 
and 
2. a distinction between approaches in patentability of products and methods. 
In relation to the first matter, their Honours noted 'the very limited extent to which 
the Parliament dealt with patents with respect to the human body when it enacted 
the new 1990 Act: 138 They emphasized that Parliament did so 'at a time when the 
long-standing practice in Australia was (as we are informed it still is) to grant 
patents for methods of medical treatment of the human body.' 137 The reason was 
based on the fact that in 1979 IPAC undertook a major review of the patent 
system, which resulted in replacement of the 1952 Act. In debating the new 
legislation, Parliament was well aware of the issues surrounding patentability of 
such methods. However, it choose not to follow the United Kingdom's approach of 
excluding methods of medical treatment from the scope of patentable subject 
matter, instead leaving the definition of 'invention' unchanged. 138 
In considering the second issue, their Honours drew attention to 'the 
insurmountable problem, from a public policy viewpoint, of drawing a logical 
distinction, which would justify allowing patentability for a product for treating the 
human body, but deny patentability for a method of treatment.' 139 In making this 
point, they followed Davison CJ in Wellcome and Gummow J in Rescare. Their 
Honours were of the opinion that since the claim was for an invention for the 
administration of a product, this case was a good example of a situation where to 
draw a logical distinction was impossible. 
In deciding whether patenting of methods of medical treatment were 'generally 
inconvenient', Black CJ and Lehane J acknowledged that, at first sight, it was easy 
to see how it could be argued that it was 'generally inconvenient' to grant a patent 
to a novel life-saving therapeutic method. It would be based on a belief that such a 
method must be available universally and without restrictions. However, their 
136 Bristol—Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd [2000] FCA 316, [15] 
137 Ibid, [16]. 
138 See Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s18. 
139 Bristol—Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd [2000] FCA 316, [15]. 
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Honours did not share this view. They concentrated on logic, rather than ethics, in 
concluding that: 
[t]he difficulty remains of drawing any logical distinction between a method of 
treatment and a patentable pharmaceutical product that produces the same 
beneficial result. More specifically, if (say) an antivenene for spider bite is 
patentable, on what ground can a new form of treatment for the same life-
threatening bite be denied? The second consideration, referred to above [the 
very limited extent to which the Parliament dealt with such patents], would also 
seem to remain as an obstacle. 140 
Clearly, Black CJ and Lehane J were unwilling to share the view of Barwick CJ in 
Joos141 and the European decision-makers, in particular, the United Kingdom 
Patents Appeal Tribunal in Eli Lilly & Company's Application 142 . 
While acknowledging the existence of ethical considerations, their Honours leaned 
towards the logical approach, based on facts mainly that patents for 
pharmaceutical products and medical devices have been granted for a long time, 
and have never been challenged on the basis of general inconvenience. 
• 	The judgment of Finkelstein J 
Finkelstein J examined the history of the Statute of Monopolies and its proviso to s 
6, and concluded that the exclusion of methods of medical treatment from 
patenting as based on public policy grounds and, in particular, on the grounds that 
the grant of a patent would be illegal, mischievous to the State or generally 
inconvenient. 143 
Finkelstein J pointed out that it was necessary to make an inquiry into the scope of 
operation of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies and the effect of its proviso. The 
result of that inquiry, he said, would determine whether methods of medical 
14° Ibid, [17] [Parenthesis added]. 
141 Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 611, 623. In this case Barwick CJ expressed the view 
that he would place the exception on "public policy as being, in the language of the Statute of Monopolies, 
"generally inconvenient"... ." 
142 [1975] RPC 438. 
143 Although his Honour looked at the history of the proviso to s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, he did not 
consider its meaning or purpose. This thesis argues that an understanding of how the proviso, and in 
particular, the term 'generally inconvenient' should be interpreted by courts is important. Thus, in Chapter 5 
it is argued that the modern interpretation of the term is contrary to its original meaning and, arguably, the 
patent law concept. Chapter 5 also makes an inquiry into whether it is correct to interpret the proviso 
absolutely in its strict sense - in isolation to the rest of s 6, which it qualifies. 
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treatment are a patentable invention. 	Honour held that methods of medical 
treatment clearly fell within the concept of manner of manufacture. 145 
The second critical question was whether medical or surgical process patents were 
'generally inconvenient'. He proceeded to consider the public policy arguments for 
and against such patents and stated: 
Perhaps the most powerful argument against patenting is the idea that a patient 
may be denied medical treatment that she needs. .... It presumes that a medical 
practitioner may be unable to obtain the right to use a particular process, or may 
not be able to do so within due time, and therefore will be unwilling to undertake 
the process on her patients for fear of legal action. 146 
His Honour noted the other side of the debate, that the fundamental principle of 
granting patents is the promotion of science and the advancement of the arts for 
the general welfare of the State. By approaching this counter-argument, Finkelstein 
J continued: 
As a general principle there can be no doubt that patent protection is desirable to 
encourage new medicines and surgical methods. It is inescapable fact that 
inducement is necessary to encourage the great expense that is now required to 
evaluate and investigate the utility of many new medical processes and surgical 
methods.'" 
In considering the above argument Finkelstein J faced the dilemma of how the 
courts are to resolve these competing public policy issues, given that none of them 
are supported by empirical data, and, as he noted, some may not even be capable 
of proof. His Honour then stressed that even if there was some evidence, 'on what 
basis is the court to decide how the public interest will best be served?' 148 
In approaching this issue, Finkelstein J adopted the view taken by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Diamond v Chakrabarty. 149 In that case the court was 
asked to decide whether a live human-made microorganism was patentable 
subject matter. Having faced the strong public policy argument against such 
patenting, the court ruled that when the process involves balancing of competing 
'Bristol—Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd [2000] FCA 316, [12]. See also above n 138. 
145 /bid, [32]. 
146 Ibid, [36]. 
147 /bid, [38]. 
148 •-• • ma [42]. 
149 447 US 303 (1980). 
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values and interests of society, it is the task for elected representatives, such as 
the political branches of the Government, the Congress and the Executive, and not 
the courts. 15° By taking this view, and pointing at the limited ability of courts to take 
evidence on the social and economic policies involved, Finkelstein J concluded: 
I do not believe that in a controversial issue such as is raised by the present 
argument, I would be abandoning my responsibility as a judge to follow this 
approach [taken in Diamond v Chakrabarty] and to hold that if public policy 
demands that a medical or surgical process should be excluded from 
patentability, then that is a matter that should be resolved by the Parliament. 151 
This view reflects Wilcox J's view in Rescare, who said that the courts have no 
'special expertise' in matters of ethics and social policy. 152 It also reflects the 
approach (though with the opposite result) of the United Kingdom Patents Appeal 
Tribunal judges, Graham and Whitford JJ, in Eli Lilly, 153 Russell LJ in Upjohn 
Company (Robert's) Application , 154 and the New Zealand Court of Appeal in 
Wellcome 155 . 
However, whilst casting doubt over the competency of the courts in considering the 
'generally inconvenient' prohibition in s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, it could not 
be said that Finkelstein J thought that the courts lacked 'special expertise' at all in 
matters of ethics and social policy. His Honour's decision goes beyond Wilcox J's 
view in Rescare. Indeed, Finkelstein J considered the public policy arguments for 
and against medical patents in this judgment. 156 It could be understood, therefore, 
that he was of the opinion that the proviso to s 6 should not be ignored, and thus 
moral considerations are still relevant to the question of patentability. By holding 
that medical treatment and surgical process are patentable in Australia, his Honour 
found that public policy considerations against patenting of methods of medical 
treatment were of less significance in comparison with the advantages offered by 
the encouragement of medical research. 157 
' 50 Diamond v Chakrabarty 447 US 303 (1980), 318. 
151 Bristol—Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd [2000] FCA 316, [43] [Parenthesis added]. 
152 Anaesthetic Supplies Ply Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 1, 45. 
153 [1975] RPC 438, 445. 
154 [1977] RPC 94. 
155 Commissioner of Patents v Wellcome Foundation Ltd (1983) 1 EPR 156, 172. 
156 Bristol—Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd [2000] FCA 316, [36]-[43]. 
157 Ibid, [38]-[42]. 
137 
4.5.3 The Effect of the Decisions in Rescare and BMS 
on the Australian Medical Profession 
The BMS case represents one of the most significant decisions of the Federal 
Court of Australia in recent times, for it made an important contribution not only to 
the body of case law on patenting of medical methods, but to patent law in general. 
The decision provides a valuable and authoritative statement on the law 
concerning patentability of such methods and addresses several issues related to 
the interpretation of the 1990 Act, such as the meaning of the threshold test for 
patentability. 
The decision also highlights the complexity of the combination of patent law and 
public policy issues. It acknowledges that consideration of moral and ethical 
matters in deciding what would be best for the society has been a difficult task for 
the courts. The decision cast doubt over the courts' competency in deciding these 
tasks. 1 " 
In relation to patenting of medical methods issue, BMS delivers a clear message 
that, for the time being, methods of medical treatment are patentable under the 
1990 Act. However, if public policy requires a different result, it is for the Parliament 
to amend the legislation. 159 Since the parties in this case did not appeal to the High 
Court of Australia, the Full Federal Court decision will provide the guiding approach 
to the issue under consideration, and will be the binding authority for the time 
being, notwithstanding that the patents were declared invalid on other grounds. 
It is submitted that had Heerey J's judgment in BMS been upheld, it might have 
had serious implications for the development of medical research and the 
pharmaceutical industry in Australia. It is highly likely that in order to continue this 
development the inventors would have been forced to use the Swiss-type form, 
which is a legal fiction, for it allows a patent protection for a method of therapeutic 
treatment indirectly. 160 However, the appeal decision clarified the issue and 
prevented the need for getting around the prohibition. By pronouncing methods of 
medical treatment patentable in Australia, the BMS decision gave medical 
researchers greater confidence that they will be able to recover high expenses 
associated with research. 
158 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to make an inquiry as to whether judges have ability to make moral or 
public policy judgments in interpreting statutes. 
159 Bristol—Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd [2000] FCA 316, [45]. 
160 See discussion of 'Swiss-type' form in Chapter 2, Part 2.5. 
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The implications of Rescare and BMS for the medical profession are that the 
Australian Patent Office considers any medical invention as being a proper subject 
matter for letters patent. Thus, new invention such as: 
• medical device; 
• medical substance; 
• method for using a device and/or substance; 
• new use and/or method for an old substance; and 
• pure method of medical treatment of the human body, 
could all be considered to be 'patentable inventions' in Australia provided that they 
fulfil the standard patenting requirements. It is argued in this thesis that both the 
inventor, in this case, a medical practitioner, and the public benefit from this 
temporary monopoly because, during the time of a patent, the medical practitioner 
is able to exclude others from exploiting the invention for 20 years161 and when the 
patent expires, the invention is freely available for others to use. 
However, a disadvantage of this arrangement is that when a medical practitioner is 
found infringing a patent the court may grant an injunction to prevent further 
infringement; and, at the patent-holder's option, grant damages or an account of 
profits to compensate them. 162 Such consequences raise the important public 
policy concern that in order to ensure the best possible health outcomes, a medical 
practitioner must always be free to choose the best possible method of treatment. 
Since a patent may restrict this freedom, the debate still exists whether methods of 
medical treatment should be excluded from patent protection, or whether the US 
approach should be adopted, protecting medical practitioners from liability. These 
issues will be addressed in Chapter 6. 
161 See Patents Act 1990 (Cth), Ss 65 and 67. 
162 See Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 122(1). 
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4.6 CONCLUSION 
With the passage of the new 1990 Act, the Australian Parliament chose to leave 
the terminology of 'invention' and 'manner of manufacture' unchanged. It seems 
that the Parliament felt comfortable with the current status of the 'manner of 
manufacture' concept, developed by the High Court in NRDC. This case clearly 
formed the turning point in the case law development of the concept of 'manner of 
manufacture', and, as the other authors have commented, its general impact is 
similar to that of Donoghue v Stevenson 163 in the law of negligence. 164 The 
importance of the NRDC decision has since been recognised in all jurisdictions 
where the 'manner of manufacture' is or had been one of the requirements of 
patentability. Thus, the decision is still a part of the law of Australia 166 and New 
Zealand 166 and was accepted in England prior to the enactment of the new Patents 
Act 1977 (UK). 167 
From the fact that the terminology of 'invention' and 'manner of manufacture' were 
left unchanged, it could be inferred that the Parliament endorsed a broad and 
flexible power for the courts to decide what is suitable subject matter for the grant 
of letters patent and, under NRDC principles, this decision must be made in the 
light of progress in the field of science and technology. Since this is a constantly 
evolving process, it might not, in some cases, be a straightforward task to decide 
whether the invention at issue is or is not a 'patentable invention' within the 
meaning of the 1990 Act. One example of such a case is the patentability of 
methods of medical treatment. Indeed, it is a complicated issue, taking into account 
that the definition of 'invention' provides little or no guidance as to whether such 
methods could be patentable subject matter, and neither the legislation nor the 
case law provide guidance on whether patenting of such methods would or would 
not be 'generally inconvenient' under the proviso in s6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies, which is a part of the definition of 'invention'. 
163 [1932] AC 562. 
164 William van Caenegem, 'The Technicality Requirement, Patent Scope and Patentable Subject Matter in 
Australia' (2002) 13 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 309, 310. 
165 NRDC was applied in IBM Corporation v Smith, Commissioner of Patents (1991) 22 IPR 417; CCOM Ply 
Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1994) 28 IPR 481; Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 1; and 
Bristol—Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd [2000] FCA 316. 
166 SWift & Co v Commissioner of Patents [1960] NZLR 775; Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of 
Patents [1979] 2 NZLR 59 land Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1999] 
NZCA 332. 
167 Swift & Co's Application [1962] RPC 37. 
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However, what is now clear, in Australia, is that methods of medical treatment are 
considered to be a 'manner of manufacture' within s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. 
In considering this issue, courts have been guided by the decisions in NRDC and 
Joos. Although, the question of patentability of methods of medical treatment of 
the human body was not directly considered by the High Court in NRDC, it follows 
from that decision that any methods, including methods of medical treatment, could 
be capable of being a proper subject of letters patent, provided that they have 
commercial application. Joos, in its turn, removed the assumption that medical or 
surgical processes do not have commercial application. The decision narrowed the 
boundaries of the exclusion of methods of medical treatment from patenting. The 
case makes it clear that the only legitimate basis on which the patentability of 
methods of medical treatment could be denied is on public policy. This case 
opened debate on question of whether general inconvenience could be used to 
introduce public policy considerations into Australian patent law. 
Rescare and BMS seem to have shut the door somewhat, at least for methods of 
medical treatment. However, the true ambit of general inconvenience remains 
uncertain and it is likely that further attempts will be made in the future to introduce 
public policy considerations under its veil. The next Chapter analyses the origins 
and history of patent law to see if there is any basis for using general 
inconvenience to import such public policy considerations into Australian law. 
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CHAPTER 5: 	THE PROVISO TO SECTION 6 
We have graunted to God: when anything is 
granted for God, it is deemed in Law to be 
graunted to God.. .And this and the like were 
the formers of ancient Acts and Graunts, and 
those ancient acts and graunts must be 
construed and taken as the Law was holden 
at that time when they were made.' 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As noted previously, s 18(1) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (the 1990 Act) defines a 
'patentable invention' as one that 'is a manner of manufacture within the meaning 
of Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies'. The Statute of Monopolies 1624 (the 
Statute of Monopolies) declared all monopolies void, aside from the exception 
contained in s 6. This section defined the privileges which the Crown might grant to 
new inventors, and it became the foundation of present day patent law. The 
following is the precise wording of s 6: 
Provided also (and be it declared and enacted)2 that any declaration before 
mentioned shall not extend to any letters patent and grants of privilege for the term 
of fourteen years or under, thereafter to be made, of the sole working or making of 
any manner of new manufactures within this Realm, to the true and first inventor and 
inventors of such manufactures which others at the time of making such letters 
patent and grants shall not use (main provision), so as also they be not contrary to 
the law or mischievous to the state, by raising prices of commodities at home, or 
hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient (proviso). 3 
Since s 6 remains a part of Australian law by virtue of s 18(1) of the 1990 Act, 
when deciding whether an alleged invention is patentable, examiners and courts 
consider the meaning of s 6, including that of the entire proviso for manufactures 
that are also contrary to the law or mischievous to the state, by raising prices of 
commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient. 
Edward Coke, 2 Institutes of the Laws of England (1644), 2, commencing with the opening phrase of Magna 
Carta, in D J Hurst, 'The problem of the Elderly Statute' (1983) Legal Studies 21. 
2 Words in brackets repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act 1888 (51 Vict. C. 3), sl, Schedule. Part I. 
3 21 Jac. I, c.3, § 6 (Emphasis added). 
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Therefore, in answering the question of whether a method of medical treatment of 
the human body is patentable, one must consider whether or not a patent for such 
method is 'generally inconvenient'. This leads to the enquiry as to the meaning of 
the term, which, in turn, cannot be ascertained without close examination of its 
origin and purpose. 
This Chapter analyses the origins of s 6 in detail. Since the main reason for 
prohibiting patenting of methods of medical treatment in Australia has been based 
on the courts' interpretation of the proviso 'also they be not.., generally 
inconvenient' as a public policy clause, attention will be focused particularly on the 
meaning of given to this proviso in the case law and debates leading up to the 
Statute of Monopolies. This Chapter aims to challenge the modern judicial 
interpretation of the proviso and show that it is not supported by the ancient laws. 
The main proposition of this thesis regarding interpretation of 'inconvenience' is 
that only patents that are given to a known commodity should be void on the basis 
of being inconvenient or contrary to law and monopolies to new inventions should 
not be declared invalid on the basis of inconvenience. 
The historical analysis in this Chapter aims to ascertain the meaning of the phrase 
'also they be not.., generally inconvenient' and the role it was intended to transmit. 
The result of that inquiry determines whether or not it is correct to justify exclusion 
from patentability of methods of medical treatment based on the proviso of general 
inconvenience alone. Chapter 4 of this thesis illustrated that the Full Court of the 
Federal Court of Australia was not willing to use general inconvenience to justify 
exclusion of methods of medical treatment in the case of Bristol-Myers Squibb Co 
v F H Faulding & Co Ltd (BMS). This thesis accepts that the decision in that case 
was correct, but questions the reasoning behind the application of general 
inconvenience. The court in BMS accepted that the general inconvenience proviso 
could be used to introduce public policy considerations in patent examinations in 
Australia. In this Chapter it is argued that the general inconvenience proviso was 
never intended to be used in this way. It is further argued that this form of usage is 
contrary to the general rules of statutory interpretation. It will be argued in Chapter 
6 of this thesis that if it is desirable to introduce such considerations then it should 
be done overtly, and not under the guise of general inconvenience. 
4 [2000] FCA 316. 
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5.2 HISTORY OF THE PROVISO TO SECTION 6 OF THE STATUTE of 
MONOPOLIES 
5.2.1 Pre-Enacting History 
5.2.1.1 	Letters Patent 
The name 'letters patent' is derived from the Latin litterae patentes, which means 
'open letters'. 5 Originally these documents were executed by English sovereigns 
and meant to be read without the need of breaking their seals. They were intended 
to be open to the public and traditionally began: To all to whom these presents 
shall come:6 
These letters patents had nothing to do with inventions per se, but represented 
privileges to promote royal policies. The English sovereign was empowered with 
certain prerogatives that allowed him' to give various freehold interests, franchises 
and other privileges upon favored subjects. He granted those privileges 'for the 
sake of the public good, although prima facie they appear to be clearly against 
common right: 5 The sovereign usually granted letters patents only upon receipt of 
consideration. The validity of such grants was recognised by the medieval lawyers 
if they could be shown to be clearly for the welfare of the realm. 9 This was due to 
shortage of the ready cash needed to operate the monarchs' respective 
administrations. Such grants were accomplished by the letters patent so that every 
one could see the favored subject. 19 
Thus, through the exercise of the royal prerogative, letters patents were used for 
appointment of military, judicial and colonial officers, and to confer rights, 
privileges, ranks or titles personally and directly from the sovereign. They were 
recorded on the Patent Rolls in the Record Office." 
5 R A Klitzke, 'History of Patents Abroad' in R Calvert, The Encyclopedia of Patent Practice and Invention 
Management (1964), 384. 
6 Gomme, Patents of Invention, (1946), 1 
7 Here, the male form is used because sovereigns almost invariably were male at the time. 
8 EW Hulme 'The History of the Patent System Under the Prerogative and at Common Law' (1896) 12 Law 
Quarterly Review 141,143, continued at (1900) 16 Law Quarterly Review 44. 
9 W Holdsworth, A History of English Law (3 rd ed, 1945) vol 4, 345. 
I° Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (1950), 260. 
Klitzke, above n 5,384. 
144 
5.2.1.2 Early English industrial grants and meaning of 'invention' 
English patent law made greater advances in the Tudor period than in any other. 
The Sixteenth century could well be called 'the birth years of the English patent 
system'. 12 In pursuing national economic policy of stimulating domestic production 
of both raw materials and manufactured goods previously imported from abroad, in 
1561 Queen Elizabeth I introduced the new system of granting industrial monopoly 
licences. This system is considered to be the origin of our modem patent law. 13 
It must be noted that although the term 'invention' was used at the time, the 
meaning of invention was different from its modem meaning. For instance, E 
Wyndham Hulme explains that the word 'invention' denoted mainly the physical act 
of introducing, rather than the mental process of 'discovering'. 14 
Early English patents for inventions were, in fact, patents for the introduction of a 
new 'trade' rather than for 'invention' in the modern sense. These types of patents, 
although distinguished from other patents, were thought and spoken of in terms of 
a policy strategy used to nourish and support the development of the English 
economy by the introduction of a new trade and industry. 
Statistics for the periods 1561-1603 indicate that Queen Elizabeth I granted 55 
monopoly licences, 21 of which to foreign inventors for new industries and 
inventions. 15 The essence of the industrial monopoly licences was that, in return for 
the introduction of an unknown manufacturing process, the introducer was granted 
a monopoly of using that process for a specified period. 
5.2.1.3 Clauses to secure the fulfillment of the promise by the grantee 
In the absence of any requirement to describe the nature of the invention and the 
best method for performing it, the Crown needed to do something to prevent 
foreign inventors 'from suddenly returning home before the termination of their 
periods of privilege without having established the new industries which they 
12 Klitzke, above n 5, 389. 
13 Holdsworth, above n 9. 
14 EW Hulme 'The History of the Patent System Under the Prerogative and at Common Law' (1896) 12 Law 
Quarterly Review 141, 151. 
15 EW Hulme, 'The History of the Patent System Under the Prerogative and at Common Law' (1900) 16 Law 
Quarterly Review 44, 52. 
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premised to introduce: 16 History has shown that, at that time, there were instances 
that the Crown was deceived in this way. 17 
Such deception resulted in a requirement to include in patent grants clauses to 
secure the fulfillment of the promise by the grantee. By virtue of these clauses the 
grantees were required to introduce their processes within a fixed period of time, to 
employ and teach English subjects, and sometimes to manufacture a minimum 
quantity within a given time." It is submitted that these clauses may provide some 
insight on the uncertainty around the meaning of 'generally inconvenient' in s 6. For 
this reason, they require a detailed examination. 
(a) 	Limitation of time clause 
The first type of clause inserted in the grant was a limitation of time. By virtue of 
this clause a patentee was obliged to introduce his lg invention to the realm, and for 
prove that it was new and useful. Failure to fulfill this condition resulted in 
avoidance of the grant.26 Some examples of relevant clauses include the following: 
• Cockeram's patent (1561)21 - 'one year - void if "not of the utility and profit 
as is presently pretended"; 
• Cobham (1562)22 - 'three months'; 
• Stoweberghen (1563)23 - 'the grant is void in case the patentees fail to come 
over and put the grant into practice within two months'; 
• Burchard Cranick (1563)24 - 'three years... to demonstrate his said arte to be 
perfitt and unfaylable and that also the like thereof hath not bene put into 
execution within this our Realm'; and 
• Peter Morris (1578)25 - 'three years'. 
16 D Seaborne Davies, 'The Early History of the Patent Specification' (1934) 50 Law Quarterly Review 86, 
100. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Holdsworth, above n 9. 
19 Here, the male form is used because almost in every occasion the inventors were male at the time 
" Davies, above n 16. 
21 P.R. 3 Elizabeth, 6. 
22 P.R. 4 Elizabeth, 10. 
23 P.R. 5 Elizabeth, 1. 
24 P.R. 5 Elizabeth, 2. 
25 P.R. 20 Elizabeth, 10. 
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(b) The apprenticeship clause 
The apprenticeship clause is another device used during the reign of Elizabeth I to 
secure the consideration for the grant. The apprenticeship clause provided that the 
grantee should teach their 'art and science', their 'feat and mystery', to 
Englishmen.26 For instance, the monopoly patent granted to Cockeram in 
(1561),27 in addition to the abovementioned limitation of time clause, required that 
at least two of the patentee's workers were to be of 'native birth'. 28 The patent to 
Becku and Came' (1567)29 for the manufacture of window glass demanded as a 
condition for the validity of the patent that the French patentees train Englishmen in 
this trade. 39 
The apprenticeship clause is also found in the patents granted during the reigns of 
James I and Charles 1, 31 and was reproduced in different forms in patents granted 
after the Statute of Monopoles and Restoration. 32 
The fact that the above clause was also a condition that authorised the Crown to 
declare grants void on proof of its non-fulfillment suggests that it fell into the wide 
term of 'inconveniency' in addition to a limitation of time clause. 
(c) The 'inconveniency' proviso (1575) 
The limitation of time clause gradually transformed into a revocation clause that 
authorised Elizabeth I to declare grants void on proof of their inconveniency. 
According to Professor Seabome Davies, Inconveniency' was 'a proviso' and 'a 
wide term which cover any failure to introduce an invention within a reasonable 
period'33 . For the first time this proviso was inserted in the grant of a letters patent 
to Holmes and Frampton for African Headwear (1575). 34 It was generally used 
after that, particularly during the period of debate against Monopolies in Parliament 
in 1601. Examples can be found in the patent to Nasmith 35 and many others. In its 
26 Davies, above n 16. 
27 P.R. 3 Elizabeth, 6. 
28 Hulme, above n 14, 145. 
29 PR 9 Elizabeth, 11. 
30 Hulme, above n 14, 149. 
31 Davies, above n 16. 
32 Ibid. The period of Restoration refers to the return of a constitutional monarchy to Great Britain in 1660 
under Charles II, in particular, the period between the crowning of Charles II and the Revolution of 1688. 
33 Davies, above n 16. 
34 P.R. 17 Elizabeth, 9. 
35 P.R. 10 Anne, 2. 
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final form the proviso stated that 'if on examination of the patent the grant was 
found to be inconvenient or prejudicial to the realm, the patent immediately, or at 
the end of a specified period of notice, was to be void and frustrate'. 36 
Hyde Price stated that in the course of the agitation against Monopolies in 1601, 
many patents were brought to trial and at least 15 had been revoked on basis of 
the 'inconveniency' proviso. 37 To illustrate this point, in 1601 one member of the 
Parliament, Sir Robert Wroth argued: 
And I have heard a Gentleman affirm in his House [the Court of Exchequer] that 
there is a Clause or Revocation in these Patents; if so what needed this stir of 
Scire Facias, Quo Warranto and I know not what, when it is but only to send for the 
Patentees and cause a redelivery?38 
The above indicates that the patent would be found to be inconvenient if the 
underlying invention failed to be introduced by the grantee within specified period 
in the grant. 
It will be demonstrated further in this Chapter that as the consequence of 
numerous debates in the Parliament during 1623 and 1624, this proviso became a 
permanent feature of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, which played role of a 
general escape clause. According to Hu[me, Price and Davies, this escape clause 
appeared often in the patents of James 1. 39 During the next 100 or so years there 
were some periods when it was omitted, but Davies argues that the Privy Council 
frequently declared the patents void under this clause throughout the seventeenth 
century, and that there are records of patent revocations made under the clause as 
late as 1779.49 
5.2.1.4 Conclusion regarding 'limitation of time' and 'apprenticeship' 
clauses 
It follows that limitations of time and apprenticeship clauses were the main devices 
used by the Crown to ensure that the promise of the grantee would be fulfilled. 
These revocation clauses were general escape clauses that gave the Crown or the 
Privy Council a power to revoke a patent upon proof of inconveniency. On this 
basis the author submits that these clauses formed the principal components of the 
36 Davies, above n 16. 
37 W Hyde Price, The English Patents of Monopoly (1913),vol 1, 20-22 and Appendices H, J and I. 
38 Townsend's Historical Collection, 225; S. P. D., Elizabeth, CCLXXXII, 28,65-67. 
39 Hulme, above n 15; Price, above n 37; Davies, above n 16, 100. 
40 Davies, above n 16, 100. 
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wider revocation clause of 'generally inconvenient' in s 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies. 
It is important to note that some grants specified other particular forms of 
inconveniency in addition to limitation of time and apprenticeship. These forms 
included that the patent 'crossed' some previous grant, 41 or lacked novelty, or that 
the patentee was not the first inventor, or that the invention was not useful: 12 It is 
concluded that these particular forms of 'inconveniency' also formed part of the 
foundation of the proviso, and therefore they are worthy of consideration. 
5.2.2 Particular forms of 'inconveniency' - the invention must be new and 
useful 
5.2.2.1 Matthey's case (1571) and Bircot's case (1572) 
The requirement that the patent cannot be 'inconvenient' was specified in the 
requirement that a patent could only be given to a new manufacture. The main idea 
or policy behind this was to prevent displacing an existing trade within the realm. 43 
Accordingly, a patent was treated 'inconvenient' if it was given to an already known 
trade, or a mere improvement. For example, this issue was central to a dispute in 
1571 before the Privy Council regarding the monopoly patent granted to Rd. 
Matthey to make Turkye haftes' for knives (Matthey's case)." Another case 
regarding a patent for mere improvements was Bircot's case (Bircot's case).45 
Although these cases were never reported,46 they were frequently cited until the 
late eighteenth century as authorities for opposing patenting of improvements of 
existing manufactures. Matthey's case is known from its inclusion in submissions of 
counsel for Allen - Mr Fuller - in the famous case of Darcy v Allen47 (Darcy v 
Allen). Bricot's case is known mainly from Sir Edward Coke's reference in his 
Institutes of the Laws of England." 
Matthey's case was decided in the Privy Council and involved a patent for 
manufacture of knives with a new kind of hafts. According to reference made to this 
41 Nasmith, P.R. 10 Anne, 2. 
42 See Council Registers, Vol 71, 276; Vol 72, 484; Vol 75, 267etc, listed by Davies, above n 16, 103. 
43 Hulme, above n 15, 56. 
" Hulme, above n 15, 45. 
45 Edward Coke, 3 Institutes of the Laws of England (1644) 181, 183. 
46 Charles Viner, A General Abridgment of Law and Equity (2nd ed, 1793), 210-11 (citing Matthey's case, 
Noy 113). 
47 (1603) Noy 173-185,74 ER, 1131, 11 Co Rep 8413-88b, 77 ER, 1260. 
48 Coke, above n 45 181, 183. 
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case by Mr Fuller in Darcy v Allen and Charles Viner's summary of the case, the 
patent was granted to Matthey for the sole making of knives with bone hafts and 
plates of latin.49 The wardens of the company of cutlers argued that 'they did use to 
make knives before, though not with such hafts; and that such a light difference or 
invention should be no cause to restrain them'. 5° The wardens further argued that 
the patent was for 'mere improvements' and was already known in the realm at the 
time of the grant. Therefore, it was submitted that the patent was inconvenient and 
no one could benefit from it. This argument was accepted by the Privy Council who 
ruled that the new hafts were 'mere improvements' and thus did not justify the 
patent. Consequently, the Privy Council declared the patent void on basis of its 
inconveniency. 
Bircot's case51 is another example of a patent for 'mere improvements'. According 
to Coke, the patent concerned a new method of preparing and melting of lead ore. 
In that case, the patent was held to be contrary to law because the invention in 
question was not a new manufacture, but rather it was like putting 'a new button on 
an old coat'. 52 
5.2.2.2 Conclusion regarding Matthey's and Bircot's cases 
In the absence of the case reports it is impossible to ascertain the exact 
explanation of 'inconvenience'. The extent of restraint to which the judgments were 
laid on royal prerogative for inconvenient patents also remains unclear. However, 
the references to these cases suggest a possible legal basis for the revocation 
clause of 'generally inconvenient', which appeared later in s 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies. 
At the very least, the information that we have on these cases give an indication as 
to what arguments were relied upon to show that a monopoly was inconvenient, 
Though the introduction of new technologies means that the rule against 
improvements of existing manufactures propounded in these cases is no longer 
relevant, Matthey's and Bircot's cases should be viewed in the context of the 
conceptual environment at the time, wherein inventions were viewed in terms of 
the introduction of pure new manufactures or trades to the realm. The rule against 
improvements was based on policy that, although in some cases technological 
advances could be desirable and beneficial, in other cases 'mere improvements' of 
49 Viner, above n 46. 
5° Ibid. 
51 Coke, above n 45, 183. 
52 Ibid. 
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existing manufactures could be inconvenient and harmful. 
According to Edward Waterscheid, the rule against improvements was usually 
employed to argue that the proposed benefit involved with the introduction of a 
monopoly patent for an improvement to an existing trade was likely to be much 
smaller than the harm that would be caused by such a monopoly to the realm, such 
as the employment and livelihoods of Englishmen.53 Coke explains this in the 
following way: '...a mans trade is accounted his life, because it maintaineth his life; 
and therefore the monopolist that taketh away a mans trade, taketh away his life, 
and therefore is so much the more odious.' 54 
Matthey's and Bircot's cases demonstrate that patent monopoly could only be 
granted to a new trade, or a trade that had not existed within the realm in recent 
memory55 - granting a monopoly otherwise would unlawfully restrain someone's 
trade and be harmful to the realm, thus causing inconvenience. Moreover, 
Matthey's case illustrates the point that to be 'convenient' a monopoly must not 
only be given to a new manufacture but must also beneficial for the realm. 
It is important to emphasise that there was no suggestion in the cases that if letters 
patents simply purported to restrain subjects from engaging in a trade, they had to 
be void for inconveniency. The cases show the common law position, which was 
quite opposite - if an invention was in relation to a lawful trade or manufacture, 
which was new, or given to a first inventor, it would be granted a monopoly patent. 
That would be the case notwithstanding that the monopoly would restrain subjects 
from unauthorised practising of this trade for a certain period. 56 
This position was reaffirmed in Darcy v Allen. In support of his proposition that 
Darcy's patent was unlawfully restraining someone's trade, Mr Fuller referred to the 
Matthey's case. Though the term 'inconvenience' was never used in his 
submissions, it seems that Fuller was suggesting that the patent should be viewed 
as contrary to the law or inconvenient if it is given to a known commodity. 57 The full 
import of Darcy v Allen will be discussed in the next section. 
53 Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents, (4 parts), 
(1994) 76 Journal of the Patent Office Society 697, 849 (parts 1-2); (1995) 77 Journal of the Patent Office 
Society 771 (part 3); (1996) 78 Journal of the Patent Office Society 71 (part 4). 
54 Coke, above n 45, 183. 
55 Hulme, above n 15, 56. 
56 This conclusion undermines the legitimacy of the main argument against patents for methods of medical 
treatment, which based on the proposition that since such patents might restrict physicians from practicing 
their medical practice, the patents are inconvenient. 
57 See discussion of the case and Fuller's arguments below. 
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5.2.3 Abuse of monopoly system 
While originally designed to encourage the setting up of new industries, the 
monopoly system began to be abused from the late 16 th century onwards. Privy 
Council records show that between 1581 and 1603 patents were awarded 
regardless of whether a manufacture was new to the realm or not. For instance, 
many monopoly grants, such as for the production and sale of vinegar, starch and 
playing cards, 58 already existed in the realm at the time of the grant. At the same 
time, the Queen Elizabeth I rejected a large number of petitions for real inventions. 
These practices negated the whole purpose of the issuance of letters patent - the 
introduction of new and useful manufactures. The abuse of monopolies contributed 
little to the development of the patent system. The consequences of the abuse 
were hindrance to trade and manufacture, high prices, inferior goods and all kinds 
of oppression.59 
Abuse of monopoly system led to a judicial review of patents granted between 
1581 and 1603. This review was sought by a London trader Thomas Allen in 
defending an infringement action brought against him by the holder of a playing 
card monopoly, Edward Darcy. 
5.2.4 Darcy v Allen (The Case of Monopolies) (1602) 
Before this case is examined further, it is important to note that, due to political 
sensitivities surrounding the first common law judicial review of a patent granted by 
the Crown, the judges on the Kings Bench did not issue reasons for the unanimous 
decision that Darcy's patent was void in this case. It was left to the case reporters, 
such as Coke,8° Moore and Noy82 to announce to the world the unstated judicial 
reasons largely formed from submissions of counsel for Allen - Fuller and 
Dodderidge. 
58 Hulme, above n 15, 53. 
59 Holdsworth, above n 9, 347. 
60.11 Co Rep 84b-88b, 77 ER, 1260. 
61 (1602) Moore KB 671-675. 
62 (1603) Noy 173-185. 
63 Professor Davies made significant contribution to the author's understanding of the economic background 
and immediate consequences of the Darcy v Allen (or The Case of Monopolies, as it is better known under the 
name given to it by Coke): See D Seaborne Davies, 'Further Light on the Case of Monopolies' (1932) 48 Law 
Quarterly Review 394. Professor John H. Baker and Jacob I. Corre also supplemented the knowledge about 
the case by making analyses of some of the unpublished notes on the case. For instance, Baker examined 
several survived manuscript reports of The Case of Monopolies. One in a series of reports Baker called 'a 
uniformly minute and detailed account' of all the significant proceedings presented in the King's Bench from 
Michaelmas term 1598 through Hilary term 1604: See John H. Baker, 'The Dark Age of English Legal 
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5.2.4.1 An infringement action against Thomas Allen 
It appears that in 1576, the Queen granted the sole right of importing, 
manufacturing and selling playing cards to Ralf Bowes and Thomas Bedingfield. 
The patent was re-issued twice before it was again re-issued in 1598 to Lord 
Darcy, a Groom of the Elizabeth's Privy Chamber, in consideration of his long and 
acceptable services to the Crown." The term of his privilege was to extend to 21 
years from the expiration of the former grant to Bowes. 65 
Since at the time of the grant the card industry was already established, the card 
monopoly was strongly resisted throughout the realm. Thus, notwithstanding the 
monopoly grant, there were many traders who where engaged in card 
manufacturing and selling activity. To prevent this activity, Bowes successfully 
sued infringers of his grant on several occasions. 66 
When Darcy received his patent in 1598, he was soon involved in patent 
infringement suits similar to those of Bowes'. In 1602, Darcy brought an 
infringement action against a London trader Thomas Allen. Allen denied most of 
the allegations, but admitted that he had sold a small quantity of playing cards and 
pleaded a right to do so, since he was a free citizen of London. The case was 
argued at great length in Trinity and Michaelmas terms in 1602. The King's Bench 
rendered judgment for Allen in Easter term in 1603. 
5.2.4.2 Argument for the plaintiff, Edward Darcy - a novel theory on which 
to base exception 
Altham's speech on behalf of Darcy opened the arguments in Trinity term in 1602. 
Tanfield completed Altham's argument. Attorney General Coke and the Solicitor 
General Flemming argued for Darcy in Easter term in 1603. 
To defend the grant in Darcy v Allen meant constructing a novel theory on which to 
ground monopolies. Darcy's counsel did not deny the principle that a patent grant 
may wrongfully restrict the inheritance, liberty or freely exercised trade of the 
History, 1500-1700' in Legal History Studies (1975) 1 (The Dark Age), reprinted in John H. Baker, The Legal 
Profession and the Common Law (1986) 135. Also Baker reviewed Coke's own unprinted notes on the case, 
which Baker announced and introduced to the world: See John H. Baker, 'Coke's Notebooks and the Sources 
of His Reports' (1972) 30 Cambridge Law Journal 59, 60 (Coke's Notebooks), reprinted in John H. Baker, 
The Legal Profession and the Common Law, (1986) 135, 177, 178. 




subjects, and therefore such grants must be excluded. The strategy was to show 
that the cards monopoly grant fell outside the principle, and thus should be 
excused from exclusion. 
The foundation of that novel theory was the proposition that a gap existed between 
lawful conduct and conduct that the law categorically prohibited and punished. 
According to Darcy's counsel, the Crown was free to regulate conduct that fell in 
that gap. In his opening argument for Darcy, Altham argued that there was a class 
of activity, such as jousting and dice playing which 'although the law tolerates it 
and does not inflict punishment on those who do it, still it is unlawful'. 67 
Darcy's counsel applied this distinction not to the activity of making and selling 
cards, but to the activity of card playing. It was argued that because card playing 
was unlawful, the Queen was permitted to forbid it entirely. The argument involved 
showing card playing as a thing of 'vanity'. This meant that cards were not useful or 
necessary products. According to the argument, card playing could be considered 
a harmful practice that caused 'loss of time and decrease in the substance of 
many, the loss of the service and work of servants, causes of want which is the 
mother of woe and destruction.' 68 
Darcy's counsel raised the policy argument that since playing cards were the 
product of an unnecessary trade and promoted a wasteful and abused habit, the 
Queen could do what she saw fit with the whole business, and that, though the 
practice of card playing was not expressly prohibited and punished by law, its 
nature and the abuse involved with it made it 'unlawful'. 69 
It follows that what Darcy's counsel were arguing, in effect, was that card making, 
which was necessary prerequisite to card playing, was a dangerous and harmful 
activity, and that the Queen had authority to regulate and restrict this nature of the 
activity through a monopoly grant, which was supposed to serve the public interest. 
The novel theory was based on the proposition that notwithstanding its unlawful 
nature, as soon as the grant was regulated by the crown (by placing the power to 
control the amount of cards sold into the hands of a trusted servant), it was good 
and valid. 
67 Jacob I. Corre, 'The Argument, Decision and Reports of Darcy v. Allen' (1996) 45 Emory Law Journal 
1261, 1298, citing the unprinted notes on the case, which Baker announced and introduced to the world: See 
Baker, 'Coke's Notebooks' above n 63. 
6811 Co Rep 85b. 
69 1 1 Co Rep 85v-86, 77 ER, 1261-63. 
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In proposing that the activity was 'unlawful', and therefore of such nature that the 
Queen should regulate it, Darcy's counsel used the term 'inconvenience' along with 
'unlawfulness'. For instance, in concluding Altham's argument for Darcy, 7° Tanfield 
noted that Darcy's grant was a tool of controlling the degree of card playing by 
placing the power to control the amount of cards sold into the hands of a trusted 
servant!' 
Similarly, Solicitor-General Flemming, who represented Darcy in Easter term in 
1603, argued that since the card playing was a harmful practice, the Queen was 
permitted to allow or forbid it entirely, as something inconvenient to the 
Commonwealth 72 
It follows that inconvenience to the Commonwealth had the same meaning as 
unlawfulness: if an activity was dangerous and harmful, or involved an 
unnecessary trade that promoted a wasteful and abused habit, the activity was 
inconvenient to the Commonwealth due to its unlawful nature. Accordingly, the 
novel theory of Darcy's counsel was that playing cards were patentable because 
they were inconvenient. 
5.2.4.3 	Argument for the defendant, Thomas Allen 
Though the validity of Darcy's grant was the key question in Darcy v Allen, it was 
never Allen's counsel's intention to base the entire defence on the hope that the 
King's Bench would declare the patent void. Each of Allen's counsel, except Fuller, 
made arguments that Darcy did not have an action on the case. 73 According to 
Baker, the case was not presented to the King's Bench as one that revolved 
entirely around fundamental questions about the scope of royal prerogative. In 
some respects, it was an ordinary commercial dispute. 74 
70 Altham opened the arguments for Darcy in Trinity term in 1602. 
71 The original text of this argument is the following: 'le roine poet aver prohibitte ousterment le use de ceo 
game. . . est 'office et dutie de roigne par restraine ceux illoiall games quex tendont al increase de vice et de 
plusors inconveniences in le realme et ceo le roine ad notablement performe in le fesans de cest graunt car el 
ad. '(Emphasis added) 
72 The original text of this argument is the following: `Donques est apparant que le vice de carde playenge es-t 
mult inconvenient pur le common weale et par ceo besoigne reformacion mes ad est dit coment carde 
playenge soet illoyal uncore le fesans de eux nest issint et de faire et vend cardes est un loyall trade.' 
(Emphasis added) 
73 	• For Instance, Croke, on Allen's behalf, stated that he did not want to discuss the validity of Darcy's grant 
because he did not have time to consider it. Croke based his argument on showing that Darcy did not have the 
case of action even on the assumption that the grant was good: Corre, above n 67, 1269-1297. 
74 See Baker, 'Coke's Notebooks' above n 63, 177, 178. 
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(a) 	Arguments of Fuller regarding restraint of trade 
This issue is directly relevant to the question as to whether the fact that a patent 
restricts someone from unauthorised use of an invention makes that patent void on 
basis of inconvenience. It has already been noted on many occasions that the 
main argument against patenting of methods of medical treatment is based on the 
proposition that such patents might restrict physicians from practising their medical 
practice, thus should be disallowed on basis of inconvenience. 78 Hence, it is 
important to ascertain whether 'inconvenience' was ever used in this context by 
Fuller or any other counsel. 
Fuller's most radical argument was that letters patents that purported to restrain 
subjects from engaging in a lawful trade were in contravention of several statutes, 
and so void.78 However, given that the statutes were phrased in terms that 
arguably applied only to lawful trades, this argument would have been of no use 
against Darcy's primary argument that the trade was unlawful because the activity 
it made possible was unlawful (thus, Darcy argued, the Queen could regulate it). 77 
Yet, the statutes assisted Fuller's argument in that they reflected a policy against 
restraining subjects from practising a trade. However, this policy did not limit the 
Crown's power to issue patents. Fuller acknowledged that the limitation of the 
Crown's power was based on the requirement of the patent of invention. 78 In other 
words, the Crown clearly had the power to grant monopoly privileges to anyone 
who introduced a new invention into the realm, notwithstanding that the grant 
restrained subjects from practising a trade. 
It must be noted that the review of the Case of Monopolies' report78 and other 
relevant materials, in particular works of Davies 80, Baker81 and Corre82, has 
revealed that 'inconvenience' was never used to support the arguments for 
invalidity of patents on basis of restraint of trade. 
75 See discussions in Chapters 1-4. 
76 11 Co Rep 88, 77 ER, 1265-66. The statutes were 9 Edw. 3, ch.1; 25 Edw. 3 (Stat. 3), ch. 2; and 27 Edw. 3, 
ch. 11. Coke also claimed that the grant contravened Chapter 18 of the Magna Carta. 
77 11 Co Rep 88, 77 ER, 1265-66. 
78 Noy 183, 74 ER, 1139. 
79 (1603) Noy 173-185, 74 ER, 1131, 11 Co Rep 84b-88b, 77 ER, 1260. 
8° Davies, above n 63, 395. 
81 Baker, 'The Dark Age' above n 63; Baker, 'Coke's Notebooks' above n 63. 
82 Corre, above n 67. 
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(b) 	Arguments of Fuller and Dion regarding patents of invention: 
'inconvenient' meant 'no innovation' 
This argument was different from the one introduced by Darcy's counsel. It related 
to a different kind of exception to invalidity of monopolies: that patents could only 
be granted for inventions. 
Both Diott and Fuller submitted that Darcy's grant was bad because he had not 
introduced any innovation into the craft of making playing cards. 83 Fuller relied on 
precedents to indicate that a patent of invention could be voided if it turned out that 
the grantee was not the true inventor. 84 
Fuller referred to Matthey's case in arguing that Darcy's patent should be void on 
the basis that card playing was contrary to law.85 As discussed above, the issue 
whether a patent should be void for 'inconvenience' for being granted for 
improvements in an existing trade was central in Matthey's case. Though Fuller did 
not use term 'inconvenience', it could be inferred that Fuller, like Darcy's counsel, 
treated the term 'inconvenience' in the context of 'unlawfulness' or 'contrary to law'. 
Here is what Fuller said as to when a monopoly could be justifiable: 
...where any man by his own charge and industry, or by his own wit or intention doth 
bring any new trade into the realm, or any engine tending to the furtherance of a 
trade that never was used before: and that for the good of the realm: that in such 
cases the King may grant to him a monopoly consideration of the good that he doth 
bring by his invention to the commonwealth: otherwise not.86 
As discussed above, Darcy sought to justify the grant as a legitimate exercise of 
royal authority in the area of regulating harmful (unlawful) conduct. However, since 
invention was a necessary condition for a valid grant of monopoly, neither Diott nor 
Fuller had difficulties in establishing that the grant was never justified as a patent of 
83 Noy 183, 74 ER, 1139. 
84 In fact Fuller cited one of the earliest instances of patent's infringement litigation for which extensive 
records survive - the Hastings case of 1577 (no citations was found). In that case, John Hastings had been 
granted a 21-year patent for the exclusive manufacture, sale, and importation of a style of fabric called Harlan 
Freseadoes: PRO C 66/1054, m. 14 (1569). Hastings sued a group of clothiers on the equity side of the 
Exchequer, and claimed that the clothiers were infringing his grant. The clothiers produced evidence that their 
cloth differed from Hastings' and that their cloth had been manufactured in England before Hastings' patent 
had been granted. Fuller concluded that the defendants were discharged because the bays were made before in 
the realm: Noy 173, 183. 
85 Noy 173, 183. 
86 Darcy v Allen (1602) Noy 173, 183 (Emphasis added). 
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invention, and thus had to be void on basis of being contrary to law or 
inconvenient. 
5.2.4.4 Conclusion regarding The Case of Monopolies 
In the absence of a judicial opinion, the exact scope of Darcy v Allen remains 
unclear, like Matthey's and Bircot's cases discussed above. 87 This makes it difficult 
to establish the precise reasons for the decision in this 400 year old case. All that is 
left is a report of the plaintiffs counsel, prepared some 15 years later. 
Notwithstanding the above, the reports of the arguments of counsel do reveal the 
development of legal analysis regarding granting of the monopoly patents. The 
Case of Monopolies has been regarded as one of the outstanding decisions of the 
English Common Law. 88 It is possible to draw the following inferences from the 
evidence presented: 
• From the arguments of Allen's counsel it follows that 'inconvenience' was 
used to establish unlawful conduct and had the same meaning as 
'unlawfulness'. If an activity was dangerous and harmful, or involved an 
unnecessary trade that promoted a wasteful and abused habit, the activity 
was inconvenient to the Commonwealth due to its unlawful nature. 
• From the fact that Fuller referred to Matthey's case, in arguing that Darcy's 
patent should be void for being contrary to law, it could be inferred that 
Fuller also treated the term 'inconvenience' in the context of 'unlawfulness' 
or 'contrary to law'. 
• 'Inconvenience' was never used to support the arguments for invalidity of 
patents on basis of restraint of trade. 
• The monopoly at issue was found to be contrary to the common law of the 
land, statute law and liberty of the subject because it was given to a well-
known commodity, which was not an invention, and not because it 
inconveniently restrained someone from practising a trade. 
87 For instance, Jacob I. Corre argues that the case summaries produced by many historians who rely heavily 
on the report published by Coke in 1615, probably exaggerated the extent to which the case laid the 
limitations on the royal prerogative. According to Corre, what Coke published in his report fifteen years later 
as the reasons of the court was probably based on his version of an informal private communication to him by 
one of the Justices and 'was heavily filtered through the lenses of his own ideological project of the time': see 
Cone, above n 67,1269-1271. 
88 See Davies, above n 63, 395. According to Davies, the case 'deserves to be placed in the most select list of 
celebrated common law decisions.' 
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• 	The reports provide specific criteria directly relevant to the question of when 
monopolies will be treated to be contrary to the law or mischievous to the 
state, or hurt of trade in the sense of raising prices. According to the case, 
there were three specific criteria for invalidation of monopolies: 
1. the prices of the commodity had to have risen; 
2. the quality of the product needed to have declined; and 
3. artisans must have lost work as a result of the monopoly. 89 
These criteria were later reworded and reappeared in the King's ninth proviso of 
the Book of Bounty. 
5.2.5 The Book of Bounty (1610) - the King's ninth proviso 
In 1603 James I acceded the English throne. Notwithstanding the outcome in 
Darcy v Allen, he continued to grant, as Coke commented, 'odious' monopolies. 90 
However, following political pressure arising from granting those royal prerogatives, 
in 1603 the King issued a proclamation against monopolies. In 1610 the 
proclamation, widely known as 'The Book of Bounty', was published wherein 
James I declared that monopolies were against the laws of the realm and 
expressly commanded that `no suitor presume to move Us' to grant them. 91 
Monopolies for new inventions were, however, excluded from this prohibition, 
provided they were 'not contrary to law or hurtful to the state and trade, or 
generally inconvenient' 92 (so called as the King's ninth proviso). 
Taking into account the similarity in the wording of the report of the submissions of 
the counsel for Allen (Fuller) in Darcy v Allen, the fact that Coke was the Attorney-
General before the King's Bench in that case, and that he was the opponent of the 
unfettered exercise of the Royal prerogative, it could be suggested that the wording 
of the King's ninth proviso had been drawn by Coke from Fuller's submissions and 
introduced to the King as the draft for the ninth proviso to the Book of Bounty. This 
exact wording in the Book of Bounty later reappeared as the proviso to s 6 in the 
Statute of Monopolies. 
89 Noy, 173; 11 Co Rep 84b; Moore KB 671; Harold G. Fox, Monopolies and Patents: A Study of the History 
and Future of the Patent Monopoly (1947), 87-9, 318-26; Price, above n 37, 34; Davies, above n 16, 103. 
90 77 English Reports, 1264, 1266. 
91 Guy Aldous, Terrell on the Law of Patents (1 1 th ed, 1965), para 3. 
92 Ibid. 
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5.3 THE ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE OF MONOPOLIES (1621-1624) 
5.3.1 Debating the Bill 
In 1619 matters came to a crisis point as a result of increasing scandalous abuses 
of the monopoly system. One such example was the imprisonment of five silk 
mercers by a patentee. Although James I released them, he proclaimed a support 
for the continuance of the monopoly system. 93 The following year there was debate 
in Parliament over a patent for inns, and by 1621, public anger and complaints 
about monopolies were widespread. 94 When Parliament assembled in 1621 
patents were one of the first issues debated, and the Commons decided to 
introduce a Bill to give a statutory power to declare monopolies illega1.95 
It appears that Coke played a significant role in drafting the Monopolies Bill. Taking 
the crisis surrounding monopolies as a political opportunity, Coke introduced the 
original draft (the precursor to the Statute of Monopolies) into Parliament and 
acknowledged that he drafted the Bill so that it was 'grounded upon the King's own 
Book'. 96 Coke also was a member of the committee to consider the Bill. 97 
Even though the various sections of the Monopolies Bill had been substantially 
debated in the House of Commons and the Upper House and altered many times 
(by Coke and others), 95 the wording of the proviso to s 6 had been left substantially 
untouched and again, appeared as it had been drawn from the submissions of the 
counsel for Allen in Darcy v Allen. 
5.3.2 19 April 1624 conference in the House of Commons - the provisos to 
the Monopolies Bill 
During the debating of the Monopolies Bill, it was decided that the Bill should have 
a 'main body' and provisos. 99 According to Coke's report of the 19 April 1624 
conference to the Commons, the Lords introduced 17 exceptions to the Bill. 
93 Thompson, Magna Carta — Its Role in the Making of the English Constitution —1300-1629 (1943), 301. 
94 Klitzke, above n 5. 
95 Chris R Kyle, 'But a New Button to an Old Coat: The Enactment of the Statute of Monopolies, 21 James I 
cap.3' in Frank Cass, Legal History (1998) vol 19, N3, 202-223. 
96 Kyle, above n 95, 223. 
97 The committee was comprised of Coke, William Noy, Crew, William Denny, Francis Glanville and Walter: 
see Kyle, above n 95, 202-223. 
98 Kyle, above n 95, 202-223. 
99 Ibid. 
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At the conference, Viscount Mandeville argued that there was a contradiction 
between the main part of the Bill, which declared all monopolies void, and the 
specific saving clauses. Coke, however, explained that those clauses were 
provisos, not saving clauses. 100 He explained that the provisos only affected the 
declaratory law to the extent that they were exempted from the penalties imposed 
by the Bill. 101 
5.3.2.1 New inventions are not void - further light on the meaning of 
`inconvenient' 
The Lords were concerned about the status of new inventions. The Monopolies Bill 
did not declare the future new inventions void and it noted that these 'should not be 
inconvenient'. 102 Mandeville argued that additions to old inventions might or might 
not be inconvenient, depending on the case. 103 Coke agreed on the point regarding 
new inventions and stated that the Bill should clarify that these should not be 
inconvenient (though it was never clarified, taking into account the proviso's 
ambiguous meaning). However, Coke did not accept that additions to old 
inventions should be classified as a new invention 'but a new button to an old 
coat' . 1°4 
The above is a clear illustration of the main argument presented in this Chapter: 
only patents that are given to a known commodity should be void on basis of being 
inconvenient or contrary to law. Monopolies to new inventions should not be 
declared invalid on the basis of inconvenience. 
5.3.3 No distinction between 'contrary to law' and `inconvenient' 
In support of earlier argument in this Chapter, it is necessary to refer to work of 
Elizabeth Read Foster, 105 who states that when patents were reviewed in 
Parliament during 1621 and 1624, an obscure distinction between 'contrary to law' 
and 'inconvenient' was employed. A 'contrary to law' patent was one contrary to a 
1°° It must be noted that the term proviso is used here to describe the whole s 6 (which the author referred to 
earlier as the 'main provision'). Within Section 6 there is another proviso (the proviso to s 6). This is the 
general inconvenience proviso. 
101 Kyle, above n 95, 213. 
102 Kyle, above n 95, 202-223, 287; S Rawson Gardiner, Notes of Debates in the House of Lords ...1624 and 
1626 (1879) Vol LXXXI, 50. 
1°3 Kyle, above n 95, 202-223. 
103 Kyle, above n 95, 287; Gardiner, above n 102. 
104 Kyle, above n 95, 203, 214. 
105 Elizabeth Read Foster, 'The Procedure of the House of Commons against Patents and Monopolies 1621- 
1624' in Stuart England (ed), Essays in Honour of Wallace Notestein (1960), 74-75. 
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strict legal requirement for a valid patent (for example, lack of new invention or not 
the first inventor) and thus infringed the rights of the subjects. An 'inconvenient' 
patent was one clearly obnoxious and injurious to the best interest of the 
Commonwealth, due to its lack of invention, which was the consequence of breach 
of a legal requirement for a patent. According to Foster, 'both were grounds for 
attacking patents and the theoretical analytical distinction was rarely strictly 
maintained in actual debates. 106 
Moreover, though Coke never commented on the meaning of the term 'generally 
inconvenient', an argument based on inconvenience, he said, was of great weight 
in law ('argumentum ab inconvenienti plurimum valet in leget). 1" After stating this 
maxim, Coke added the following: not only what is lawful but also what is 
convenient is to be considered. Nothing that causes inconvenience can be taken 
as lawful (Won solum quod licet sed quod est conveniens est considerandum. Nihil 
quod est inconveniens est licitum). 108 
From the above comments on the meaning of inconvenience, it is concluded that 
inconvenience and unlawfulness employed similar considerations and 
interpretative factors. 
5.3.4 The royal assent 
Debate in Parliament continued, and in May 1624 the Monopolies Bill was reported 
by the Lord President of the Upper House as 'fit to pass, with some Amendments 
and Provisos'. 109 On 25 May 1624 Coke reported that the committee agreed to the 
amendments and provisos. On 29 May the King gave the royal assent to 73 Bills, 
including the Monopolies Bill (James I. cap. 3), 'An Act concerning Monopolies and 
Dispensations with the penal Lawes and the Foreyture thereof', so called the 
Statute of Monopolies. 
Thus, the Statute of Monopolies declared all monopolies, dispensations and grants 
to compound penalties void, aside from the exception contained in s 6. This section 
defined the privileges the Crown might grant to new inventors. All such grants were 
1°6 Ibid. 
107 Co Litt 66a, cited by Bowen LI in Gard v London sewers Comrs (1885) 28 Ch D 486, 511. 
1°8 Co Litt 178, cited by F Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, A Code (2nd ed, 1992), 686. 
1°9 Kyle, above n 95, 203, 215. 
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to be tried at common law. Section 6 correlated with the King's ninth proviso, 110 
and only added the limitation of monopoly term of 14 years. 
5.4 POST - 1624 HISTORY OF THE PROVISO 
Since the Restoration, 111 patents declined in importance. According to Harold G. 
Fox, there is only one reported case between the enactment of the Statute of 
Monopolies and the end of the seventeenth century, and only one more case 
reported until 1765. 112 Notwithstanding this fact, the fundamental framework in 
either granting/revoking patents or legal doctrines remained that of the early 
common laW. 113 The main patent law concept and the traditional discretionary 
policy - based process discussed above did not change. 
According to MacLeod, during the late seventeenth century, patents were often 
granted with little investigation. 114 This approach dominated only as long as no 
interested party initiated objection to a particular patent grant. When an objection 
did occur, it usually prompted the Privy Council to demand more information and 
conduct a more thorough investigation, especially if it was alleged that the patent 
was 'contrary to law' or 'inconvenient'. 116 For instance, in 1663 Lord Treasurer, 
Southampton supported his recommendation of Garil's patent by saying that 'in 
case any unseen abuse be found out' it could be revoked by the Privy CounciI. 116 It 
must be noted here again that MacLeod does not make any distinction between 
'contrary to law' or 'inconvenient'. MacLeod states that when patents were 
subjected to review in the Privy Council, the process was much closer to the 
traditional discretionary policy based process discussed above. 
Moreover, until the nineteenth century, there was no change in patent law that 
affected the English concept of patents - the discretionary privilege concept was 
still followed by Privy Council when it was raised by interested parties in relation to 
patent grant. 117 As late as 1847, in one of the earliest patent law treatises W.M. 
11° It must be noted that the term proviso is used here to describe the whole s 6 (which the author referred to 
earlier as the 'main provision'). Within Section 6 there is another proviso (the proviso to s 6). This is the 
general inconvenience proviso. 
111 See above n 32. 
112 Fox, above n 89. See also: Christine MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial Revolution: The English Patent 
System 1660-1800 (1988), 61-62; EW Hulme 'On the Consideration of the Patent Grant Past and Present' 
(1897) 13 Law Quarterly Review 313, 318. 
'"MacLeod, above n 112, 20-39. 
114 Ibid,42. 
115 Ibid, 45-47. 
116 Ibid, 47. 
117 Ibid, 45-47. 
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Hindmarch included a section regarding the Revocation of a Patent 'by the Queen 
or the Privy Council'. 118 Hindmarch described the revocation proceedings in terms 
that corresponded to the traditional privilege concept: 
The grant of a patent is a matter of grace and favour and therefore... the Crown 
may annex any conditions it pleases to the grant... with the view of enabling 
the Crown to determine any illegal grant which may be unadvisedly made, 
without allowing the public to be put to the trouble or cost of resisting the unlawful 
patent. 119 
According to Hindmarch, by 1847, however, this was already 'a history' with little 
practical significance. He concluded: 
[t]here is no instance in modem times of the determination of a patent under this 
proviso, but there can be no doubt that the power it confers could be exercised if a 
case should arise calling for such an extraordinary interference of the Crown for the 
protection of the public. 120 
There is no doubt that the traditional discretionary approach of the Privy Council 
would be applied notwithstanding the fact that it was falling out of favour in the 
broader context. 
5.5 APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
This analysis illustrates that early common law interpretation of term 'generally 
inconvenient' focused on inventiveness and novelty, but Chapter 4 showed that the 
modem interpretation, at its heart, is focused on restraint of trade, or restriction on 
use per se. Essentially, it is based on the argument that even though a method of 
medical treatment might be inventive, new and useful, it may nevertheless restrict 
medical practice, and thus should be void. 
It is submitted that this modem interpretation has twisted the original meaning of 
the term 'inconvenient' for advancement of different policy reasons. In the modem 
context, the term has been used to promote 'public policy', 121 'social policy' ;122 




121 Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 611, 623 (Barwick CJ). 
'22 i Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 1, 45 (Wilcox J). 
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'ethics' 123 and 'morals' 124 in the context of the restraint of trade, 125 and not in the 
context of inventiveness or novelty. 126 In essence, the argument that has been 
used is that medical practitioners should not be restrained from practising their 
trade, based on these underlying social policy concerns. Whilst there may be some 
merit to such arguments, this thesis argues that general inconvenience is not the 
appropriate vehicle for driving them. 
The aim in this section is to analyse the modem interpretation of the proviso to s 6 
using the general principles of statutory interpretation. 
5.5.1 The literal approach and the phrase 'such manufactures [shall] be 
not.., generally inconvenient' 
If it is possible to conclude that the term 'generally inconvenient' is clear and 
carriers a plain meaning, then according to the literal approach to statutory 
interpretation, it should be construed according to the rules of grammar. 127 As 
Bennion puts it, 'the grammatical meaning of an enactment is its linguistic meaning 
taken in isolation.' 128 In some cases, however, the grammatical meaning might not 
correspond with the intention of the founders and may lead to doubts in law. 129 
The modem Oxford English Dictionary interprets the word 'generally' as to 'include 
every particular, as a whole, collectively; universally; with few or no exceptions; in 
general sense or way; opposed to 'specially". 130 The word 'inconvenient' means: 
'unsuitable, inappropriate; morally or ethically unsuitable; unfavourable to comfort; 
something inconsistent with reason; something morally unfitting.' 131 Putting this 
together, a grammarian would say that it looks like 'generally inconvenient' means 
something that is 'in general sense, as a whole, unsuitable or inappropriate or 
morally or ethically unsuitable or unfavourable to comfort'. Thus, following a literal 
interpretation the suggestion might be that the proviso was designed to advance 
arguments of morals, ethics and/or public policy. 
123 - Eli Lilly &Company's Application [1975] RPC 438, 445; Anaesthetic Supplies Ply Ltd v Rescare Ltd 
(1994) 50 FCR 1, 45 (Wilcox J). 
24 Bristol - Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd [2000] FCA 316, 355 (Finkelstein J). 
125 Ibid. 
126 Darcy v Allen (1603) Noy 173-185, 74 ER 1131, 11 Co Rep 84b-88b, 77 ER 1260. 
127 P Langan, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th ed,1969, reprinted 2003), 28 F Bennion, 
Statutory Interpretation, A Code (4thi ed, 2002), 320. 
128 Bennion, above n 127, 321. 
129 PP Maxwell, On the Interpretation of Statutes (1875); Langan, above n 127, 29; DC Pearce and RS 
Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (6th ed, 2006), 23-24; Bennion, above n 127, 320-323. 
1313 The Oxford English Dictionary, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970) vol V, 105. 
131 Ibid, 176. 
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The history presented above reveals that the term 'generally inconvenient' was 
indeed used to advance public policy purposes. However, the nature of those 
policy considerations was different from those implied by the dictionary meaning 
provided above, and also different from those advanced by modem courts. Though 
the application of these policy considerations might use similar weighing technique 
and arrive at a similar conclusion (invalidation of patents on public policy grounds), 
they are of a fundamentally different nature or based on a different concept. 132 The 
term 'generally inconvenient' was not meant to be reduced to a question of verbal 
interpretation, but to be interpreted as a qualification at the end of the general 
statement in s 6, in the context of s 6 as a whole, that is, invalidation of known 
monopolies that do not fulfill the 'manner of manufacture' requirement. 
Hence, it would appear that there is a significant difference between the modem 
dictionary meanings of 'generally' and 'inconvenient' and the meaning of these 
words as used in 1624 in the Statute of Monopolies. On this basis, it is submitted 
that the meaning of the term 'generally inconvenient' is far from clear. The term 
carries more than one meaning and could be interpreted in many ways. The 
conclusion, therefore, is that the term is ambiguous. It is concluded that the term 
'generally inconvenient' should not be interpreted literally for the following reasons: 
• the term is not clear or unambiguous; 
• the literal meaning of the term conflicts with the purpose or mischief that 
Parliament intended to deal with; and 
• according to principles of statutory interpretation, the proviso should not to 
be taken 'absolutely in [its] strict sense', 133 in isolation to the rest of the 
whole provision and its context. 
5.5.2 The purposive/ legislative intent approach and the phrase 'such 
manufactures [shall] be not.., generally inconvenient' 
Lord Reid in Kirkness (Inspector of Taxes) v Hudson 134 explained that the inherent 
uncertainty of words is normally cured by the context, that is, by selection of other 
words in the sentence. To resolve uncertainty, the court should employ the 
purposive approach to look at the overall intention of the legislature as discovered 
from reading the statute or the words in the section as a whole. Once it is apparent 
132 See Part 5.6.3 of this Chapter. 
133 R v Dibdin [1910] P 57, 58. 
"4 [1955] AC 696, 735. 
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that the term 'generally inconvenient' is uncertain or ambiguous, it is necessary to 
determine the purpose of the statute and adopt an interpretation of the meaning 
which is consistent with that purpose. The purpose is usually deduced by looking at 
the statute as a whole. Thus, taking into account the history of the proviso, the 
court must answer questions such as: what is the context of s 6 and its proviso? 
what does the Statute of Monopolies, and s 6 as a whole, provide for? what does 
the history of its enactment reveal? 
The historical analysis of Statute of Monopolies shows that it was primarily a 
declaration of the common law of monopoly, and s 6 did nothing but continue the 
common law exclusion of patents for invention from the statutory prohibition of 
monopolies. 135 The mischief or defect was the abuse of monopoly system by 
granting monopolies to known commodities, and the remedy for this mischief was 
the pronouncing of all monopolies void, except those that were a manner of 
manufacture, novel, inventive, useful and not previously known or used in the 
realm. Following on from this conclusion, it is necessary to reject the modern 
dictionary definition of the term 'generally inconvenient' and refer to the defect in 
the common law the 1624 Parliament intended to cure. The term should not be 
interpreted in isolation from the rest of the section and its context. 
5.5.3 The general rule of interpretation of provisos 
When considering the context of the proviso to s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, it 
is necessary to consider the style of drafting that was used at the time. Modem 
statutory drafting is quite different from the form of drafting adopted by draftsmen of 
the Statute of Monopolies. In modern drafting, the tendency is for two different 
propositions to be presented in separate sections or subsections. Consider, for 
example, a section of legislation that is split into subsections (1) and (2). Here 
subsection (2) might begin 'Subject to subsection (1)...', or 'Notwithstanding 
anything in subsection (1)...'. That is, subsection (1) provides the general 
proposition and subsection (2) provides the qualification. 
Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, on the other hand, contains both a general 
statement, and an ancient verbal formula, called 'the proviso' that makes a 
proposition or qualification at the end of that general statement. 136 The effect of this 
style of drafting is that s 6 allows monopolies that are a manner of new 
manufacture (main provision), but only in so far as (the words `so as also they be' 
135 S Ricketson, The Law of Intellectual Property (1984), 552. 
136 For early references to provisos in statutes see Hatsell, Parliamentary Precedents (1575) 3.46; (1660) 
3,114. 
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suggest this) those manufactures are 'not contrary to the law or mischievous to the 
state, by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally 
inconvenient' (proviso). 
According to the general rule of interpretation of provisos as laid down or adopted 
by the courts and supported by leading textbooks on statutory interpretation in 
England and Australia, 137 the words of a proviso are not to be taken 'absolutely in 
their strict sense'; 138 a proviso is of necessity 'limited in its operation to the ambit of 
the section which it qualifies.' 139 As Langan observes, so far as the main section 
itself is concerned, the proviso again receives a restricted construction. 14° Where 
the section confers powers, 'it would be contrary to the ordinary operation of a 
proviso to give it an effect which would cut down those powers beyond what 
compliance with the proviso renders necessary: 141 According to Bennion, in the 
case of a proviso, a statute must be construed as a whole. 142 He further explains 
that a section containing a proviso must also be construed as a whole, within that 
statute. 143 
As a consequence, the proviso to s 6 should be treated as a provision that is 
dependent on the main statement. Adopting the modern style of drafting, s 6 tends 
to state the following: 
(1) Provided also that any declaration before mentioned 
[monopolies] shall not extend to any letters patent and grants of 
privilege for the term of fourteen years or under, thereafter to be 
made, of the sole working or making of any manner of new 
manufactures within this Realm, to the true and first inventor and 
inventors of such manufactures which others at the time of making 
such letters patent and grants shall not use. 
(2) Those monopolies that lack of any requirement provided in sub-
section (1) above shall be held contrary to the law or mischievous to 
137 Maxwell, above n 129; Langan, above n 127,189; Pearce and Geddes, above n 129, 124-125; Bennion, 
above n 127, 492-493. 
138 R v Dibdin [1910] P 
139 Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd v Modern Cars & Caravans (Kingston) Ltd [1966] 1 QB 764, 780 (Davies 
J). 
140 Langan, above n 127,190. 
141 In his explanation, Langan quotes from Re Tabrisky, ex p. Board of Trade [1947] Ch 565 (Lord Greene 
MR), 568. 
142 Bennion, above n 127, 494. 
143 Bennion, above n 127, 494, citing Jennings v Kelly [1940] AC 206, 229. 
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the state, by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, 
or generally inconvenient. 
5.5.4 The modern usage of the phrase 'such manufactures [shall] be not... 
generally inconvenient' 
The decision in Joos v Commissioner of Patents 144 (Joos) was the first decision 
where an Australian judge mentioned the proviso to s 6. As noted in Chapter 4, 
prior to Joos the exclusion of medical treatments from patenting was based on the 
principle that they were not 'in some way associated with commerce and trade'.145 
As the history revealed, the proviso had never been applied by the courts in 
relation to any patentable subject matter after 1765. 146 When, however, Barwick CJ 
made it clear that methods of medical treatment do have a commercial application, 
he justified the exclusion on public policy grounds. Without considering either the 
meaning or the original reason for the proviso, the Chief Justice found that a public 
policy ground could be read into the term 'generally inconvenient' located in the 
proviso. Thus, the Chief Justice pronounced the following: 
If I had to do so, as at present advised, I would place the exception, if it is to 
be maintained, on public policy as being, in the language of the Statute of 
Monopolies, 'generally inconvenient' _ 147 
Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 1, when the longstanding practice 148 of 
exclusion of methods of medical treatment from patenting in the UK was removed 
by the decision of the Australian High Court in NRDC, the UK courts started 
searching for some other ground on which to base the exclusion. In Eli Lilly & 
Company's Application149 (Eli Lilly), the Patents Appeal Tribunal166 clearly stated 
that the restriction still applied regardless of other changes in law and refused a 
patent application, for the first time, on the basis of the proviso to s 6 of the Statute 
of Monopolies. 
Although the Australian Federal courts in Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare 
Ltd151 (Rescare) and Bristol—Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd162 (BMS) 
144 (1972) 126 CLR 611. 
'45 1n the Matter of C & W's Application for a Patens (1914) 31 RPC 337. 
146 Fox, above n 89,119; See also: MacLeod, above n 112, 61-62; Hulme above n 112, 318. 
147 Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 611, 623 (Emphasis added). 
148 1n the Matter of C & W's Application for a Patent (1914) 31 RPC 235. 
149 [1975] RPC 438. 
15° Per Graham and Whitford JJ. 
151 (1994) 50 FCR 1. 
152 [2000] FCA 316. 
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decided in favour of patenting of methods of medical treatment, the in each case 
courts undertook a public policy 'balancing exercise' in light of the proviso to s 6 in 
order to find a justification for either granting or excluding patent protection for 
processes of medical treatment. For instance, Lockhart J in Rescare decided that 
there would be less incentive to expend time, effort and money to make 
discoveries of new medical uses for known chemicals if no financial return (by 
means of patents) was to be available. 153 Sheppard J, on the other hand, strongly 
dissented in Rescare on the point that to grant a patent to the methods of medical 
treatment would be 'generally inconvenient' within the public policy proviso to s 6. 
His Honour argued that though a surgical procedure invention might be 'greatly 
beneficial to mankind', 154 granting a monopoly over such procedure might mean 
the 'death or unnecessary suffering of countless people'. 155 
In deciding whether patenting of methods of medical treatment was 'generally 
inconvenient', Black CJ and Lehane J in BMS acknowledged that, at first sight, it 
was easy to see how it could be argued that it was 'generally inconvenient' to grant 
a patent to a novel life-saving therapeutic method. They stated that it would be 
based on a belief that such a method must be available universally and without 
restriction. However, their Honours concentrated on logic, rather than ethics. 156 
At no stage did judges consider the meaning of the language of the Statute of 
Monopolies, nor did they look at history of s 6 in order to find out the intention of 
the Parliament in placing the proviso. Neither could it be said that the judges read 
the proviso with the rest of s 6, nor questioned the reason for the proviso and its 
meaning. Though in BMS Finkelstein J made a brief inquiry into the history of 
patent law and s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, his Honour did not consider the 
meaning and thus effect of its proviso. 
With respect, every judge in the above mentioned cases simply saw 'generally 
inconvenient' as a term that should be interpreted in isolation from the rest of s 6, 
to which it is a proviso. They also interpreted the term in such a way as to give 
them the opportunity to make moral judgments in relation to restraint of trade. 
However, they provided no justification for so doing. As the consequence, the term 
was interpreted as a separate public policy requirement for patentability, capable of 
being used as a sole ground for denial a patent protection. While it could perhaps 
be argued that, in reliance on the literal approach to statutory interpretation, the 
153 Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 1, 18. 
154 Ibid, 41. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Bristol—Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd [2000] FCA 316, para 17. 
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dictionary meaning of 'generally inconvenient' may provide an avenue for the 
courts to introduce public policy considerations, the inherent ambiguity of the 
phrase suggests that this is not the most appropriate approach to take. The 
purposive approach, on the other hand, favours an inquiry into the intention behind 
the provision. It is argued that the judges in these modem cases should have 
considered the legislative history of the provision and that, had they done so, they 
would have reached a different conclusion. It is submitted that the founders did not 
intend that the proviso and the term 'generally inconvenient' be given this public 
policy role. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
5.6.1 The Statute of Monopolies captured limitations already assigned by 
the common law 
The analysis of the early history of patent law in this Chapter indicates that prior to 
the introduction of the Statute of Monopolies, the common law already provided an 
adequate remedy against monopolies and, though legislation subsequently 
became necessary, there was no deficiency in law in this area - the common law 
was just 'neglected, evaded, and defied'. 157 
As illustrated above, the basis for the submissions of the counsel for Allen in Darcy 
v Allen reflected the common law position regarding granting 'odious' monopolies. 
These submissions were used as the main source for the King's ninth proviso in 
the Book of Bounty, and then for the first draft of the proviso to s 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies. It is submitted that neither Darcy v Allen nor the Book of Bounty 
established a new law. Neither did the Statute of Monopolies. These only 
reasserted the common law in this area - the monopoly could only be granted to a 
new trade, which was useful - granting a monopoly otherwise would be harmful to 
the realm, thus cause inconvenience. 
5.6.2 Sources for the term 'inconvenient'/'inconveniency' 
This historical analysis also illustrates that the limitation of time and apprenticeship 
clauses were the two sources for the term 'inconvenience'. When these clauses 
157 Price, above n 37. Similarly, Hulme states that 'in other respects.. .the statute must be interpreted as re-
capitulating limitations already assigned by the common law, which limitations in their turn... are such as 
were commonly prescribed in these grants for the purpose of safeguarding the powers with which the grantee 
was thus invested', see: Hulme, above n 15, 55. 
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were breached the monopoly was considered to be inconvenient to the realm. It is 
submitted that the proviso to s 6 was simply a reproduction of these clauses. 
Moreover, the term 'inconveniency' covered issues like novelty and priority of 
invention. Matthey's and Bircot's cases and Darcy v Allen, as well as reports of the 
Parliament debates during 1621 and 1624, support the proposition that when the 
subject of the monopoly was not new - the monopoly was considered to be 
inconvenient to the realm. These also highlight that the 'inconvenience' was used 
in the same context as 'contrary to law', 'mischievous to the state' and 'hurt of 
trade'. It is concluded that these terms had no distinction in their meaning. The 
author agrees with Davies who assumes that the abuses specified in the proviso to 
s 6 - 'so as also they be not contrary to the law or mischievous to the state, by 
raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient' - 
are all covered by the term 'inconveniency'. 155 
5.6.3 Is the term 'a catch-all justification' or a specific saving clause? 
From the first reference, it seems that the term 'generally inconvenient' in s 6 was 
meant to capture every deficiency in a monopoly grant so it could be viewed as 'a 
catch-all justification' for invalidity of the grant or the specific saving clause. It could 
therefore be concluded that by using the inconveniency proviso as a discretionary-
based policy instrument, modem courts follow the originally intended meaning of 
the term. However, the explanation given by Coke during the debate of the 
Monopolies Bill regarding the inclusion of s 6 as a proviso does not support this, 
and nor do the general rules of interpretation of provisos laid down or adopted by 
the courts, 159 As a result, and with guidance from the reasoning of Ky1e 169 it is 
concluded that the provisos, either s 6 itself or the general inconvenience proviso 
within s 6, were clauses that declared the law as it was, and not saving clauses. 
Moreover, notwithstanding the term was used to advance public policy 
considerations in the ancient case law and debates, the discussion above shows 
that basis for those policy considerations was quite different from those advanced 
by modem courts. The early common law cases indicate that the discretion was 
exercised in the name of the 'public good' to prevent unlawful inventions. 
According to the Darcy v Allen, those patents that lacked invention and novelty 
were contrary to the public good or unlawful, thus were considered to be 
inconvenient to the Commonwealth due to their unlawfulness. It follows, therefore, 
158 Davies, above n 16. 
159 See discussion regarding interpretation of provisos in Part 5.5.3 of this Chapter. 
160 Kyle, above n 95, 213. 
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that the royal discretion was based on satisfaction of legal requirements for a valid 
patent - requirements of invention and novelty. The decisions in Matthey's and 
Bircot's cases lend further support to the above proposition. 
5.6.4 How should the term be interpreted? 
The discussion in this Chapter aimed to show that the proviso to s 6 should be 
interpreted, as Sir Edward Coke stated, according to the intent of the Parliament 
that enacted it, 161 because the sole object in statutory interpretation is to arrive at 
the legislative intention. 162 As Lord Goddard CJ stated, a court cannot add words 
to a statute or read words into it that are not there.163 If the Parliament made an 
unclear statement, it should amend the statute. Unless and until it is done, the 
words 'are frozen in their imperfect state' 164 and the court is bound to endeavour to 
place some meaning upon them. In so doing it gives effect to intention of that 
Parliament, 'but it may only elicit that intention from the actual words of the 
statute: 166 
In this Chapter it has been argued that the modern view about interpretation of the 
proviso to s 6 has been based on a misconception by the courts that the proviso is 
a separate clause, independent of the provision to which it is a proviso. It is 
concluded that the proviso has been interpreted grammatically, that is, taken in 
isolation, according to the rules of grammar - standing along and without taking into 
consideration the context of the Statute of Monopolies and the main purpose of s 6. 
By treating the proviso independently, the proviso and, in particular, the term 
'generally inconvenient' has lost its original meaning. The grammatical or literal 
interpretation leads the term being treated as a public policy clause relating to a 
restraint of trade and a separate requirement for patentability, capable of being 
used as a sole ground for denial of patent protection. It is argued in the Chapter 
that the drafters of s 6 did not intend the term be given this role. 
From history of s 6 it follows that, notwithstanding the ambiguity of the term 
'generally inconvenient', if one adopts the general rule of interpretation of 
provisos166 and thus reads s 6 as a whole, it is clear that the intention of the 
founders was that if an invention otherwise satisfies the requirements of manner of 
manufacture, inventiveness, novelty and usefulness (located in the main provision 
161 Edward Coke, 4 Institutes of the Laws of England (1644), 330. 
162 Bennion, above n 127, 345. 
163 R v Wimbledon JJ, ex p Derwent [1953] 1 QB 380, 384. 
164 Bennion, above n 127, 3. 
165 Langan, above n 127, 1; see also Maxwell, above n 129, 1; Bennion, above n 127,345-347. 
166 See Part 5.5.3 of this Chapter. 
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of the section), the invention should not be declared generally inconvenient on the 
basis that the monopoly simply restricts others from trade or its use. This view 
corresponds with the position of Heerey J in Welcome Real-Time SA v Catuity 
/nc, 167 who rejected a submission regarding general inconvenience on similar 
grounds:168 
This submission should not be taken as implying that public policy should never be 
considered in deciding patentability of inventions. The argument is that public 
policy considerations should only be made where the legislature specifically directs 
them to be made and this should be done by bodies other than judiciary. This 
proposition is addressed in the next Chapter. 
167 [2001] FCA 445. 
168 It seems that Heerey J has changed his view in relation to the meaning of general inconvenience since 
Bristol—Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd [1998] 860 FCA 22. As discussed above, in this case His 
Honour held that patenting of methods of medical treatment was 'generally inconvenient'. See discussion of 
BMS in Chapter 4, Part 4.5.2.2. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous five Chapters of this thesis have provided an historical and 
contemporaneous analysis of patenting of methods of medical treatment of 
human beings in Australia and other common law countries that derived their 
origin from the UK law. It has also inquired into the history and concept of patent 
law and examined the rules of statutory interpretation as they relate to s 6 of the 
Statute of Monopolies 1624 (the Statute of Monopolies). In summary, this 
thesis has: 
1. described the approaches adopted in a number of countries in dealing 
with patenting of methods of medical treatment of human beings; 
2. explored the deficiencies (if any) with the approaches; 
3. examined the justification for denying patents to methods of medical 
treatment inventions in countries outside Australia; and 
4. critically analysed the advancement of the general inconvenience 
objection against such patents to import public policy considerations 
into Australian law. 
In this Chapter, the key conclusions of this thesis will be summarised and a set of 
proposals will be made. The proposals in this Chapter aim to provide practical 
tools to assist the courts, Australian Patent Office or other relevant body in 
assessing inventions relating to methods of medical treatment of human beings. 
6.2 THE EXCLUSION IN PRACTICE — CHAPTERS 1-3 
The analysis of patenting of methods of medical treatment of human beings in 
common law countries has revealed a consistent pattern of exclusion of methods 
of medical treatment from C & Ws Application' in 1914 onwards. However, the 
rationale for the exclusion has changed over time in• parallel with the changes to 
the interpretation of the manner of manufacture requirement. 
In the Matter of C & W's Application for a Patent (1914) 31 RPC 235. 
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Since the 1970s, 2 the exclusion of methods of medical treatment has largely 
been based on the public policy concern that patenting of methods of medical 
treatment may restrict physicians in practicing medicine. The argument that has 
been put in to the legislatures and the courts and in the associated academic 
commentary is that, in order to ensure the best possible health treatment, 
physicians must always be free in their choice of treatment. Based on this 
argument, the UK, other European countries, Israel, Canada and New Zealand 
(as well as countries in Asia, Africa, North America, South America, Central 
America) exclude methods of medical treatment from patent protection. 
However, the exclusion of methods of medical treatment has not been always 
based on these public policy reasons. Since 1914, the courts appeared to be 
comfortable with the long established grounds for such exclusion, based on the 
decision of English court C & W's Application that such inventions lacked 
'commercial value'. 3 However, the foundation for the exclusion pronounced in the 
case of C & W's Application was removed by subsequent decisions in NRDC4 , 
Swift5 and Schering. 6 These cases clearly show that methods of medical 
treatment can have commercial value, just as much as the drugs and devices 
used in medical treatment. However, since the exclusion of such methods had 
become established practice at that time, in the absence of any express 
exclusion in the legislation itself, the UK courts turned to the application of s 6 of 
the Statute of Monopolies, which declares a patent void if it is 'generally 
inconvenient' to the society. Accordingly, patents to methods of medical 
treatment were declared 'generally inconvenient' on the basis that such patents 
might restrict medical practitioners from using patented medical treatment 
inventions. Thus, the proviso to s 6 became a new ground on which to base the 
refusal to patents to methods of medical treatment in the UK. 
This long history of the prohibition of methods of medical treatments in the UK, 
and also in other European countries, led to the enactment of s 4(2) of the 
Patents Act 1977 (UK), Art 52(4) of the EPC and other relevant European 
provisions, which expressly exclude methods of medical treatment of the human 
or animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods practiced on the 
human or animal body from patentability by treating them as not 'susceptible of 
industrial application'. The interpretation of the wording of Art 52(4) 'shall not be 
regarded as' leads to the conclusion that such methods would in fact be 
2 Eli Lilly & Company's Application [1975] RPC 438. 
3 In the Matter of C & W's Application for a Patent (1914) 31 RPC 235. 
National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents [1959] 102 CLR 252. 
5Swifi & Co v Commissioner of Patents [1961] RPC 147. 
6Schering AG 's Application [1971] RPC 337. 
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susceptible of industrial application but for artificial prohibition created by Art 
52(4). 
Notwithstanding the prohibition on patents for methods of medical treatment 
created by Art 52(4), the legislation of member states of the EPC, and the 
legislation in Israel legislation and exclusion adopted by the Canadian and New 
Zealand courts, these jurisdictions have adopted special rules for allowing claims 
directed to the protection of the first and/or second medical use of a known 
products. These claims have been called Swiss—type claims'. 
These patent applications to the first and/or second medical use of known 
products are usually directed to treatment of a particular disease and consist of 
instructions to the physician on how to employ a certain medical substance to 
treat the disease. The consequence of allowing these Swiss-type claims is that 
they provide an indirect way for applicants to obtain patent protection for 
therapeutic methods of medical treatment. With the introduction of the Swiss-type 
claims format, patent examiners are left with no capacity to exclude of methods 
of medical treatment involving first and second therapeutic applications, 
irrespective of whether or not their governing legislation or case law proscribes 
patenting of methods of medical treatment. Accordingly, only 'pure' methods of 
medical treatment, such as methods of treating human illness by surgery and/or 
diagnostic methods are left outside protection of the Swiss-type claim. 
Additionally, in considering whether a patent request regarding a method of 
medical treatment is allowable under Art 52(4) EPC and associated legislation in 
member states, the critical questions remains whether it is going to be performed 
on a living body and whether this is a method for the treatment of the human or 
animal by therapy or surgery. This limitation has created some concern in 
relation to methods of diagnosis, because the law is not clear as to whether such 
methods are patentable in Europe 7 and Canada8 . 
It is suggested in this thesis that the technical criteria in Art 52(4) EPC should not 
be the only considerations with regard to patent applications for methods of 
medical treatment. Such patent applications should also be read in conjunction 
with the exclusionary provisions of Art 53 EPC, which provide that inventions the 
publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to 'ordre public' or morality, 
must be prohibited. Equivalent provisions allowing the exclusions of inventions 
7 T 385/86, Non-Invasive Measurement/Brulcer. 
8 Merck & Co v Apotex (1995) 59 CPR (3d) 133; Re Application No. 016, 962; Re Application No. 880, 719 
and Re Application No. 372,233. 
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from patenting on ethical or social policy grounds also exist in the legislation of 
EPC member states and in New Zealand legislation.9 Arguably, these provisions 
derive from the necessity to protect social values and public interest that could be 
traced back to the early cases of the Tudor period, and the time surrounding the 
enactment of the Statute of Monopolies 1624 discussed in Chapter 5. 
It is submitted that if methods of medical treatment inventions are meant to be 
excluded from patentability by the EPC or its member states, they should be 
excluded as 'exceptions to patentability' under Art 53 EPC and its equivalents in 
the legislation of member states. This proposition corresponds with the opinion 
voiced in academic legal literature with regard to the provision in Art 52(4) EPC 
where the connection between the exclusion of methods of medical treatment 
with the requirement of industrial applicability was announced as being 
systematically inappropriate .") and a legal fiction. 11 
Although the Patents Act 1953 (NZ) does not expressly excludes patents to 
methods of medical treatment, New Zealand courts have taken an approach 
similar to that of Europe, finding that since methods of medical treatment have 
traditionally been excluded from patentability at common law, it is Parliament's 
responsibility to provide otherwise. 12 It has now been recognised that the 
statutory basis in New Zealand for the exclusion of methods of medical treatment 
is that of general inconvenience. 13 According to the New Zealand courts, this is a 
separate issue from whether or not an invention satisfies the 'manner of 
manufacture' requirement, although general inconvenience also finds its statutory 
basis in s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. Despite this, the ability to use general 
inconvenience as a ground to exclude inventions from patentability is not well 
supported in New Zealand law. The exclusion from patentability of methods of 
medical treatment is based on policy grounds, 14 mainly that the use of such 
methods would be contrary to morality. 15 
A review of the background of US Public Law 104-208 reveals that substantial 
change in US patent law was provoked by a single patent lawsuit, Pal/in v 
9 Section 1(3) of the Patents Act 1977 (UK) and s 17 of the Patents Act 1953 (NZ). 
I° Gall, 'Patentability in the Field of Pharmacy/Therapy' (1991) 10 Management Intellectual Property, 38. 
11 Rainer Moufang, 'Methods of Medical Treatment Under Patent Law' (1993) 24 International Review of 
Industrial Property & Copyright Law, 32. 
12 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1999] NZCA 332; Pfizer Inc v 
Commissioner of Patents [2004] NZCA 104. 
13 Pfizer Inc v Commissioner of Patents [2004] NZCA 104, [26]. 
14 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1999] NZCA 332, [29]. 
15 By virtue of s 17 of the Patents Act 1953 (NZ). 
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Singer16 . Even though infringement litigation is generally not rare in American 
society, it was certainly rare at the time in the world of surgeons and physicians. 
Doctors viewed this litigation as a threat to medical science, which might have 
devastating consequences. However, it is submitted that since medical method 
patents have been allowed in the US for nearly forty years, 17 it was already 
proven that such patents were not a threat to the promotion of medical welfare. 
Moreover, as infringement litigation was so uncommon among the medical 
profession, the legislative reaction (by enacting the Public Law 104-208 18) on a 
single case, resulting in a substantial reduction in remedies available for methods 
of medical treatment patent infringement, was arguably premature and 
unwarranted. 
Notwithstanding Public Law 104-208, the US law providing protection for 'uses of 
compositions' 18 clearly eliminates any need for Swiss-type claims. In this way 
methods of medical treatments can be indirectly enforced in the US. The 
experience of the US in granting patent protection for methods of medical 
treatment might be treated as a useful example to solve the issue of patentability 
of such methods around the world. Though there is no authority for such 
proposition, based on the reviewed case law and practices, it is the author's 
opinion that, the practice of allowing methods of medical treatment patents in the 
US may have been an inspiration for indirect protection of such methods in 
Europe, Canada, Israel and New Zealand through the vehicle of Swiss-type 
claims. It could also be suggested that the US approach towards patentability of 
all medical inventions inspired the judges of the Federal Court of Australia in 
Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd2° and Bristol—Myers Squibb Co v F H 
Faulding & Co Ltd, 21 to rule that methods of medical treatments were patentable 
in Australia. 
At the present time, Israeli legislation expressly prohibits patenting of methods of 
medical treatment. 22 However, the case of The Wellcome Foundation Ltd v 
Plantex Ltd23 made a significant contribution in changing attitudes towards 
patentability of such methods in Australia, and still might play a valuable role in 
Israeli patent law in the future. 
16 36 USPQ 2d (BNA) 1050 (D Vt 1995). 
17 Ex Parte Scherer 103 U.S.P.Q. 107 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1954). 
18 Amendment to 35 US Code § 287(c), known as Pubic Law 104-208. 
19 By virtue of § 616 (c)(2)(A) of Title 35 US Code § 287 (c). 
2° (1994) AIPC 91. 
21 [2000] FCA 316. 
22 See Section 7 of the Patents Act 1967 (Israel). 
23 [1974] RPC 514, published in Hebrew in PD! (Supreme Court Judgments), vol. 27, p 29. 
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Another landmark case which addressed the issue, was the decision reached by 
Davison CJ in the New Zealand case of Wellcome Foundation Ltd v 
Commissioner of Patents. 24 Though the Court of Appeal overturned Davison CJ's 
decision that methods of medical treatment were patentable subject matter, the 
case was instructive for Australian judges faced with the same task. 
Although a detailed evaluation of the position in Europe is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, some suggestions are made below as to how member states of the 
EPC might better approach the issue of patenting of methods of medical 
treatment based on the analysis of the case law and legislative provisions 
presented in Chapters 1-3 and summarised above. 
1 	Since only 'pure' surgical, therapeutic and diagnostic methods are 
excluded from patent protection, as a matter of practice, it appears unlikely 
that a medical practitioner would make a patent claim for such method. 
Instead, a practitioner who wishes to patent a new medical procedure 
involving therapeutic substances in Europe would draft their claim in the 
Swiss-type format. Thus, since the Swiss-type format causes therapeutic 
methods of medical treatment to be de facto no longer excluded from 
patent protection, excluding such methods from patenting has little 
practical value. Rather than taking the root of creating a 'legal fiction' using 
the Swiss-type format, a more realistic approach should be taken by 
allowing patentability of method of medical treatment claims. 
2 	However, bearing in mind competing interests and public policy concerns 
regarding social impact of patents to methods of medical treatment 
inventions, patent examiners should seriously consider whether or not they 
should be excluded on public policy grounds on a case by case basis. 
3 	There is scope to consider such matters in European patent law in the form 
of the ordre public and morality exclusion under Art 53(a) of the EPC, 
though according to current interpretation of Art 53(a), the exclusion can be 
invoked only in extreme cases. As it was demonstrated in Chapter 5, the 
scope of any term in legislation (and the 'ordre public' and 'morality' is not 
an .exception) is a matter of interpretation, and in the absence of clear 
legislative definition of the term, it is usually left for the courts to interpret. 
Since application of the 'ordre public' and morality exclusion involves 'a 
careful weighing up' of competing interest, 25 there is scope to argue that 
24 [1979] 2 NZLR 591. 
25 Harvard/Oncomouse [1990] EPOR 501, 513. 
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instead of express prohibition of patents to methods of medical treatment, 
each patent application must be examined in conjunction with the 'ordre 
public' and morality considerations, and, by using the 'weighing up' 
exercise, considered in accordance with the circumstances of particular 
case. Only those methods that are likely to be against ordre public or 
morality should be refused patenting. 
6.3 THE AUSTRALIAN POSITION — CHAPTER 4 
Australian patent law, in contrast with more conservative jurisdictions in Europe, 
Canada, Israel and New Zealand, recognises that methods of treatment of the 
human body should be patentable in order to provide considerable incentive for 
medical research and development. However, opponents to the patentability of 
methods of medical treatment in Australia have attempted to rely on the judicial 
interpretation of s 6, arguing that granting a patent to such methods would be 
generally inconvenient within the meaning of s 18(1) of the Patents Act 1990 
(Cth) (the 1990 Act).26 
The examination of s 18(1) in Chapter 4 of this thesis revealed that while the 
definition of a valid patent, from first sight, appears to be simple, identifying the 
boundaries of each requirement is a difficult task. Due to the overlapping 
concepts of 'patentable invention', 'invention', 'newness', 'novelty' and 'manner of 
new manufacture' the 1990 Act is far from being clear. Moreover, the definition of 
'patentable invention' provides little or no guidance on whether methods of 
medical treatment of human beings could be patentable subject matter, or 
whether it could possibly be decided that patenting of such methods would or 
would not be 'generally inconvenient' under the proviso to s 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies, which is a part of the definition of 'invention'. For these reasons it is 
concluded that the 1990 Act needs to be amended to provide a more succinct 
definition of a 'patentable invention'. 
Based on judicial interpretation, and in the absence of any express guidance in 
the legislation itself, in Australia, methods of medical treatment are considered to 
be a 'manner of manufacture' within s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. 27 This 
approach can be contrasted to the approach adopted by the EPC member states 
26 See, eg, Anaesthetic Supplies Ply Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 41 (Sheppard J); Bristol—Myers 
Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd [2000] FCA 316 (Heerey J); W. Yang 'Patent Policy and Medical 
Procedure Patents: The Case for Statutory Exclusion From Patentability' (1995) 1 Boston University 
Journal of Science and Technology Law 5; P Loughlan 'Of Patents and Patients: New Monopolies in 
Medical Methods' (1995) 5 Australian Intellectual Properly Journal 13. 
27 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents [1959] 102 CLR 252, 271. 
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that expressly pronounce methods of medical treatment as Tunisusceptible of 
industrial application'. 28 Yet, it is still arguable whether or not such methods are 
patentable in Australia due to the 'generally inconvenient' exclusion in the proviso 
to s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies or through any other means. In similarity with 
the reasoning used to justify the exclusion in UK case law in the 1 970s, 29 it has 
been argued in Australia that the main obstacle to patenting of methods of 
medical treatment inventions is the general inconvenience exclusion on the basis 
that it allows for the introduction of public policy considerations. 39 
Nevertheless, following Rescare31 and BMS32 methods of medical treatment 
have been granted patent protection in Australia. Consequently, compared to the 
European countries, Canada, Israel and New Zealand, there is no need to use an 
indirect way to get patent protection for a method of medical treatment through 
the vehicle of the Swiss-type format. 
Patentability of such methods in Australia, therefore, provides a clear solution to 
the existing problem in practical terms. From a practical point of view, it is not 
difficult to establish the validity and define the precise scope of a claim to a 
method of medical treatment, compared to the Swiss-type form. The nature of 
the act of infringement is also certain here, and thus making a clearer case for an 
infringement action. The Swiss-type claim, on the other hand, creates uncertainty 
as to whether the claim is for the manufacture of the medicament, its use, or 
manufacture with a view to use. 33 Moreover, patents for medical treatment 
methods, unlike the Swiss-type patents, also assist potential infringers in 
determining what they are and are not entitled to do without risking an 
infringement action being brought against them . 34 
Rescare and BMS seem to have shut the door somewhat on the advancement of 
the general inconvenience argument against patenting of methods of medical 
treatment. However, the true ambit of general inconvenience remains uncertain 
and it is possible that attempts could be made to introduce public policy 
considerations under its veil. Chapter 4 illustrated that the Full Court of the 
28 Section 4(2) of the Patents Act 1977 (UK) and Art 52(4) of the EPC. 
29 Eli Lilly & Company's Application [1975] RPC 438; Upjohn Company (Robert's) Application [1977] 
RPC 94. 
30 Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 611; Anaesthetic Supplies Ply Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 
50 FCR 41; Bristol—Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd [2000] FCA 316. 
31 Anaesthetic Supplies Ply Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 1. 
32 Bristol—Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd [2000] FCA 316. 
33 J Savina, 'The Patentability of the Second Therapeutic Application — Why must the Law by Changed?' 
(1995) 8 Patent World 32, 34. 
4 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc [1999] RPC 253, 272 (Jacob J). 
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Federal Court of Australia was not willing to use general inconvenience to justify 
exclusion of methods of medical treatment in the case of BMS. This thesis does 
not question whether the decision in that case was correct, but questions the 
reasoning behind the application of general inconvenience. The court in BMS 
accepted that the general inconvenience proviso could be used to introduce 
public policy considerations in patent examinations in Australia. For this reason 
Chapter 5 analysed the origins and history of patent law to ascertain whether 
there is any basis for using general inconvenience to import such public policy 
considerations into Australian law. 
6.4 THE PROVISO TO SECTION 6: ITS ORIGINAL MEANING 
This thesis has revealed that there remains great deficiency of case law on the 
meaning of the proviso, 35 and in particular, the meaning of 'generally 
inconvenient'. Until today, neither the case law nor legislation has furnished an 
entirely clear answer as to the circumstances in which a monopoly would be 
generally inconvenient. In the absence of the case law on the construction of the 
term in question, it was felt necessary in this thesis to examine the pre-enacting 
and enacting history of the Statute of Monopolies to ascertain the scope of the 
proviso to s 6. In order to determine, the reasons for enacting the Statute of 
Monopolies and its proviso it was necessary to examine the mischief for which 
the common law did not provide. 
These analyses led to the main conclusion of Chapter 5, that s 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies was aiming to spell out that in order to be patentable a commodity 
must satisfy requirements of novelty, manner of manufacture, no prior use in the 
realm and usefulness. By using words 'so as also they' at the end of the main 
provision, s 6 was making a clarification by means of the proviso, aiming to 
transmit a message that if an alleged new commodity lacked the 
abovementioned requirements, it must not be granted a patent. Since the whole 
idea of s 6 was granting monopolies to something new and useful, giving the 
grant of letters patent to something lacking novelty or utility would prevent a 
craftsman from carrying on his ordinary trade, thus be inconvenient for that 
craftsman and the society as a whole. According to this interpretation, the proviso 
therefore is just an explanation of the logical consequence of granting a 
monopoly to a previously known or useless trade or industry. 36 
35 See R Frost, Treatise on Letters Patent for Inventions (1912), 30-31. 
36 The historical evidence revealed that 'inconvenient', 'contrary to law', or 'mischievous to the state', had 
no distinction in their meaning, thus the above interpretation is relevant to the whole proviso. 
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The history of Statute of Monopolies indicates that notwithstanding the term was 
used to advance public policy reasons, the basis for those policy reasons was 
different from those advanced by modem courts. Even though the policy reasons 
perhaps use similar weighing technique and arrive at a similar conclusion 
(invalidation of patents on public policy grounds), they are of different nature or 
based on different concept. In the early days the discretion was exercised in the 
name of the public good to prevent unlawful inventions that failed to satisfy 
requirements of invention and novelty. Due to their unlawful nature such 
inventions were considered to be inconvenient to the Commonwealth. 
The modem courts, on the other hand, advance the 'generally inconvenient' 
objection against method of medical treatment inventions, relying on the restraint 
of trade argument and/or an assumption that even though a method of medical 
treatment might be inventive, new and useful, it would nevertheless restrict 
medical practice, and thus void. In deciding the meaning of the general 
inconvenience, the modern courts did not examined the history of s 6 and the 
original purpose of the proviso. Rather, they interpreted the proviso 
grammatically or literally by employing moral and public policy judgments. 
6.4.1 Where does the term 'generally inconvenient' fit in? 
Applying the legislative intention regarding the term 'generally inconvenient' 
within the context of current common law and s 18 of the 1990 Act, it is 
concluded that the term fits in between the concept of 'manner of new 
manufacture', redefined by the High Court of Australian in NRDC'37 and the term 
'useful' in section 18(1)(c). Accordingly, the concept of general inconvenience 
involves the three requirements: the invention must be new, inventive (not 
obvious), and useful. 
It is submitted that the term 'generally inconvenient' in the proviso of s 6 no 
longer has a role to play in modem Australian patent law. In 1624 it may be that it 
was necessary to include this term to emphasise the importance of having a 
lawful invention, but this is no longer the case. The 1990 Act clearly spells out 
that patents can only be granted for inventions that are new, inventive and useful. 
This was not the case in the Statute of Monopolies, hence the need for the 
general inconvenience proviso. Given that the three requirements of novelty, 
inventiveness (not obvious), and usefulness are now expressly listed as 
requirements for valid patents, continued use of the term general inconvenience 
37 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252, 269. 
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and indeed the proviso as a whole does not have any significance or carries little 
weight. As such, there is no justification for continued reference to these 
provisions in Australian patent legislation and the most desirable outcome would 
be for the Patents Act 1990 to be amended to delete all reference to the proviso. 
6.5 WHAT NEXT? 
In the meantime, in the absence of a clear definition of the terms 'patentable 
invention' and 'generally inconvenient' and clear High Court authority on the 
question of whether methods of medical treatment patenting is 'generally 
inconvenient', the Australian Patent Office must be guided by the Full Federal 
Court decisions in Rescare and BMS. In those cases, although the judges 
decided it was appropriate to consider public policy arguments under the guise of 
general inconvenience, public policy was nevertheless deemed insufficient to 
justify exclusion of patents for methods of medical treatment. Currently, by 
adopting these decisions, the Patent Office declares: 
[i]t is now firmly established that methods of medical treatment are patentable 
subject matter, and there is no objection to this aspect of an invention. 38 
However, such definite interpretation of the case law by the Patent Office might 
be undermined in future. The point is that Rescare and BMS do not close the 
debate about whether methods of medical treatment should be patentable and 
the decision is yet to be made. 
6.6 DEFICIENCIES IN REVIEWED APPROACHES 
The approaches analysed in Chapters 1-4 in respect of patentability of methods 
of medical treatment of human beings indicate that all approaches have their own 
problems. These are summarised below. 
1. The express exclusions in Europe and Israel can be worked around by 
skilled patent attorneys in drafting a patent application in the form of 
the Swiss type claims, thus making the exclusions of minimal value. 
2. The same could be said about prohibition of methods of medical 
treatment by Canadian and New Zealand courts, which treat such 
methods as inherently unpatentable in Canada, and rely on 
38 APO. Manual of Practice and Procedure-National, June 2001, at para8.2.13.3 (Emphasis added) 
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longstanding practice of exclusion in New Zealand (including the 
general inconvenient argument). The prohibition can also be avoided 
via vehicle of the Swiss type claims in these jurisdictions. 
3. The justification for exclusion based on general inconvenience in New 
Zealand and arguments to this effect advanced in Australia have no 
merit either. This is because it is questionable whether the term 
'generally inconvenient' includes public policy considerations in its 
scope, and whether the interpretation of the term adopted by the courts 
has a sound historical basis. 
4. The US exemption approach dictated by the provisions in the Public 
Law 104-208 is also problematic, as, on one hand, it allows patents to 
methods of medical treatment, but at the same time, takes away their 
value by making them unenforceable against medical practitioners and 
related health care entities. 
Based on the above conclusions the author makes the following proposals, which 
may be taken into account under existing Australian patent law by patent 
examiners and courts in addressing patenting of methods of medical treatments 
of human beings. 
6.7 PROPOSALS 
6.7.1 Option One 
In the case that s 18 of the 1990 Act remains unaltered, this option proposes that 
in interpreting ambiguous terms such as 'generally inconvenient', the courts 
should search for and follow the intention of the makers of the legislation and not 
the judge's preferred meaning or that of today's circumstances. As such, if the 
Australian courts are presented with another opportunity for considering the 
patentability of methods of medical treatment, or indeed the patentability of any 
other subject matter that might raise public policy concerns, they should not be 
guided by the conclusions of the courts in Rescare and BMs with regard to the 
ambit of general inconvenience. Since the court decisions in Rescare and BMS 
did not truly reflect the legislative intention of the drafters of the provisio, later 
courts might be pointed to this defect in interpretation and distinguish these 
decisions. This is not to say that the ultimate decisions in Rescare and BMS 
should not be followed. It is the interpretation of general inconvenience 
propounded by the courts in those decisions that raisesconcerns. 
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6.7.2 Option Two 
Another approach would be to amend the 1990 Act by adding to the current 
definition of 'patentable invention' a specific legal definition of the term 'generally 
inconvenient'. This would provide a more succinct definition of a 'patentable 
invention' and clear up the uncertainty in Australian patent law in relation to 
interpretation of the proviso to s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. 
As noted in Chapter 5, 39 it is proposed that the proviso to s 6 should be treated 
as a provision that is dependent on the main statement. Section s 6 therefore 
may state the following: 
(1) Provided also that any declaration before mentioned 
[monopolies] shall not extend to any letters patent and grants of 
privilege for the term of fourteen years or under, thereafter to be 
made, of the sole working or making of any manner of new 
manufactures within this Realm, to the true and first inventor and 
inventors of such manufactures which others at the time of making 
such letters patent and grants shall not use. 
(2) Those monopolies that lack of any requirement provided in sub- 
section (1) above shall be held contrary to the law or mischievous 
to the state, by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of 
trade, or generally inconvenient. 
6.7.3 Option Three 
Taking into account that: 
(a) there is no modem case law regarding interpretation of the term 'generally 
inconvenient' and the term is ambiguous; 
(b) arguably, the concept of general inconvenience has already been covered 
by the requirements of novelty, inventiveness and usefulness — the 
existing requirements of s 18 of the 1990 Act; and 
39 Part 5.5.3. 
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(c)  the fact that Australia has entered into the Agreement on Trade-related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1995 (TRIPS)4° and Free Trade 
Agreements,'" neither of which refers to general inconvenience,42 
it is concluded that term 'generally inconvenient' adds nothing to the criteria of 
patenting and the whole proviso has not value. 
For these reasons, an alternative proposal would be to alter the current definition 
of 'patentable invention' by: 
1. striking out the phrase 'within the meaning of Section 6 of the Statute 
of Monopolies' and adding to s 18 a provision which would allow 
inventions to be excluded from patentability where it is necessary to 
prevent their commercial exploitation in order 'to protect ordre public or 
morality, including protection of human, animal or plant life or health'; 43 
and 
2. additionally including a specific legal definition of the terms `ordre 
public' and 'morality'. 
Adopting this option would mean altering the current definition of 'patentable 
invention' by departing from the use of the proviso to the Statute of Monopolies. 
This would have advantage of defining more clearly the requirements for a 
patentable invention. However, if the reference to the proviso to s 6 of the Statute 
of Monopolies is removed from the 1990 Act, there will be no authority for the 
Commissioner of Patents or the courts to refuse patents where the use of an 
invention would raise social and ethical concerns." In addressing this issue it is 
proposed to introduce the public policy ground for objection as a separate 
criterion for the patentability, which does not form part of the 'manner of new 
manufacture' test. It is argued that this criterion should be a distinct requirement 
40 See, eg, Article 27.2 of Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Including 
Trade in Counterfeit Goods (1994) 25 BC 209 (TRIPS). 
41 North American Free Trade Agreement (17 December 1992, Ottawa) (NAFTA); Australian-US Free 
Trade Agreement, [2005] ATS 1. 
42  Though those Agreements refer to `ordre public' and 'morality'. Trade agreements such NAFTA and 
TRIPS allow member states to exclude methods of medical treatment from patent protection. In article 
1709(3)(a) of NAFTA, for example, parties are permitted to exclude from patent protection 'diagnostic, 
therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals.' Similarly, Art 27.2 of the TRIPS 
TRIPS agreement permits member states to exclude from patent protection 'diagnostic, therapeutic and 
surgical methods for the treatment of humans and animals.' 
43 See Article 27.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
44Apart from s 50(1)(a) of the 1990 Act that allows the Commissioner of Patent to refuse patents that are 
contrary to law. 
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for patenting, along with a manner of manufacture, novelty, inventive step, 
obviousness and usefulness. 
Thus, similar to the proposition made in relation to the European patent law 
practice, adopting this option would allow examination of each patent application 
for a method of medical treatment in conjunction with the 'ordre public' and 
morality exclusion. Instead of an express prohibition of patents for all methods of 
medical treatment, an individual case by case approach of 'weighing up' public 
policy considerations would be involved. Only those methods that are likely to be 
against ordre public or morality should be refused patenting. 
This amendment would harmonise the Australian requirements for patenting with 
that used in other countries. However, this would not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that patentability of methods of medical treatment should be 
prohibited, as in Europe, Israel, Canada and New Zealand. To eliminate 
confusion as to the meaning of the terms 'ordre public' and 'morality', a specific 
legal definition of these terms should be included in the 1990 Act. The definition 
adopted by the EPC and European Biotech Directive could provide some useful 
guidance in this respect. While Art 6 of the Biotech Directive only provides 
examples of the types of biotech-related subject matter that may be considered 
as contrary to ordre public or morality, it also provides guidance as to how to 
similar sets of examples might be formulated in other areas, including the area of 
methods of medical treatment. 
6.7.4 Option Four 
This option is focused on non-involvement of courts in considering public policy 
issues. It suggests that, while allowing methods of medical treatment to be 
patented, precautions should be taken in eliminating involvement of the courts in 
deciding public policy matters, by giving this task to an independent advisory and 
policy making body. This option proposes an involvement of an agency for 
making public policy decisions. The Agency should be either a part of the 
Australian Government, a politically accountable institution to which the 
Government would delegate a power for policy-related decisions regarding 
patentability, or an independent body. 
One example of a suitable agency might be an Ethics Board to, which Australian 
Patent Office (APO) can refer all applications that raise public policy issues. 
Once an inventor makes a patent application to the APO, the APO would assess 
an alleged invention to determine whether it satisfies all the requirements of 
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patentability under s 18 of the 1990 Act, and, if necessary, refer it to the Ethics 
Board for public policy assessment. The Ethics Board then would make policy 
choices and resolve competing views as to whether the alleged invention is 
either 'generally inconvenient' (in the case if the 1990 Act remains unaltered), or 
against 'ordre public' and 'morality' (in the case if the 1990 Act includes provision 
containing these terms and does not provide their legal definition). 
In deciding whether a particular invention should be given patent protection, the 
Ethics Board should consider issues such as protection of the public health, 
promotion of competition, dissemination of medical information, protection of 
patients and support of medical practitioners, while recognizing the effort made 
by an inventor and respecting their rights to obtain a reward for contributions 
made to the mankind. 
The establishment and operation of such an agency is already a valid practice in 
the field of the tax law, where the Australian Tax Office is granted a policy-
making responsibilities and power to exercise the Commissioner's of Taxation 
discretion in dealing with certain tax matters. In exercising the discretion, the 
Commissioner of Taxation is guided by administrative law principles that provide 
that each decision must be made according to the merits of each case, taking 
into account the purpose and policy of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997.45 A 
taxpayer who is not satisfied with the legitimacy of the discretion can approach a 
tribunal or court to consider whether, in the process of exercising the discretion, 
the Commissioner either abused his power, denied the taxpayer of procedural 
fairness or erred in law in interpreting the tax legislation. 
It is proposed that the Australian Government should reconsider the scope of the 
APO's practice and instruct APO to seek approvals from the Ethics Board, when 
public policy issues are likely to arise. Similar to the practice of the Australian Tax 
Office, the Ethics Board might be given policy-making responsibilities (for 
example, the issuance of guidelines as to the scope of the public policy exclusion 
from patenting) as well as the power to exercise discretion under administrative 
law principles as to whether an alleged invention should be granted patent 
protection. A patentee who is not satisfied with the legitimacy of the discretion 
may appeal the decision of the Ethics Board to the court. However, the court 
would not consider issues of public policy, but only the legitimacy of the 
discretion exercised by the Ethics Board. 
45 The Taxation Ruling TR 98/12, paragraphs 17-20, 82, 87 and 91-93. 
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The above approach would force a reconsideration of the allocation of 
institutional authority between two institutional bodies — the legislature and 
judiciary. This would make a balance between judicial and administrative 
functions. Accordingly, when an issue becomes more political, it would be 
decided by politically responsible institution — the agency of the Government 
rather than the courts. 
6.7.5 Option Five 
Adopting the US approach in dealing with methods of medical treatment 
inventions, and bearing in mind that there should be freedom in the medical 
practitioner's choice of treatment, this proposal would allow medical treatment 
patents to be granted, but would require from the patent holder a disclaimer of 
any right to sue medical practitioners utilizing the patented invention for medical 
or surgical purposes. 46 Alternatively, a new provision might be included in the 
1990 Act, which would expressly exempt medical practitioners from liability for 
infringing a patent on a medical or surgical procedure in certain circumstances.'" 
However, as stated above, this approach would significantly devalue a patent 
given to the patent holder and thus, has the capacity to considerably discourage 
the incentive for medical research and development. 
46Perhaps the US Public Law 104-208, discussed in Chapter 3 could be used as guidance for such 
disclaimer. 
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